Міністерство освіти і науки України
Харківський національний університет імені В. Н. Каразіна
Філософський факультет
Кафедра теоретичної і практичної філософії імені професора Й. Б. Шада

РОБОЧА ПРОГРАМА ТА НАВЧАЛЬНО-МЕТОДИЧНИЙ КОМПЛЕКС

НАВЧАЛЬНОЇ ДИСЦИПЛІНИ

ФІЛОСОФІЯ
(англійською мовою)

рівень вищої освіти перший (бакалаврський)

галузь знань 03 гуманітарні науки

спеціальність 29 міжнародні відносини, 073 менеджмент

освітньо-професійна програма Право, Бізнес

спеціалізація

вид дисципліни обов'язкова

факультет юридичний, Каразінська бізнес школа

2024 / 2025 навчальний рік

Програму рекомендовано до затвердження Вченою радою
філософського факультету

“__21__” _____червня_____ 2024 року, протокол № 11

РОЗРОБНИКИ ПРОГРАМИ:

Наталія ЗАГУРСЬКА, доктор філософських наук, професор кафедри теоретичної і практичної філософії імені професора Й.Б. Шада

Програму схвалено на засіданні кафедри теоретичної і практичної філософії імені професора Й.Б. Шада

Протокол від “19” червня 2024 року № 15

Завідувач кафедри теоретичної і практичної філософії імені професора Й.Б. Шада

_____ Олег ПЕРЕПЕЛИЦЯ

Програму погоджено з гарантом освітньої програми:

Програму погоджено науково-методичною комісією філософського факультету

Протокол від “19”_____червня_____2024 року № 10

Голова науково-методичної комісії філософського факультету

_____ Сергій ГОЛІКОВ

The educational program of the discipline «**Philosophy**» is made according to the educational level of preparation for the first (bachelor's) degree.

Specialty (direction) 29 Public law, 073 Management

Educational program *Law, Business*

Specialization 082 International law, management

1. Description of the discipline

1.1. The aim of studying of the discipline

Studying philosophy develops abilities that are not only essential to almost any vocation, but instills qualities vital to one's growth as a person. Moreover, for many students such qualities quite often produce practical benefits as well. During the course of study, it is possible to master the heritage of the history of philosophy, to get acquainted with the main philosophical conceptions and approaches, and also to navigate in the diversity of contemporary philosophical trends.

1.2. The main tasks of studying the discipline

Studying philosophy not only provides general career preparation, but in many cases specific preparation as well. Here are just a few examples: the student pursuing medicine will benefit from studying bioethics, the student pursuing art, film, or music will benefit from studying aesthetics, of the philosophy of music, the student pursuing literature will benefit from studying the philosophy of literature, the student pursuing law, or political science will benefit from studying the philosophy of law, or political philosophy; the student pursuing business will benefit from studying business ethics, the student pursuing theology, or religion will benefit from studying the philosophy of religion, the student pursuing some arena of science will benefit from studying philosophy of science, the student pursuing computer science or engineering will benefit from studying logic and the student pursuing psychology will benefit from studying the philosophy of mind. *If you want to succeed in business, don't get an M. B. A. Study philosophy instead*. M. Stewart «The Management Myth».

The study of the discipline "Philosophy" is aimed at the formation of the following competencies in students of higher education:

General competencies:
– to think through a problem clearly,
– to communicate a solution effectively,
– to think, speak, and write clearly and critically,
– to communicate effectively,
– to form original, creative solutions to problems,
– to develop reasoned arguments for one's views,
– to appreciate views different from one's own,
– to analyze complex material,
– to investigate difficult questions in a systematic fashion.

Professional competencies:
– to manage information;
– to sort, compile and rank data;
– to evaluate information and to use it to solve problems;
– to locate information in many electronic and paper media;
– to use creative insight to guide information searches;

– to abstract concepts in order to summarize information;
– to focus on the big picture, to see the forest and the trees;
– to discern what is valuable from what is irrelevant.

1.3. Number of credits – 4

1.4. Total hours – 56

1.5. Features of the discipline	
Standard	
Full-time form	Part-time form
Year of preparation	
2-nd	0 h.
Term	
4-th	0 h.
Lectures	
32 h.	0 h.
Practical, seminar classes	
16 h.	0 h.
Laboratory classes	
0 h.	0 h.
Independent work	
72 h.	0 h.
Individual tasks	
0 h.	

1.6. Planned studying outcomes
Philosophy majors develop problem solving skills at a level of abstraction that cannot be achieved only through the case study or profession-specific approach favored in disciplines geared towards occupational training. People with strong abstract reasoning skills do better in applied fields, on average, than people who lack the ability to abstract from particular problem-situations.
Students should achieve the following learning outcomes:
Critical Thinking Skills:
– to think logically;
– to identify the key issues in a discussion;
– to assess the pros and cons of proposed solutions;
– to ask the right questions;
– to see beyond superficial categorizations (i. e., «to think outside the box»);
– to draw accurate conclusions from confusing data;
– to clarify purposes, principles, and general objectives;
– to differentiate fact from value.
 Problem-Solving Skills:
– to find creative solutions to hard problems;
– to define the parameters of a problem;
– to look at a problem from different angles and to identify alternative courses of action;
– to identify useful resource materials for solving a problem;
– to factor complex problems into solvable pieces.
 Argument Skills:
– to use argumentation techniques to persuade others;
– to assess the implications of a proposal.
Communication Skills:

– to express and to explain difficult ideas clearly and straightforwardly;
– to express one's point of view while respecting the views of others;
– to use a variety of tools and strategies to convey information.
Information Management:
– to sort, compile and rank data;
– to evaluate information and to use it to solve problems;
– to locate information in many electronic and paper media;
– to use creative insight to guide information searches;
– to abstract concepts in order to summarize information;
– to focus on the big picture, to see the forest and the trees;
– to discern what is valuable from what is irrelevant.

2. Topical plan of the discipline

SECTION 1. *General problems and history of philosophy*

TOPIC 1. *What is philosophy*
Philosophy as a love of wisdom. Different definitions of philosophy. The Value of Philosophy according to B. Russell. Philosophical methods. Philosophical argumentation.

TOPIC 2. *Divisions of Philosophy*
Natural, metaphysical and moral philosophy. Metaphysics as the philosophical study of reality nature. Ontology as the philosophical study of being. Epistemology is the study of knowledge. The main questions of metaphysics, ontology as the philosophical study of being and epistemology. Areas of current philosophy.

TOPIC 3. *Ancient Philosophy*
History of philosophy as a significant part of philosophy, as a history of answers and arguments about philosophical very questions. From myth to logos. Philosophy of elements. Pythagorean school. Sophists. Socratic Method. Gnoseology of Plato. Plato's metaphors of chariot and cave. The state according to Plato. Aristotelian metaphysics. Matter and form. Essentiality and accidentality. Teleology. Material, formal, efficient and final causes. Cynical philosophy of Antisthenes and Diogenes of Sinope. Epicurean atomism. Free will according to Epicurus. Stoicist alism. Logic of stoics. Skepticist suspending of judgement. The concept of ataraxia. Neoplatonic philosophy. Plotinus's influence on following philosophy.

TOPIC 4. *Rationalism*
Knowledge through reason. Mathematics as the paradigm example of knowledge. Cartesian skepticism. Epistemological project of providing systematic justification of knowledge. *Cogito Ergo Sum* or *I think, therefore I exist*. Dualistic Cartesian philosophy of mind. *The Passions of the Soul*. Monism of Benedict Spinoza. Infinite number attributes of the substance. Intellectual love. Determinism. Monadology of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. Psychical monad as a reflection of all creation. Plurality of substances.

TOPIC 5. *Empiricism*
Knowledge grounded in sense experience. Mind as a tabula rasa, a blank slate. Simple and complex ideas. Primary and secondary qualities. Liberty as a freedom from domination, but not freedom to do whatever one pleases. Property rights as natural extensions of a human liberty. Idealism on empiricist grounds by George Berkeley. Sense impressions as an appearances. Empiricist epistemology by David Hume. Impressions and ideas. The role of imagination. A priori and a posteriori reasoning. Skeptical Empiricism about a moral truths. Self as a bundle of experiences.

SECTION 2. *Particular problems of philosophy*

TOPIC 6. *Ethics*

Ethics about what we ought to do, what it would be best to do, how we ought to live, how we ought to treat others and how we ought to organize our communities. Good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, justice and crime. Right and wrong conduct. Moral epistemology. Descriptive and prescriptive ethics. Applied, normative ethics and meta-ethics. Ethical conventionalism, relativism, subjectivism and realism. Immanuel Kant about on intrinsic value. Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives. Formulations of Categorical Imperatives. Ethical monism and pluralism. Instrumental values are useful for me. Intrinsic values are useful to me.

TOPIC 7. *Philosophy of love*

Need, appetence, passion, love. Pragma is practical kind of love. The problem of sex-objectivation. Storge is obligative kind of love. Family affection. Mania is obsessive kind of love. Partner's personal space. Agape is selfless kind of love. Ludus is game kind of love. Love affair. Tokos is creative kind of love. Pteros is destructive kind of love. Eros is ideal kind of love. Erotic and sexuality. Philia is friendly kind of love. Actual conceptions of love.

TOPIC 8. *Philosophy of happiness*

Aristotle about a passive and an active happiness. Eudaimonia as living well and doing well. Happiness as telos. Happiness requires more than just a virtue. In Epicurus views happiness needs natural and necessary pleasures. Significance of good habits. Importance of wisdom (prudence) and friendship. According to Stoics happiness is achieved in accepting of fate. Concerning with things within our control according to Epictetus. According Utilitarists happiness as a pain and no pleasure from utilitarian point of view. To maximize overall happiness is an aim of John Stuart Mille. Happiness needs both instrumental and fundamental, intrinsic values.

TOPIC 9. *Philosophical anthropology*

Philosophical anthropology as a trend in German philosophy and a special discipline in philosophy. Human being as a loving being according to Scheler. Intersections of love, knowledge and values. Human being as a value-bearer. Rank of values according to Scheler. Value's (disvalue's) existence or non-existence. Basic moral tenor of the person. An order and disorder of the heart. Human beings as problems for themselves. Homo religious, homo sapiens, homo faber, homo dionysiacus, homo creator.

TOPIC 10. *Esthetics and philosophy of art*

Concept of beauty in a natural landscape, of a person or a human-made object. Whether beauty is in the eye of the beholder: objectivist, subjectivist and culturalist kinds of answers. The interrelation between beauty and higher metaphysical qualities, such as goodness, truth and unity. Beauty-goodness theory (kalokagatia). Beauty-goodness as a related purest form. Irrespective good and beauty in and of themselves. Concept of taste. The psychological faculty of taste enables to detect beauty within objects. Possibility to improve the taste. Esthetic and taste. The evolutionary origin of our human sense of beauty. Sense of beauty as an advantage of sexual selection. Intuitionism, imitationism, expressivism, formalism. Family resemblance and the institutional definition. Inaesthetics by Badiou.

TOPIC 11. *Feminist and gender philosophy*

Feminism is both an intellectual commitment and a political movement that seeks justice for women and the end of sexism in all forms. Feminist philosophy about women, their roles and locations. Beauvoir about becoming a wo/man. Denaturalizing of heteronormative sexuality. Woman's happiness and freedom. Neither alienation from sexuality nor risk for ideas/ideals. Subject and Other in erotics. An importance of Foucault's philosophy for a queer theories. Genealogical approach to identity in conceptions of sexuality. Gender studies as an interdisciplinary studies. Gender as a social and cultural construction. Gender Trouble according to Butler. Need of the gender lenses. Feminist contribution in philosophy.

TOPIC 12. *Philosophy of law and justice*

Relationship between law and morality, logics, politics, etc. Legal positivism vs. natural law. Hobbes' philosophy of law. Kantian and positivist conceptions of law. Kelsen about the basic norm. Hart between formalism and rule-scepticism. Dworkin about black-letter provisions. John Austin's version of legal positivism. Finnis's view on law as an expression of a deeper moral and political theory and a framework of institutions. Dworkin about constructive interpretation of law. The problem of legislation and the problem of adjudication according to Unger. Force of law according to Jacques Derrida.

TOPIC 13. *Environmental Philosophy, Bioethics and Esthetics*

Environmental philosophy as philosophy first of all the natural world. Environmental philosophy as an alternative to anthropocentric one. Ecojustice, political ecology, sustainable development ethics, ecofeminism, ethics and sense of place and so on. Animal rights. A biocentric ethics about respect to life. A plant as neither t a subject, no an inanimate object. Bioethics as inclusive ethics of biodiversity. Land ethic by Leopold. Serres about social contract and natural contracts. Deep ecology. Medical ethics, genet(h)ics, etc. as subsets of bioethics. Intuitionism by Wittgenstein and after. Speciesism.

TOPIC 14. *Postmodern Philosophy*

Ihab Hassan's table of modernism and postmodernism. Postmodern, postmodernism, postmodernity. Postmodern conditions according to Lyotard. What philosophy is according to Deleuze. Concept of the Concept. Simulacre by Deleuze and Baudrillard. Hyperreality. Critic of phallocentrism and deconstruction by Derrida. Suspension of philosophy from truth procedures, conditions: science (onthology) – joy – the matheme, politics – enthusiasm – ethics – political invention, art – pleasure – the poem, love – happiness – anthropology, psychoanalysis according to Badiou.

TOPIC 15. *Speculative realism and object-oriented ontology*

Speculative realism as post-Continental philosophy. Object-oriented ontology (OOO) about importance of things. The real beyond human experience. OOO by Harman and Levi Bryant. Transcendental materialism by Grant. Life itself according to Thacker. Transcendental nihilism by Brassier. Bryant's onticology. Hyperobjects according to Morton. Alien phenomenology by Bogost. Berry and Galloway's pancomputationalism and digital philosophy. Bennett's *Vibrant Matter*. Speculative naturalism by Niemoczynski.

3. Structure of the discipline

Section titles	Number of hours											
	full-time form						part-time form					
	in total	including					in total	including				
		l	p	lab.	ind.	i.w.		l	p	lab.	ind.	i. w.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13
Section 1. *General problems of philosophy*												
Total for section 1	50	12	6			32						
Section 2. *Particular problems of philosophy*												
Total for section 2	70	20	10			40						
In total	120	32	16			72						

4. Topics of the seminar (practical, laboratory) classes

№ n/o	The title of the topic	Number of hours
1	Metaphysics // The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.	4

2	Epistemology // The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.	4
3	Ethics; Bioethics, Genethics and Medical Ethics; Environmental Ethics; Business Ethics // The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.	4
4	Philosophy and Feminism // The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.	4
	In total	16

5. Tasks for independent work

№ n/o	Types, content of independent work	Number of hours
1	Elaboration of lecture materials	10
2	Preparation for seminar classes	26
3	Preparation for control works	8
4	Preparation for the exam	28
In total		**72**

6. Individual tasks

Individual deepening of knowledge from the course is offered through mastering the following test tasks:

1. The word «philosophy» derives from:
a) Latin, meaning «love of life»;
b) Greek, meaning «love of wisdom»;
c) Jewish, meaning «love of knowledge»;
d) Icelandic, meaning «love of fish».

2. Philosopher is
a) a lover of wisdom;
b) a husband of wisdom;
c) a magician;
d) a sage.

3. B. Russell argues that philosophy
a) frees human;
b) enslaves human;
c) consoles human;
d) supports human.

4. Philosophical methods include
a) questioning and critical discussion;
b) questioning and critical debates;
c) questioning and critical disapproval;
d) questioning and critical condemnation.

5. Metaphysical issues are concerned with
a) the nature of reality;
b) the nature of human being;
c) the nature of knowledge;
d) the nature of art.

6. Ontology is the philosophical study of
a) being;

b) human;
c) knowledge;
d) art.

7. Ontology is
a) the theory of existence (or being);
b) the theory of «ought»;
c) the theory of knowledge;
d) another name for the Socratic Method.

8. Epistemology is the study of
a) being;
b) human;
c) knowledge;
d) art.

9. The view that we can't have knowledge is called
a) skepticism;
b) stoicism;
c) cynicism;
d) atomism.

10. According to G. Deleuze, philosophy is the art of
a) creating concepts;
b) creating notions;
c) creating images;
d) destroying concepts.

11. According to A. Badiou philosophy is suspended from
a) truth procedures;
b) truth comprehension;
c) fallacy procedures;
d) lies procedures.

12. Water is the source of ultimate reality according to:
a) Thales;
b) Anaximander;
c) Anaximenes;
d) Heraclitus.

13. *Everything that is, is in a state of flux* is affirmed by
a) Thales;
b) Anaximander;
c) Anaximenes;
d) Heraclitus.

14. Heraclitus believed that
a) the world was made up of tiny «atoms»;
b) the world was made from water;
c) change has a form that underlies all reality;
d) there was an ultimate force ruling the universe.

15. Pythagoras brought philosophy closer to
a) mathematics;
b) biology;
c) logic;
d) law.

16. Knowledge often is defined by Plato as
a) any idea;
b) an idea about God or the supernatural;
c) justified true beliefs;
d) the foundations of self-consciousness.

17. Plato believed in the immortality of the
a) animals;
b) souls;
c) Gods;
d) spirits.

18. The Republic by Plato is about
a) an ideal society and government;
b) the Greek heroes;
c) the Greek gods' powers and symbols;
d) a war in Ancient Greece.

19. Aristotle's best-known idea is
a) parabolas;
b) The Golden Mean;
c) love;
d) the theory of forms.

20. Aristotle affirmed, that the goal of a life is
a) loneliness;
b) love;
c) happiness;
d) friendship.

21. *I would rather go mad than feel pleasure* spoke
a) Antisthenes;
b) Epicurus;
c) Zeno;
d) Plotinus.

22. *I am looking for a genuine man* spoke
a) Diogenes of Sinope;
b) Epicurus;
c) Zeno;
d) Plotinus.

23. Epicurus accepted
a) determinism;
b) ascetism;
c) atomism;
d) idealism.

24. Epicurus held, that happiness needs a
a) love;
b) loneliness;
c) friendship;
d) pleasure.

25. Zeno was a
a) voluntarist;
b) fatalist;
c) hedonist;
d) naturalist.

26. Stoics assert, that a fate is
a) aleatoric;
b) free;
c) changed;
d) fated.

27. Sceptics suggested
a) refuse judgment;

b) suspend judgement;
c) assert judgment;
d) all the above.

28. Skeptical suspending of judgment leads to
a) aristocracy;
b) ataraxy;
c) kalokagathia;
d) all the above.

29. Plotinus identified The One with the
a) Intellect;
b) Soul;
c) Beauty;
d) all the above.

30. Origin of Western philosophy is
a) Greek philosophy;
b) Slavic philosophy;
c) philosophy of Far East;
d) philosophy of Near East.

31. Rationalists claim that
a) beliefs cannot be justified;
b) knowledge comes through sense experience;
c) reason alone can be trusted to provide knowledge;
d) we should doubt everything.

32. *Cogito ergo sum means (I think, therefore I am)* is affirmed by
a) Descartes;
b) Spinoza;
c) Leibniz;
d) Hume.

33. Descartes was a
a) monist;
b) dualist;
c) physicalist;
d) idealist.

34. Descartes views on the physical world are
a) naturalism;
b) organicism;
c) mechanicism;
d) technicism.

35. Beliefs justified through the evidence is
a) rationalism;
b) empiricism;
c) materialism;
d) idealism.

36. The distinguishing of belief from knowledge is
a) the mind-body problem;
b) dualism;
c) double consciousness;
d) the method of doubt.

37. Spinoza was a
a) monist;
b) dualist;
c) physicalist;
d) idealist.

38. According to Spinoza perfect love is
a) physical;
b) sensual;
c) intellectual;
d) spiritual.

39. Method of Spinoza is
a) arithmetical;
b) geometrical;
c) algebraical;
d) differential.

40. Leibniz was a
a) monist;
b) dualist;
c) physicalist;
d) pluralist.

41. Monad is a notion, used by
a) Descartes;
b) Spinoza;
c) Leibniz;
d) Hume.

42. Pre-established harmony is a notion by
a) Descartes;
b) Spinoza;
c) Leibniz;
d) Hume.

43. Empiricists claim that
a) beliefs cannot be justified;
b) knowledge comes through sensual experience;
c) reason alone can be trusted to provide knowledge;
d) we should doubt everything.

44. According to Lock the mind starts off
a) as a tabula rasa, a blank slate;
b) as a curriculum vitae, a tracker;
c) as a terra incognita, an unknown land;
d) hic et nunc, here and now.

45. Lock asserts that a sense experience is a source of a
a) simple ideas;
b) complex ideas;
c) complicated ideas;
d) sophisticated ideas.

46. Lock's political views were
a) tyrannical;
b) authoritarian;
c) liberal;
d) democratic.

47. Political philosophy of Lock issues from
a) contest;
b) liberty;
c) love;
d) friendship.

48. Idealists claim that there is
a) physical substance underlying a sense impressions;

b) no physical substance underlying a sense impressions;
c) no spiritual substance underlying a sense impressions;
d) spiritual substance underlying a sense impressions.

49. Materialists claim that there is
a) physical substance underlying a sense impressions;
b) no physical substance underlying a sense impressions;
c) no spiritual substance underlying a sense impressions;
d) spiritual substance underlying a sense impressions.

50. Berkeley argued, that a sense impressions are
a) mere superstition;
b) mere prejudices;
c) mere beliefs;
d) mere appearances.

51. According to Berkeley in our absence things
a) appear;
b) disappear;
c) exist;
d) don't exist.

52. Hume distinguished impressions from ideas through
a) their vividness;
b) their vitality;
c) their livingness;
d) measuring tool.

53. Hume asserts that the imagination is guided by
a) association;
b) calculation;
c) presentation;
d) observation.

54. After Hume truths about the external world depend on
a) a priori reasoning;
b) hic et nunc reasoning;
c) a posteriori reasoning;
d) eternal reasoning.

55. According to Hume self is a
a) bundle of feelings;
b) bundle of experiences;
c) bundle of beliefs;
d) bundle of thoughts.

56. The philosophy of science is
a) the science of reality;
b) the science of the world;
c) the science of consciousness;
d) the science of science.

57. The Positivists employed
a) Empiricism;
b) Rationalism;
c) Spiritualism;
d) Metaphysics.

58. Most philosophy is verified as
a) true;
b) false;
c) both true and false;
d) neither true nor false.

59. According to Popper hypothesis must be
a) refutable;
b) falsifiable;
c) testable;
d) verifiable.

60. In Kuhn's view, the paradigm is a
a) parable;
b) framework;
c) explanation;
d) state of affairs.

61. Philosophers of mind research a
a) psychic;
b) thinking;
c) consciousness;
d) mental states.

62. Logical Behaviorism is based on
a) Empiricism;
b) Rationalism;
c) Idealism;
d) Spiritualism.

63. On the Brain State Identity Theory
a) the mind is parallel with the brain;
b) the mind is identical with the brain;
c) the mind is correspondent with the brain;
d) the mind communicates with the brain.

64. Functionalism is compatible with
a) Metaphysics;
b) Idealism;
c) Spiritualism;
d) Dualism.

65. Property Dualism is a theory of
a) Descartes;
b) Lock;
c) Hume;
d) Chalmers.

66. Ethics is a study of a
a) moral;
b) human;
c) knowledge;
d) art.

67. The specific ethical matters
a) are issues of applied ethics;
b) are issues of normative ethics;
c) are issues of meta-ethics;
d) aren't issues at all.

68. How things ought to be
a) is the issue of applied ethics;
b) is the issue of normative ethics;
c) is the issue of meta-ethics;
d) isn't the issue at all.

69. Fundamental ethical questions
a) are issues of applied ethics;

b) are issues of normative ethics;
c) are issues of meta-ethics;
d) aren't issues at all.

70. Ethical Realism implies that ethical truths
a) are made true by facts;
b) are made true by ideas;
c) are made true by conventions;
d) aren't, only subjective ethical sentiments.

71. Ethical Conventionalism implies that ethical truths
a) are made true by facts;
b) are made true by ideas;
c) are made true by conventions;
d) aren't, only subjective ethical sentiments.

72. Ethical Subjectivism implies that ethical truths
a) are made true by facts;
b) are made true by ideas;
c) are made true by conventions;
d) aren't, only subjective ethical sentiments.

73. Kant's moral theory is grounded on
a) relative value;
b) intrinsic value;
c) subjective value;
d) isn't grounded.

74. A hypothetical imperative suggests
a) respect for person;
b) respect for law;
c) achieving some goal;
d) nothing.

75. A categorical imperative suggests
a) respect for person;
b) respect for law;
c) achieving some goal;
d) nothing.

76. Ethical Monism is based on
a) a single value;
b) two kinds of values;
c) achieving some goal;
d) a plurality of values.

77. Ethical Dualism is based on
a) a single value;
b) two kinds of values;
c) achieving some goal;
d) a plurality of values.

78. Ethical Pluralism is based on
a) a single value;
b) two kinds of values;
c) achieving some goal;
d) a plurality of values.

79. Mania is
a) creative kind of love;
b) obsessive kind of love;
c) selfless kind of love;
d) practical kind of love.

80. Eros is
a) ideal kind of love;
b) destructive kind of love;
c) selfless kind of love;
d) practical kind of love.

81. Agape is
a) creative kind of love;
b) destructive kind of love;
c) selfless kind of love;
d) practical kind of love.

82. Ludus is
a) creative kind of love;
b) destructive kind of love;
c) selfless kind of love;
d) game kind of love.

83. Storge is
a) creative kind of love;
b) obligative kind of love;
c) selfless kind of love;
d) practical kind of love.

84. Pragma is
a) creative kind of love;
b) destructive kind of love;
c) selfless kind of love;
d) practical kind of love.

85. Tokos is
a) creative kind of love;
b) destructive kind of love;
c) selfless kind of love;
d) practical kind of love.

86. Pteros is
a) creative kind of love;
b) destructive kind of love;
c) selfless kind of love;
d) practical kind of love.

87. Philia is
a) creative kind of love;
b) destructive kind of love;
c) selfless kind of love;
d) friendly kind of love.

88. Instrumental values are useful
a) to me;
b) for me;
c) of me;
d) isn't useful.

89. Intrinsic values are useful
a) to me;
b) for me;
c) of me;
d) isn't useful.

90. Happiness needs
a) instrumental values;

b) fundamental values;
c) both instrumental and fundamental values;
d) needn't values.

91. It's preferable a happiness, which is
a) passive;
b) active;
c) quite;
d) spiritual.

92. Happiness requires
a) less than a virtue;
b) just a virtue;
c) more than just a virtue;
d) doesn't require anything.

93. In Epicurus views happiness needs
a) natural and necessary pleasures;
b) natural and unnecessary pleasures;
c) unnatural and unnecessary pleasures;
d) doesn't need anything.

94. According to Stoics happiness is achieved
a) in denial of fate;
b) in the rejection of fate;
c) in accepting fate;
d) unachievable.

95. Epictetus concerned with things
a) within our control;
b) out of our control;
c) which is uncontrolled;
d) doesn't concern with things.

96. According to Utilitarists happiness is
a) a pleasure and a pain;
b) a pleasure and no pain;
c) a pain and no pleasure;
d) doesn't exist.

97. To maximize overall happiness is an aim of
a) Aristotle;
b) Epicurus;
c) Epictetus;
d) John Stuart Mille.

98. Feminist philosophy
a) knowledge;
b) goodness;
c) beauty;
d) relationship.

99. Philosophical anthropology is a study of a
a) moral;
b) human;
c) knowledge;
d) art.

100. Esthetics is a study of a
a) moral;
b) human;
c) knowledge;
d) art.

7. Studying methods

The course program includes classroom (lecture and seminar) classes and independent work of students. Preliminary preparation is being done through entrance control, diagnostic testing, survey, acquaintance or repetition of terminology. The following methods are used when delivering the lecture material: presentational method, reproductive method, explanatory-illustrative method, method of problem delivering of the material, partial-search method. The following methods are used when conducting seminar classes: presentational method, reproductive method, explanatory-illustrative method, exercise method, search for answers to questions, discussion of cases. It is also possible to use training through observation of the phenomenon, questions-answers, questions for self-testing, discussions, debates, non-assessment tasks, watching films, interactive practical tasks.

8. Methods of control

Current control is carried out through the evaluation of students' knowledge in seminar classes, which provide for oral answers, performance of reproductive and creative tasks.

Self-monitoring during the semester through the completion of relevant tasks is also provided.

The final control is the assessment of credit work consisting of test tasks.

Exam question:
1. Philosophy: science or art?
2. Main trends in philosophy.
3. General features of contemporary philosophy.
4. Ontology.
5. Metaphisics.
6. Epistemology.
7. Ethics.
8. Bioethics.
9. A human in philosophy.
10. Contemporary trends of philosophical anthropology.
11. Esthetics and philosophy of art.
12. Gender as a subject of philosophical analyses.

Questions for self-control:
What is philosophy?
What can be done with philosophy?
Why study philosophy?
What is being?
What is the nature of reality?
Is the world strictly composed of matter?
Do people have free wills?
What is truth?
What is it for one event to cause another?
What is knowledge?
Do we know anything at all?
How do we know what we know?
Can we be justified in claiming to know certain things?
How do you know that you know the stuff you think you know?
What is good? What makes actions or people good?
What is right? What makes actions right?
Is morality objective or subjective?
How should I treat others?

What is a human?
What is a person? What makes a person the same through time?
Do people have minds? If so, how is the mind related to the body?
What is gender?

9. Scheme of scoring

Current control, independent work, individual tasks															Control work provided by the syllabus	Individual task	In total	Exam work	In total
Section 1				Section 2															
T1	T2	T3	T4	T5	T6	T7	T8	T9	T10	T11	T12	T13	T14	T15					
4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4			60	40	100

Evaluation criteria

Види навчальної роботи	Кількість балів
Section 1. *General problems and history of philosophy*	
Attending classes	**0**
Participation in seminar classes	**20**
In total for section	**20**
Section 2. *Particular problems of philosophy*	**0**
Attending classes	**0**
Participation in seminar classes	**30**
In total for section	**30**
Control work provided by the syllabus	**20**
Examination / assessment work	**40**
IN TOTAL	**100**

Scale of scoring

The sum of points for all types of educational activities during the term	The score for the exam	
	for a four-level rating scale	for a two-level rating scale
90–100	excellent	passed
70–89	good	
50–69	satisfactory	
1–49	poor	unpassed

10. Recommended literature

Basic literature

Monographies:

Russell B. A History of Western Philosophy and Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1972.

Russell B. The Problems of Philosophy. New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004.

The Philosophy Book (Big Ideas Simply Explained). London: Dorling Kindersley, 2011.

Manuals:

Blackburn S. Think: A Compelling Introduction to Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Craig E. Philosophy. A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Solomon R., Higgins K. The Big Questions: A Short Introduction to Philosophy. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2010.

The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.

Westphal J. Philosophical Propositions: An Introduction to Philosophy. London: Routledge, 2005.

Russ Pain W. An Introduction to Philosophy.
https://commons.bellevuecollege.edu/wrussellpayne/an-introduction-to-philosophy/

Teaching aids:

Stevenson Jay. The Complete Idiot's Guide to Philosophy. New York: Alpha, 2002.

Additional literature

Cathcart Th. The Trolley Problem. New York: Workman, 2013.

Cathcart Th., Klein D. Aristotle and an Aardvark Go to Washington: Understanding Political Doublespeak through Philosophy and Jokes. New York: Abrams Image, 2007.

Cathcart Th., Klein D. Heidegger and a Hippo Walk through Those Pearly Gates. New York: Penguin, 2009.

Cathcart Th., Klein D. I Think, Therefore I Draw: Understanding Philosophy Through Cartoons. New York: Penguin, 2018.

Cathcart Th., Klein D. Plato and a Platypus Walk into a Bar: Understanding Philosophy through Jokes. New York: Abrams Image, 2006.

Cohen Th. Jokes: Philosophical Thoughts on Joking Matters. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999.

Deleuze G., Guattari F. What Is Philosophy? London: Verso, 1994.

Klein D. The Travels with Epicurus. New York: Penguin, 2012.

Negarestani R. What Is Philosophy? Part One: Axioms and Programs. https://www.e-flux.com/journal/67/60702/what-is-philosophy-part-one-axioms-and-programs/

Negarestani R. What Is Philosophy? Part II: Programs and Realizabilities. https://www.e-flux.com/journal/69/60608/what-is-philosophy-part-two-programs-and-realizabilities/

11. Links to information resources on the Internet, video lectures, other methodological support

Basic

https://open.bccampus.ca/browse-our-collection/find-open-textbooks/?uuid=24d4160c-c8b2-4f3b-9d5c-7203c92b790b&contributor&keyword&subject

https://cdn.preterhuman.net/texts/thought_and_writing/philosophy/Honderich,%20Ted%20(ed.)%20-%20The%20Oxford%20Companion%20To%20Philosophy.pdf

https://svetlogike.files.wordpress.com/2014/02/the-blackwell-companion-to-philosophy-2ed-2002.pdf

https://transversalinflections.files.wordpress.com/2015/04/deleuze-3207-what_is_philosophy-fenomenologie-van-schilderkunst.pdf

http://www.ditext.com/russell/rus15.html

http://guides.lib.jmu.edu/philosophy

https://www.apaonline.org

https://www.philosophicalgourmet.com

https://plato.stanford.edu/contents.html

https://www.iep.utm.edu
http://legacy.earlham.edu/~peters/philinks.htm
http://www.philosophersnet.com
https://philosophynow.org
http://www.angelfire.com/ego/philosophyradio/
http://ota.ox.ac.uk/

Infographics, etc.
https://dailynous.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/mapofphilosophy.png
Map of Philosophy
http://coppelia.io/2012/06/graphing-the-history-of-philosophy/
Graphing the history of philosophy | Coppelia
https://existentialcomics.com/comic/250
A Brief History of Metaphysics – Existential Comics
http://www.jamesbowman.me/post/socratic-questions-revisited/
Socratic questions revisited
https://imgur.com/r/Stoicism/x2zZGlG
Twenty-First Century Stoicism
https://m.blog.naver.com/PostView.nhn?blogId=wei-jung&logNo=221383821357&proxyReferer=https:%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F
Dualism vs. Monism
https://pediaa.com/what-is-the-difference-between-hypothetical-and-categorical-imperative/
What is the Difference Between Hypothetical and Categorical Imperative
http://www.fengshuidana.com/2017/09/13/the-color-wheel-theory-of-love-can-illuminate-your-love-story/
The Color Wheel Theory of Love Can Illuminate Your Love Story!
http://www.scapegoatjournal.org/docs/09/TANAKA.pdf
From Love Letters by Maiko Tanaka
https://www.productiveflourishing.com/aristotle-the-good-life-and-gtd/
The 3 Key Ideas from Aristotle That Will Help You Flourish
https://www.businessinsider.in/9-of-historys-greatest-philosophers-reveal-the-secret-to-happiness/articleshow/52907620.cms
9 of greatest philosophers reveal the secret to happiness
https://blog.adioma.com/meaning-of-life-according-to-philosophy/
The Meaning of Life According to Different Philosophies
https://mappalicious.com/2016/02/03/fabulous-infographic-why-people-become-unhappy/
Why People become Unhappy
https://treehouseletter.com/2020/04/18/are-we-killing-the-fat-man-the-corona-trolley-dilemma/
Are We Killing the Fat Man? The Corona Trolley Dilemma
https://www.slideshare.net/auasdp/philosophical-anthropology
Philosophical Anthropology
https://csl4d.wordpress.com/2018/04/24/human-teleology-in-plessners-philosophical-anthropology/
Human teleology in Plessner's philosophical anthropology
https://prezi.com/u7ydkgfqgsvl/philosophy-of-man-philosophical-anthropology-0-introduction/
Philosophy of Man (Philosophical Anthropology)
https://slidetodoc.com/properties-of-art-the-categories-we-use-to/
Properties of Art. The categories we use to
https://www.theartstory.org/section-movements-timeline.htm
Modern Art Movements: 1870s to 1980s
https://artsandculture.google.com/experiment/sgF5ivv105ukhA
Play a Kandinsky

https://pangendering.tumblr.com/post/98779473546/gender-symbols
pangendering
https://www.vectorstock.com/royalty-free-vector/feminism-infographics-book-pages-vector-20560459
Body Positive Wave
https://prezi.com/3eun2zx-jzbx/natural-law-ethics/
Natural Law
https://prezi.com/desshuenwcgm/the-philosophy-of-law-hla-hart/
The Philosophy of Law: H.L.A. Hart
https://olafureliasson.net/archive/exhibition/EXH101069/the-weather-project#slideshow
Olafur Eliasson – The Weather Project
https://dsrny.com/project/blur-building
Blur Building – Diller Scofidio + Renfro
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-40355-7_1
Visceral Design: Sites of Intra-action at the Interstices of Waves and Particles
http://www.iaacblog.com/programs/discussion-object-oriented-ontology/
Discussion on Object Oriented Ontology and Architecture
https://www.artspace.com/magazine/interviews_features/the_big_idea/a-guide-to-object-oriented-ontology-art-53690
What Is Object-Oriented Ontology? A Quick-and-Dirty Guide to the Philosophical Movement Sweeping the Art World
http://online.pubhtml5.com/xkcj/gnmj/#p=1
IKEA OOO (Object Oriented Ontology)

Videos
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=giQ7655MqWM&ab_channel=Carneades.org
Why We Need Philosophy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LfduUFF_i1A&ab_channel=RosenzweigBenjamin
Monty Python Philosophy Football
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jLesc5lITvo&ab_channel=TED-Ed
Plato's best (and worst) ideas
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VDiyQub6vpw&ab_channel=TheSchoolofLife
Plato
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1RWOpQXTltA&ab_channel=TED-Ed
Plato's Allegory of the Cave
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Utzym1I_BiY&ab_channel=TED-Ed
The philosophy of cynicism
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kg_47J6sy3A&ab_channel=TheSchoolofLife
Epicurus
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R9OCA6UFE-0&ab_channel=TED-Ed
The philosophy of Stoicism
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFr4z1kvGBw&ab_channel=PhilosophiesforLife
Marcus Aurelius – 7 Things To Do In Your Evenings (Stoicism Evening Routine)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DsTWlKgXniw&ab_channel=ZoeHu
What is Skepticism?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EfqVnj-sgcc&list=PLVoPb02aUm_gFAGJGW_gE2tf7Xr95tKm4&index=15&ab_channel=TED-Ed
What is Zeno's Dichotomy Paradox?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAjWUrwvxs4&ab_channel=TheSchoolofLife
René Descartes
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pVEeXjPiw54&ab_channel=TheSchoolofLife
Baruch Spinoza

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=68bQ3qSl6jc&ab_channel=Strayer

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bZiWZJgJT7I&ab_channel=TheSchoolofLife

Political Theory – John Locke

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9iBryNYU49Y&ab_channel=BBCRadio4

George Berkeley – Esse est Percipi (To be is to be perceived)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HS52H_CqZLE&ab_channel=TheSchoolofLife

Philosophy – David Hume

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u399XmkjeXo&ab_channel=TheEthicsCentre

What is Ethics?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3_t4obUc51A&ab_channel=AcademyofIdeas

Introduction to Ethics

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i_4g-cNQD-c&list=PL32TobLoKLYrTk4TB4w-kuOf_dEEmAvOg&index=3&ab_channel=McCombsSchoolofBusiness

Moral Illusions Explained | Ethics Unwrapped

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nsgAsw4XGvU&ab_channel=TheSchoolofLife

Philosophy: Immanuel Kant

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5sY4rhvB9LE&list=PLVoPb02aUm_gFAGJGW_gE2tf7Xr95tKm4&index=25&ab_channel=TED-Ed

What is love? – Brad Troeger

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yJSiUm6jvI0&list=PLVoPb02aUm_gFAGJGW_gE2tf7Xr95tKm4&index=11&ab_channel=TED-Ed

Why do we love? A philosophical inquiry – Skye C. Cleary

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-FrZl22_79Q&ab_channel=McCombsSchoolofBusiness

Utilitarianism | Ethics Defined

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R9IM3ZKNMCk&ab_channel=BBCRadio4

The Harm Principle: How to live your life the way you want to

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UHwVyplU3Pg&ab_channel=TED-Ed

Who am I? A philosophical inquiry – Amy Adkins

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oocunV4JX4w&ab_channel=TheSchoolofLife

Who am I?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QZQyV9BB50E&ab_channel=GCFLearnFree.org

What is Art?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sn0bDD4gXrE&ab_channel=TheSchoolofLife

What is Art for?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HoXyw909Qu0&ab_channel=TED-Ed

Who decides what art means? – Hayley Levitt

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lpXZpUMXRo

What is Postmodern Aesthetics?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2e3khpPyMg4

Feminism is for Everybody: A Guide to bell hooks

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ws2Y2cWme8c&ab_channel=TED-Ed

The meaning of life according to Simone de Beauvoir – Iseult Gillespie

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBJTeNTZtGU&ab_channel=TheSchoolofLife

Michel Foucault

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SoFs0ws82SM&ab_channel=DebasmitaDas

Judith Butler's Theory of Gender Performativity

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BBaImG0sCD4&ab_channel=United4SocialChange

Legal vs. Moral: Written vs. Right

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9i4jb5XBX5s&ab_channel=TheSchoolofLife

Philosophy: Thomas Hobbes

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H0tnHr2dqTs&ab_channel=TheSchoolofLife

Philosophy: Jacques Derrida
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pQ33gAyhg2c&ab_channel=TheSchoolofLife
Philosophy: Ludwig Wittgenstein
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1RokWAuCkVw&ab_channel=justwondering...justwondering...

Animal & Disability Liberation – with Sunaura Taylor
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8l1kajxU9ho&ab_channel=justwondering...
Everything is equally weird – On Graham Harman's philosophy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U-sG4BKFC04&ab_channel=justwondering...
The end of endings - with Timothy Morton's philosophy
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hnOh_NccF8c&ab_channel=DamianMarhulets
Brilliant Darkness #4 // Ben Woodard + Damian Marhulets
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jk5gibBg-4g&ab_channel=RickGrunwald
Cricket Symphony a Wonder of Nature
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0wposQzs8_k&ab_channel=FutureHumanbyDesign
Object-Oriented Ontological Concepts for Post-Anthropocentric Design Research
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5kADmTk6ItE&ab_channel=RainWorld
Introduction to Nick Land / Accelerationism
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5VA7u2BADbA&ab_channel=BloombergQuicktake%3ANow

How Will Humanity Change After the Covid-19 Pandemic? (with Philosopher Reza Negarestani)

III. Abstracts of lections

TOPIC 1. *What is philosophy*

Literally, philosophy is a love of wisdom. The term was probably coined by Pythagoras. Philosophy is the study of general and fundamental questions about existence, truth, good, beauty, mind and so forth. In a broad sense, philosophy is an activity people undertake when they seek to understand fundamental truths about themselves, the world in which they live, and their relationships to the world and to each other. As an academic discipline philosophy is much the same. Those who study philosophy are perpetually engaged in asking, answering, and arguing for their answers to life's most basic questions.

W. Russ Payne (*An Introduction to Philosophy*) offers such a definition: philosophy is all of rational inquiry except for science.

Philosophy is the mother of all arts and the true medicine of the mind. Cicero M. T.

Let no one put off studying philosophy in his youth, and in his old age he does not get tired of doing philosophy: because no one is even immature, nor overripe for the health of the soul. Epicurus

Since philosophy is the art which teaches us how to live, and since children need to learn it as much as we do at other ages, why do we not instruct them in it? Montaigne M.

Philosophy is being nothing but the study of wisdom and truth. G. Berkeley

Philosophy is the science and criticism of cognition. I. Kant

The two main requirements for philosophizing are: firstly, to have the courage not to keep any questions back; and secondly, to attain a clear consciousness of anything that goes without saying so as to comprehend it as a problem. Schopenhauer A.

Philosophy is this tyrannical drive itself, the most spiritual will to power. The philosopher as we understand him, we free spirits – as the man of the most comprehensive responsibility who has the conscience for the over-all development of man. Nietzsche F.

Philosophy is the interpretation of the world in order to change it. The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it. Marx K.

Philosophy is concerned with everything as a universal science. Spencer H.

Philosophy is not a panacea (remedy for all kinds of diseases/troubles) for the problems of men, but is that which emerges out of the methods employed by them to solve their problems. Dewey J.

Philosophy is the unusually stubborn attempt to think clearly. Philosophy, beginning in wonder, is able to fancy everything different from what it is. It sees the familiar as if it were strange, and the strange as if it were familiar. It can take things up and lay them down again. Its mind is full of air that plays round every subject. James W.

Philosophy proper deals with matters of interest to the general educated public, and loses much of its value if only a few professionals can understand it. Russel B.

All philosophy is a 'critique of language'. Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. Wittgenstein L.

Philosophy is merely an elucidated experience. Merleau-Ponty M.

Philosophy always relates to tendencies and does not consist of statements of fact. It is a misunderstanding of philosophy, resulting from its growing closeness to all-powerful scientific tendencies, to take a statement at face value. Well, I would say that philosophical reflection really consists precisely in the gap, or, in Kantian terms, in the vibration between these two otherwise so flatly opposed possibilities. T. Adorno

Philosophy is clarification of very general structures of hypotheses. Habermas J.

Philosophy is an extraordinary enquiry into the extraordinary. Heidegger M.

What is philosophy after all? If not a means of reflecting on not so much what is true or false but on our relation to truth? How, given that relation to truth, should we act? Foucault M.

But can the same be said about the question 'What is the philosophical?'? This is the most and the least philosophical of all questions. We will have to take it into account. It is in all the institutional decisions: 'Who is a philosopher? What is a philosophy? What has the right to claim to be philosophical? How does one recognize a philosophical utterance, today and in general? By what sign (is it a sign?) does one recognize a philosophical thought, sentence, experience, or operation (say, that of teaching?) What does the word philosophical mean? Can we agree on the subject of the philosophical and of the very place from which these questions are formed and legitimated?' These questions are no doubt identical with philosophy itself. But in accordance with this essential unrest of philosophical identity, perhaps they are already no longer completely philosophical. Perhaps they stop short of the philosophy they interrogate, unless they carry beyond a philosophy that would no longer be their final destination. Derrida J.

Classic philosophical questions include: What is most real? Is it possible to know anything and to prove it? Philosophers also pose more practical and concrete questions such as: Is there a best way to live? Is it better to be just or unjust (if one can get away with it)? What is a human being? Do humans have free will?

B. Russell (Chapter 15 of *Problems of Philosophy,* The Value of Philosophy) argues that there is great value in doing philosophy precisely because it frustrates our desire for quick easy answers. In denying us easy answers to big questions and undermining complacent convictions, philosophy liberates us from narrow minded conventional thinking and opens our minds to new possibilities. Philosophy often provides an antidote to prejudice not by settling big questions, but by revealing just how hard it is to settle those questions. It can lead us to question our comfortably complacent conventional opinions.

He describes the intellectual consequences of the security blanket paradox vividly: «The man who has no tincture of philosophy goes through life imprisoned in the prejudices derived from common sense, from the habitual beliefs of his age or his nation, and from convictions which have grown up in his mind without the cooperation or consent of his deliberate reason. The life of the instinctive man is shut up within the circle of his private interests. In such a life there is something feverish and confined, in comparison with which the philosophic life is calm and free. The private world of instinctive interests is a small one, set in the midst of a great and powerful world which must, sooner or later, lay our private world in ruins». It removes the somewhat arrogant dogmatism of those who have never traveled into the region of liberating doubt, and it keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect. He does hold that some philosophical questions appear to be unanswerable. We can often rule out many potential answers. However, problems that looked unsolvable years ago often look quite solvable by current experts.

So, the study of philosophy involves not only forming one's own answers to such questions, but also seeking to understand the way in which people have answered such questions in the past.

Philosophical methods include questioning, critical discussion, rational argument, and systematic presentation.

Even where certain knowledge about a particular issue can't be had, there are often interesting things to learn about why we can't have certainty and what sorts of less-than-certain reasons there are for or against holding a position on that issue. Once we have formulated an argument, we want to evaluate the reasoning it offers and evaluate its quality. So, philosophers formulate and evaluate arguments. What often motivates the study of philosophy is not merely the answers or arguments themselves but whether or not the arguments are good and the answers are true.

Evaluating flawed arguments often points the way towards other arguments and the process of formulating, clarifying, and evaluating arguments continues. This method is known as dialectic. The goal of a debate is to win by persuading an audience that your position is right and your opponent's is wrong. Dialectic, on the other hand, is aimed at inquiry. The goal is to learn something new about the issue under discussion. Unlike in debate, in dialectic your sharpest critic is your best friend. Critical evaluation of your argument brings new evidence and reasoning to light. The person you disagree with on a philosophical issue is often the person you stand to learn the most from (and this doesn't necessarily depend on which of you is closer to the truth of the matter). Dialectic is sometimes referred to as the Socratic Method.

TOPIC 2. *Divisions of Philosophy*

The first historian of philosophy of the 3rd-century Diogenes Laërtius established the traditional division of philosophical inquiry into three parts:

Natural philosophy («physics» from *ta physika*, «things having to do with nature (*physis*)» was the study of the constitution and processes of transformation in the physical world. It has split into the various natural sciences, especially astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and cosmology.

Metaphysical philosophy («logic») was the study of existence, causation, God, logic, forms and other abstract objects («*meta ta physika*» lit: «After [the book] the Physics»). It has birthed formal sciences such as logic, mathematics and philosophy of science, but still includes epistemology and others.

Moral philosophy («ethics» from *êthika,* literally, «having to do with character, disposition, manners») was the study of goodness, right and wrong, justice and virtue. It has birthed the social sciences, but still includes value theory (including aesthetics, ethics, political philosophy, etc.).

Metaphysical issues are concerned with the nature of reality. At its core the study of metaphysics is the study of the nature of reality, of what exists in the world, what it is like, and how it is ordered. Traditional metaphysical issues include the existence of God and the nature of human free will (assuming we have any).

What is it? What is a thing? How are space and time related? Does the past exist? How about the future? How many dimensions does the world have? Are there any entities beyond physical objects (like numbers, properties, and relations)? If so, how are they related to physical objects?

Since the 19th century many philosophers and scientists have been understandably suspicious of metaphysics, and it has frequently been dismissed as a waste of time, or worse, as meaningless. Contemporary analytic metaphysics is typically taken to have more modest aims than definitively settling on the final and complete truth about the underlying nature of reality. It's rather about how various claims about the reality logically hang together or conflict and better understanding how things could or could not be. Metaphysicians are in the business of exploring the realm of possibility and necessity.

Ontology is the philosophical study of being. More broadly, it studies concepts that directly relate to being, in particular becoming, existence, reality, as well as the basic categories of being and their relations. Traditionally listed as a part of the major branch of philosophy known as metaphysics, ontology often deals with questions concerning what entities exist or may be said to exist and how such entities may be grouped, related within a hierarchy, and subdivided according to similarities and differences.

Epistemology (Greek ἐπιστήμη – knowledge, cognition, science) study the nature and grounds of knowledge and its limits and validity. It is primarily concerned with what we can know about the world and how we can know it. Epistemology is concerned with the nature of knowledge and justified belief.

Even if we can't have certain knowledge of anything (or much), questions about what we ought to believe remain relevant.

Whether knowledge is really possible? How do we know? What is truth? Is knowledge justified true belief? Are any beliefs justified? What is knowledge? Can we have any knowledge at all? Can we have knowledge about the laws of nature, the laws or morality, or the existence of other minds?

Such a knowledge includes propositional knowledge (knowledge that something is the case), know-how (knowledge of how to do something) and acquaintance (familiarity with someone or something).

The view that we can't have knowledge is called skepticism. Many people are not skeptics about scientific knowledge, but are skeptics when it comes to knowledge of morality. Even if we lack absolute and certain knowledge of many things, our beliefs about those things might yet be more or less reasonable or more or less likely to be true given the limited evidence we have.

What is it for a claim to be true? The ordinary notion of truth would have it that a claim is true if the world is the way the claim says it is. When we make a claim, we represent some part of the world as being a certain way. If how my claim represents the world fits with the way the world is, then my claim is true. Truth, then, is correspondence, or good fit, between what we assert and the way things are. How do we determine that a claim is true? It isn't an epistemic issue. The truth of a claim is quite independent of how or whether we know it to be true.

A tempting pitfall in thinking about truth is to think that truth is somehow relative to meaning or open to interpretation. The truth of sentences, bits of language, is relative to meaning. But the relativity at issue here is linguistic convention. But our everyday notion of truth is not about linguistic convention any more than it is about knowledge or belief. Our notion of truth is fundamentally about the correspondence between *what is meant* by a sentence and the way the world is. Philosophers often refer to what is meant or expressed by a sentence as a *proposition*. While a sentence is a piece of language that has a meaning, the proposition it expresses is not itself a piece of language. Consider «Snow is white» and «Schnei ist wies». Being a non-linguistic thing, the proposition does not have a meaning. Rather the proposition is what is meant. For a bit of language to be open to interpretation is for us to be able to attach different meanings to it. But the meanings themselves are not open to further interpretation. And it is the proposition, what is meant by the sentence, that is the fundamental bearer of truth or falsity. A proposition is true when it represents things as they are and differs from sentence. Sentences, bits of language express propositions.

Truth, understood as correspondence between a claim (a proposition) and the way the world is, is not relative to meaning, knowledge, belief, or opinion. «Without doubt: philosophy should present the truth. But what is the truth, and what do we actually search for when we search for it? Let's just consider what we will not allow to count as truth: namely when things can be this way or equally well the other; for example, the multiplicity and variability of opinion. Thus, truth is absolute oneness and invariability of opinion. So that I can let go of the supplemental term 'opinion,' since it will take us too far afield, let me say that the essence of philosophy would consist in this: to trace all multiplicity (which presses itself upon us in the usual view of life) back to absolute oneness». Fichte J. G.

Moreover, many of the questions and issues in the various areas of philosophy overlap and, in some cases, even converge. Thus, philosophical questions arise in almost every discipline. This is why philosophy also encompasses such areas as: Philosophy of Law, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Mind, Political Philosophy, Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Feminism, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Literature, Philosophy of the Arts, Philosophy of Language.

TOPIC 3. *Ancient philosophy*

In the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, the early Ionian epic poet Homer offers a view of the world as under the influence of the Olympian gods. The Olympian gods were much like humans, capricious and willful. However, even in the early epic poems we find a moral outlook that is key to the scientific and philosophical frame of mind. The willingness to submit one's own opinions to rational scrutiny is essential to moving beyond the realm of myth and into the realm of philosophy and science.

The beginning of philosophy in ancient Greece is often given as 585 B. C., the year that the Milesian philosopher **Thales** predicted a solar eclipse. Nature of all matter, the originating principle of nature is a single material substance: water. His reason for thinking that water is fundamental is that of the four

recognized elements – earth, air, fire and water – only water can take the form of a solid, liquid, or a gas. According to Thales, earth is really water that is even more concentrated than ice and fire is really water that is more rarified than steam.

Heraclitus (544–484 B. C.) is best known for his doctrine of eternal flux according to which everything undergoes perpetual change. *One can never step in the same river twice*. The underlying substance of the world is fire or heat according to Heraclitus. This is the least stable of the elements and explains the transitoriness of all things. Everything is a kindling or extinguishing of fire. While everything is in a continual state of flux, this change is not without order. Heraclitus saw Logos or rational order as essential to the world. Changes are injustices, which by natural necessity are redressed in further changes. Heraclitus held ethical views worth noting as well. The good life involves understanding and accepting the necessity of strife and change. *Thinking [Philosophy?] is a sacred disease*.

Pythagoras (fl. 525–500 B. C.) traveled in Egypt where he learned astronomy and geometry. His thought represents a peculiar amalgam of hardnosed mathematical thinking and creative but rather superstition. Pythagoras held that all things consist of numbers. He saw mathematics as a purifier of the soul. Thinking about numbers takes one's attention off of particular things and elevates the mind to the realm of the eternal. Scientific thinking, on this view, is not so far from meditation. Pythagoras is responsible for the Pythagorean Theorem which tells us that the square of the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares of the remaining sides. He also discerned how points in space can define shapes, magnitudes, and forms: 1 point defines location, 2 points define a line, 3 points define a plane, 4 points define solid 3-dimensional objects. Pythagoras introduces the concept of form. The earlier Milesians only addressed the nature of matter, the stuff of the universe. Form implies limits. For Pythagoras, this is understandable in numerical terms. Number represents the application of limit (form) to the unlimited (matter).

Pythagoras led a cult that held some rather peculiar religious beliefs. There was the Dionysian religion, which sought spiritual purification and immortality through drunken carnal feasts and orgies. Pythagorean religious belief also aims at purification and immortality, but without the intoxication and sex. Pythagoras founded a religious society based on the following precepts: that at its deepest level, reality is mathematical in nature, that philosophy can be used for spiritual purification, that the soul can rise to union with the divine, that certain symbols have a mystical significance, that all brothers of the order should observe strict loyalty and secrecy. Members of the inner circle were strict communist vegetarians. They were also not allowed to eat beans.

In this situation, it is easy to see how many might grow impatient with natural philosophy and adopt the skeptical view that reason simply cannot reveal truths beyond our immediate experience. But reason might still have practical value in that it allows the skilled arguer to advance his interests. The Sophists were the first professional educators. For a fee, they taught students how to argue for the practical purpose of persuading others and winning their way. They were less concerned with inquiry and discovery than with persuasion. Social and moral issues come to occupy the center of attention for the Sophists. Their tendency towards skepticism about the capacity of reason to reveal truth and their cosmopolitan circumstances, which exposed them to a broad range of social customs and codes, lead the Sophists to take a relativist stance on ethical matters. Plato derisively labeled the Sophists as *shopkeepers with spiritual wares*.

One of the better-known Sophists, **Protagoras** (481–411 B.C.), authored several books including, *Truth, or the Rejection* (the rejection of science and philosophy), which begins with his best-known quote, *man is the measure of all things, of those that are that they are, of those that are not that they are not*. Knowledge, for Protagoras is reducible to perception. Since different individuals perceive the same things in different ways, knowledge is relative to the knower. This is a classic expression of epistemic relativism. Among the Sophists, this skepticism is manifested in epistemic and Moral Relativism. Epistemic relativism is the view that there is no objective standard for evaluating the truth or likely truth of our beliefs. This is the view that what is true for me might not be true for you (when we are not just talking about ourselves). Epistemic relativism marks no distinction between knowledge, belief, or opinion on the one hand, and truth and reality on the other. For the Sophists, rational argument can only be fruitfully employed as rhetoric, the art of persuasion. For the epistemic relativist, the value of reason lies not in revealing the truth, but in

advancing one's interests. Accordingly, Protagoras rejects any objectively knowable morality and takes ethics and law to be conventional inventions of civilizations, binding only within societies and holding only relative to societies.

Socrates is widely regarded as the founder of philosophy and rational inquiry. But also, he held that philosophy is a daily activity. He was born around 470 B. C., and tried and executed in 399 B. C. Socrates did not write anything himself. We know of his views primarily through dialogues of Plato's, plays of Aristophanes and the historical writings of Xenophon. Socrates claimed to hear a divine inner voice he called his *daimon* and he was prone to go into catatonic states of concentration.

Socrates was not an epistemic or moral relativist. He pursued rational inquiry as a means of discovering the truth about ethical matters. But he did not advance any ethical doctrines or lay claim to any knowledge about ethical matters. Instead, his criticism of the Sophists and his contribution to philosophy and science came in the form of his method of inquiry. As the Socratic Method is portrayed in Plato's Socratic dialogues, interlocutor proposes a definition or analysis of some important concept, Socrates raises an objection or offers counter examples, then the interlocutor reformulates his position to handle the objection. Socrates raises a more refined objection. Further reformulations are offered, and so forth. Socrates uses the dialectic to discredit others' claims to knowledge. While revealing the ignorance of his interlocutors, Socrates also shows how to make progress towards more adequate understanding. Socrates finds that he is wisest because he recognizes his own lack of knowledge while others think they know, but do not. We tend to be content with our opinions and we rather like it when others affirm this contentment by agreeing with us, deferring to our claims to know or at least by «respecting our opinion» (whatever that is supposed to mean).

Plato (429–347 B. C.) has a taste for every sort of knowledge and who is curious to learn and is never satisfied may be justly termed as a philosopher. Philosophy is the acquisition of knowledge.

Metaphysics and epistemology are best summarized by his device of the divided line. The vertical line between the columns below distinguishes reality and knowledge. It is divided into levels that identify what in reality corresponds with specific modes of thought.

Objects – Modes of Thought
The Forms – Knowledge
Mathematical objects – Thinking
Particular things – Belief /Opinion
Images – Imaging

Corresponding to these degrees of knowledge we have degrees of reality. The less real includes the physical world, and even less real, our representations of it in art. According to Plato, the only objects of knowledge are the forms which are abstract entities. The forms do not exist in space and time. They are ideals in the sense that a form, say the form of horse-ness, is the template or paradigm of being a horse. All the physical horses partake of the form of horse-ness, but exemplify it only to partial and varying degrees of perfection. No actual triangular object is perfectly triangular, for instance. But all actual triangles have something in common, triangularity. Perfectly triangularity is the form of triangularity. Beautiful physical things all partake of the form of beauty to some degree or another. Perfect beauty is not something we can picture or imagine. An ideal form of beauty is required to account for how beautiful things are similar. Only opinion can be had regarding the constantly changing physical things, events, and states of affairs we are acquainted with through our sensory experience.

Plato offers us a tripartite account of the soul. The soul consists of a rational thinking element, a motivating willful element, and a desire-generating appetitive element. The knowledge of the forms is a kind of remembrance. The soul is like a chariot drawn by two horses, one obedient, the other rebellious and also the charioteer as the rational element of the soul. To each of the elements of the soul, there corresponds a virtue; for the rational element there is wisdom, for the willing element of the soul there is courage, and for the appetitive element there is temperance. Temperance is matter of having your appetites under control. Temperance and courage are cultivated through habit. In guiding our appetites by cultivating good habits, Plato held, we can come to desire what is really good for us. Wisdom is acquired through teaching, via the dialectic, or through remembrance. Perhaps, to make the epistemological point a little less metaphysically loaded, we can think of remembrance as insight and intuition. A more general virtue of justice is conceived

as each thing harmoniously functioning as it should. The charioteer is keeping both horses running in the intended direction and at the intended speed. In the virtuous state, the rational element (the philosophers) is in charge. The willing element (the guardians or the military class) is obedient and courageous in carrying out the policies of the rational leadership. And the appetitive element (the profit-driven business class) functions within the rules and constraints devised by the rational element (for instance, by honestly adhering to standards of accounting). A temperate business class has the profit motive guided by the interests of the community via regulation devised by the most rational. The virtuous business class refrains from making its comfort and indulgence the over-riding concern of the state. Plato, in other words, would be no fan of the market economy.

Plato's vision of social justice is non-egalitarian and anti-democratic. While his view would not be popular today, it is still worthwhile to consider his criticism of democracy and rule by the people. Plato has Socrates address this dialectically by asking a series of questions about who we would want to take on various jobs. Suppose we had grain and wanted it processed into flour. We would not go to the cobbler or the horse trainer for this, we'd go to the miller. Suppose we had a horse in need of training. We obviously would not go to the miller or the baker for this important task, we'd go to the horse trainer. In general, we want important functions to be carried out by the people with the expertise or wisdom to do them well. Now suppose we had a state to run. Obviously, we would not want to turn this important task over to the miller, the cobbler, or the horse trainer. We'd want someone who knows what he or she is doing in charge. Plato has a healthy regard for expertise. As Plato sees it, democracy amounts to turning over the ethically most important jobs to the people who have the least expertise and wisdom in this area. There is very little reason to expect that a state run by cobblers, millers, and horse trainers will be a virtuous state. Philosophy is a science which discovers the real nature of supernatural elements.

Aristotle was a student of Plato, but he rejected Plato's other-worldly theory of forms in favor of the view that things are a composite of substance and form. His metaphysics is decidedly anti-Platonist. The material of the world takes various forms. Here it constitutes a tree and there a rock. The things constituted of matter have various properties. The tree is a certain shape and height, the rock has a certain mass. Aristotle's forms are themselves part of the physical spatio-temporal world. It might thus be tempting to think of Aristotle as a materialist, but his account of the nature of things includes more than just matter. Aristotle held the view that form is an integral part of things in the physical world. A thing like a rock or a tree is a composite of both matter and form. In addition to matter, the way matter *is* gets included in Aristotle's metaphysics.

Among the ways things are, some seem to be more central to their being what they are than others. For instance, a tree can be pruned into a different shapes without the tree being destroyed. The tree can survive the loss of its shape. But if it ceased to be a plant, if it got chipped and mulched, for instance, it would also cease to be a tree. That is to say, being a plant is *essential* to the tree, but having a certain shape isn't. An essential property is just a property a thing could not survive losing. By contrast, a property something could survive losing is had *accidentally*. Aristotle introduces the distinction between essential and accidental characteristics of things. When we set out to give an account of what a thing is, we are after an account of its essence. To say what a thing is essentially is to list those ways of being it could not survive the loss of. My hair length is not essential to me, but my having a mind is essential to being me.

How a thing functions is a critical aspect of its nature in Aristotle's view. As an organism, I metabolize. As an organism with a mind, I think. These are both ways of functioning. For Aristotle, what makes something what it is, its essence, is generally to be understood in terms of how it functions. Aristotle's account of the essential nature of the human being, for instance, is that humans are rational animals. That is, we are the animals that function in rational ways.

Functioning is purposeful, ends and a goal, *telos* oriented. Aristotle has a *teleological* view of the world. That is, he understands things as functioning towards ends or goals, and we can understand the essence of things in terms of these goal-oriented ways of functioning. We still understand people's actions as teleological or goal oriented. We explain why people do things in terms of their purposes and methods. Aristotle similarly understands natural processes generally as ends oriented. Even Aristotle's physics is fundamentally teleological. So, water runs downhill because it is part of its essential nature to seek out the lower place.

According to Aristotle, to explain something involves addressing *four causes, things because of which*. Part of explaining something involves identifying the material of which it is made. This is the *material cause*. Thales account of the nature of the world addressed its material cause. A further part of explaining something is to give an account of its form, its shape and structure. A complete explanation of what this chair is would include a description of its form. This is the *formal cause.* Pythagoras and Plato introduce the explanation of formal causes. The idea of a *final cause* refers to the function, end, or telos of a thing. The chair is a comfortable place to sit. Aristotle sees final causes as pervasive in the natural world. A complete biological account of an organism includes both its anatomy (its material and formal causes) and physiology (which involves functioning and final causes). The remaining cause (explanatory principle) is the one we can identify as a kind of cause in our normal sense of the word. The *efficient cause* of a thing is that which brings it into existence or gives form to its material. So, for instance, the activity of a carpenter is the efficient cause of my chair.

Cynicism emphasized denying established conventions and following one's natural inclinations. Cynic philosophers taught through deliberately shocking speech and action, thereby conveying their condemnation of traditional social values such as wealth, reputation, pleasure, property, family duties, and religion. **Antisthenes** studied under Socrates and was inspired by the content of Socrates' teachings and his dialectic method, Antisthenes was attracted to his *art of enduring, and of being indifferent to external circumstances*, that is, an independent way of living. Antisthenes was an ascetic and spoke *I would rather go mad than feel pleasure*.

Antisthenes' most famous pupil **Diogenes the Dog** of Sinope. He lived as a beggar in the streets of Athens, sometimes residing in a barrel and contempted for luxury. The name «cynicism» itself derives from the Greek word for «dog». Diogenes was a vagabond, just like a stray dog. One time at a banquet some of the guests threw him bones, as if he was a dog; he responded by lifting his leg and urinating on them just as a dog would. He lived freely according to the principles of nature and ignored subjects like music, geometry and astronomy, holding them to be useless and unnecessary. Someone once criticized him for philosophizing without possessing any knowledge; he responded, *If I only pretend to wisdom, that is philosophizing*. The most famous story about him is that he walked around during the daytime with a lit candle saying *I am looking for a genuine man*. His point was that few people lived as they should, try as we might to find them. Paradoxically, people get a sense of pleasure from ascetic lifestyles and in their contempt for pleasure. For, just as people who live in luxury grow accustom to it and resist losing it. Diogenes was sunbathing and Alexander the Great told him to ask any favor and Diogenes then requested that Alexander step to the side since he was blocking the sun.

The founder and namesake of the Epicurean school was **Epicurus**, who adapted the Atomistic views of Democritus and held that happiness is achieved through pleasure. He established his school *The Garden*, which accepted women in. Epicurus did not allow his followers to communally own their property, since he believed this showed a distrust of one another. His philosophy sought tranquility first of all through simple living. Epicurus held that happiness closely connects with pleasure.

The atoms are in a continual state of motion. Among the atoms, some are separated by great distances, others come very near to one another in the formation of combined bodies, or at times are enveloped by others which are combining. But in this latter case they, nevertheless, preserve their own peculiar motion, thanks to the nature of the vacuum, which separates the one from the other, and yet offers them no resistance. The solidity which they possess causes them, while knocking against one another, to react the one upon the other. Eventually the repeated shocks bring on the dissolution of the combined body; and for all this there is no external cause, the atoms and the vacuum being the only causes. Atoms need to deviate at least a little when they fall, which allows them to make contact with other atoms. If they did not slightly swerve, they would all fall down and there is nothing in the nature. The swerve occurs without any cause. This claim drew criticism. The general idea gains more sympathy today in view of the contemporary theory of indeterminacy in quantum physics (electrons do not have determinate positions and movements). Since humans are composed entirely of physical atoms, then all of our actions are determined according to physical laws. Free will is the result of the slight swerve. Image-particles fly off objects, but keep their qualities and in such way perception occurs.

Stoicism (from Greek *stoa* – porch) held that the cosmos is governed by an over-arching fatalistic law, and we best achieve happiness when we resign ourselves to fate. **Zeno** lived almost ascetic life. A famous story of Zeno relates that he once whipped a slave for stealing; the slave said it was his destiny to steal, and Zeno said it was also his destiny to be whipped. According to Stoicism, there is a consistency between the destiny that is fated for us and justice for how we behave. Fate is the connecting cause of existing things, or the reason according to which the world is regulated. The most prominent feature of physics is their notion of fate: everything in the world is determined according to the principle of divine law. They variously describe their notion of fate as God, fire, destiny, and, perhaps most significantly, *logos*, the Greek term for «order». Stoics take the opposite to Aristotle view: one of two possibilities is indeed true right now, before it ever happens, even though we don't yet know which one. This position is the *law of bivalence*. But the state of affairs indicated in that proposition is fated long before it occurs. Stoics created the foundational to computer programming logic.

Skepticism emphasized doubting everything, specifically as a means of becoming tranquil and happy. **Pyrrho** claimed that we should suspend judgment on every matter. The starting point is recognizing that there are always two or more conflicting ways of perceiving anything. Ataraxy opposes to debates between people and in a human mind. For any so-called truth that you pick, there are different and conflicting ways of viewing it.

By balancing reasons that are opposed to each other, we first reach the state of suspension of judgment, and afterwards that of tranquility. **Sextus Empiricus** arguments or points are: (1) the method based upon the differences in animals; (2) that upon the differences in people; (3) that upon the difference in the constitution of the organs of sense; (4) that upon differing circumstances; (5) that upon differing position, distance, and place; (6) that upon differing mixtures; (7) that upon differing quantity and constitution of objects; (8) that upon differing relations; (9) that upon differing frequency or rarity of occurrences; (10) that upon differing systems, customs, laws, mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions. All value judgments of religion and morality are creations of human culture.

Skepticism's assertions are inconsistent and self-contradictory. But the Skeptics use reason as an instrument, not dogmatically, but demonstratively. Thus, the entire «theory» of skepticism is a tool to refute dogmatic assertions of truth on its own grounds, and it does not attempt to establish any indubitable claim about skepticism itself. Besides, their very behavior is an assertion of truths that we all accept. Sextus argued that the day-to-day life of the skeptic observes normal appearances in four ways: (1) the guidance of nature in what we perceive and think, (2) the necessity of feelings such as hunger and thirst, (3) the tradition of laws and of customs regarding right and wrong conduct, and (4) the teaching of skills such as our jobs would require. *We confess that we see, and we are aware that we comprehend that such a thing is the fact, but we do not know how we see, or how we comprehend. We assert what is actually the fact, but we do not describe its character. Again, we feel that fire burns, but we suspend our judgment as to whether it has a burning nature.* From the sceptic position it's better to speak *It looks like, Seems to me* that *It's so*.

Plotinus held that there is the One, a single source of all reality from which every existing thing, hypostasis (underlying reality) emanates, like light rays emitted from the sun. The One is pure being and from it radiates all the levels of reality, with those closest to the One being most perfect, and those furthest away the least perfect. Beyond that is simply non-being, sort of like absolute darkness. Everything that exists, then, lies somewhere on a spectrum between the pure being of the One at one extreme, and non-being at the other extreme.

The One is pure undifferentiated unity and the cause of everything. Because of its pure and indivisible nature, however, it is impossible to directly describe it with words. While we can give no concrete description of the One, we still have some limited understanding of it that we can put into words. By saying enough about what it is not, we may indirectly arrive at an idea of what it is. Later philosophers refer to such a description of the divine as the way of negation.

The Intellect has separate parts to it such as the Forms, unlike the One which has no parts. The Intellect thinks about the Forms, thereby giving a logical organization to all reality which relies on these abstract truths. The divine Soul in its more obscured state desires the perfect Forms that it does not possess and produces particular things that copy the Forms. The material world is the very last level of reality just before non-being. Evil simply is the absence of good, just as darkness is the absence of light.

Where do human beings fit into this grand divine scheme of the cosmos? According to Plotinus, there are two parts to the human soul, a higher and a lower. The higher part of my soul resides within the divine Intellect and has direct awareness of the perfect Forms. However, the lower part is trapped within my body in the material world, and strives to be released from it. We will have no experience of our individual selves and be in a state of tranquility and ecstasy. *Anyone that has seen the Good, knows what I mean when I say that it is beautiful. Even the desire of it is to be desired as a good. When you see that you have become this, then you have become sight. What is beyond the Intellect we affirm to be the nature of Good radiating Beauty before it.*

When we speak of the philosophical tradition of Western civilization, it is largely in reference to Greek theories. Plotinus's philosophy was the only one that was widely embraced by Christian philosophers. Augustine Aurelius under the influence of Plato, formulates much of what will become orthodox Catholic doctrine. Aristotle's thought survived in the Islamic world. Thomas Aquinas found ways to use Aristotle's metaphysical arguments in the cause of advocating the existence of a Christian God. Aristotle's physics becomes the standard scientific view about the natural world in Europe.

TOPIC 4. *Rationalism*

According to Rationalism at least some knowledge can be had through reason alone, through the light of reason. The paradigm example of knowledge is mathematics, no experience is required to be justified in accepting truth.

René Descartes was also an important mathematician and he made significant contributions to the science of optics. He wants to find a firm foundation on which certain knowledge can be built and doubts can be put to rest. So, he proposes to question any belief. He goes through all of his beliefs, not individually but by categories. Cartesian skepticism is philosophy of the suspicion. In his *Meditations of First Philosophy* Descartes wrote that to ask *How do we know?* is to ask for reasons that justify our belief in the things we think we know. It is a classic example of the epistemological project of providing systematic justification for the things we take ourselves to know. This project carries with it the significant risk as the problem of skepticism.

Even an evil deceiver could not deceive Descartes about his belief that he thinks. At least this belief is completely immune from doubt, because Descartes would have to be thinking in order for the evil deceiver to deceive him. We form the belief that I am having a visual experience of anything. This belief about the content of my sense experience may yet be indubitable. Our beliefs about the contents of our own mind couldn't be wrong about these because we have immediate access to them. One of the more famous arguments in philosophy *Cogito Ergo Sum* or *I think, therefore I exist*.

Descartes' philosophy of mind is dualistic: the world is made up of two fundamentally different kinds of substance, matter and spirit (or mind). I can doubt the existence of my body but I can't doubt the existence of my mind. Mind and matter interact problematically. The body is a physical object that exists in space and time and is subject to the deterministic laws of nature. The mind, being spiritual in nature, exists eternally in an abstract realm rather than existing in the physical realm of space and time. Further, the mind is not bound by mechanistic laws of nature, but it has free will that allows it to will or not will to do one thing or another. The natural world as functioning like a predictable clockwork mechanism was on the rise. But spiritual things, minds, are immaterial, exist eternally, and have free will.

The critical faults in Descartes' view were quickly spotted by Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia. If mind and body are so completely different, it is hard to see how can have any influence on each other at all. How does something that exists outside of space and time have any influence over the body that exists in space and time? How can the behavior of my causally determined body be influenced by a freely willing mind?

In *The Passions of the Soul* Descartes discussed belief that the human body contained animal spirits. These animal spirits were believed to be light and roaming fluids circulating rapidly around the nervous system between the brain and the muscles, and served as a metaphor for feelings, like being in high or bad spirit. These animal spirits were believed to affect the human soul, or passions of the soul. Descartes distinguished six basic passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness. All of these passions represented different combinations of the original spirit, and influenced the soul to will or want certain

actions. For example, that fear is a passion that moves the soul to generate a response in the body. Pineal gland is a connector between the soul and the body. Descartes argued that signals passed from the ear and the eye to the pineal gland, through animal spirits. Thus, different motions in the gland cause various animal spirits. They could have a useful effect to people behavior, but could distort the commands from the pineal gland, thus humans had to learn how to control their passions. These views became a ground to reflex theory. He argued that external motions, such as touch and sound, reach the endings of the nerves and affect the animal spirits. Heat from fire affects a spot on the skin and sets in motion a chain of reactions, with the animal spirits reaching the brain through the central nervous system, and in turn, animal spirits are sent back to the muscles to move the hand away from the fire. Through this chain of reactions, the automatic reactions of the body do not require a thought process.

Descartes was among the first scientists who believed that the soul should be subject to scientific investigation. His writings went on to form the basis for theories on emotions and how cognitive evaluations were translated into affective processes. Descartes believed that the brain resembled a working machine and mathematics and mechanics could explain the most complicated processes of the mind. In the 20th century, Alan Turing advanced computer science based on mathematical biology and physiologist Ivan Pavlov was inspired by Descartes. Today, the philosophy of mind is merging with neuroscience, cognitive psychology, and information science.

Benedict Spinoza was seeking metaphysical foundations of knowledge. The world is intelligible, that its nature can be understood rationally. *Ethics* is written in a geometric style. He begins with a few definitions and axioms and the work proceeds by deductively proving an impressive array of further propositions. The propositions derived from his initial definitions give an account of God, the natural world (these turn out to be the same thing), the self, the nature of human freedom, the nature of the emotions, and the nature of the good life in-so-far as it is attainable for beings like ourselves. Any kind of mind-body interaction will perforce involve mutual limitations on each. If through a mental act of will I cause some change in the material realm, then the material realm is limited in that it can't be other than I have willed it. Likewise, if the material world has some effect on my mind, then my mind is similarly limited. The only way that any substance could be absolutely unlimited is for there to be no other substances that could possibly limit it. So, there is only one substance and it is both God and nature. Every facet of the world is a mere part of this one substance, God/nature. And everything we do and experience is a limited manifestation of the essence of God. Every aspect of our lives, everything we think and do, is an expression of God/nature's essence which is uncaused and necessary. For this reason, nothing we do or experience could possibly be any different. This settles the matter of free will, though not quite it the way Descartes would hope.

Our perception of the world as including many distinct things and minds other than our own is a confusion of ours or an inadequate idea. The true nature of the world is singular. God/nature being the one existing substance is self-sufficient. Since it depends on nothing and is affected by nothing, everything about God/nature is necessary. God/nature, being infinite and perfect in all respects, has an infinite number of aspects, or attributes. Our existence as human beings present us with only two of these, the attribute of thought and the attribution of extension (physical spatio-temporal existence). Spinoza identifies God with all of nature and denies that people have any existence distinct from God/nature. God is not personal on this view. God/nature is really nothing like us at all.

The mind and the body are really one and the same or the mind is the idea of the body. We are limited modification of God/nature. One of the ways we are limited is in only being aware of two of the infinite attributes of God, thought and extension. The idea that the mind and the body are different and interact is a confusion of ours that we suffer due to thinking of ourselves sometimes under one attribute, thought, and at other times under another, extension. Mind and body are one and the same limited modification of God, it can be understood on one hand through the attribute of thought and on the other through the attribute of extension.

We are finite an imperfect modes of the attributes of thought and extension. As such limited and imperfect beings, we see ourselves as separate from many other things. Being ignorant of the causes of things, including the determination of our own wills, we imagine that things might have been otherwise. But everything happens of necessity. Spinoza denies that we have free will. Living well, according to

Spinoza, involves coming to terms with our limitations and the way things must be as a matter of necessity. And the way to do this is through better understanding ourselves, the world (God/nature) and our position in the world. The good life, for Spinoza, is one organized around the intellectual love of God/nature.

There is one kind of freedom that we might aspire to in all of this, and it is the kind of freedom that can be had through the intellectual love of God/nature. The freedom we can have been freedom from the tyranny of our passions, our emotions. Our hopes and fears are passions that make us anxious and insecure when we fail to understand their causes and our own place in nature. Intellectual love of God/nature, is the one therapy open to us in addressing the insecurity and anxiety that comes with human vulnerability and mortality. Knowledge of how to live one's life is established after the manner of a proving a theorem of geometry. Coming to understand his demonstration of how to live well will itself be an exercise in living well.

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz also was an important mathematician and with Newton vied for credit for discovering the calculus of infinitesimals. Leibniz was arguably the first to have imagined anything like information technology. Among his grand ambitions was to formulate a universal symbolic language for science and philosophy that would be rigorously rule driven and free of all ambiguity. He even got as far as constructing a calculating machine, though not a very reliable one. He was also politically active as an advisor to assorted rulers, aristocrats and tends to re-union of Christian church.

Leibniz' metaphysical views are the world to consist of monads. Each monad is simple and indivisible. But monads are not merely physical, like atoms. Each monad would include both a physical aspect and a mental aspect. Physical objects are made up of monads that are also minds, just particularly dim-witted ones. Monads appear to interact with each other. We seem to influence each other and make things happen in the physical world. But there is no actual interaction between monads. Instead, monads exist in a harmony that is pre-established by God. As a result, like an element in a spectral image or a droplet in a cloud, each monad carries in it a reflection of all creation.

Leibniz metaphysics solves mind/body problem neatly by making his substances, monads, have mind as an integral part. We needn't worry about mind-body interaction if mind and body are already unified.

Liebniz posits a plurality of substances. Monads fit the bill. In order to preserve free will Leibniz needs for the substances that are mind not to be causally determined by other substances. The pre-established harmony of monads is his means of achieving this. But while Leibniz thereby avoids causal determinism, he seems to be saddled with a kind of theological determinism instead. Everything that happens, including every choice you make, will have been determined by God.

TOPIC 5. *Empiricism*

Empiricism takes all of our knowledge to be ultimately grounded in sense experience. The empiricist philosophical tradition comes to fruition in Great Britain over the course of the 17th and 18th centuries.

John Locke develops his empiricist epistemology in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Locke's approach is to examine the origins of the contents of the mind. He argues against innate ideas. The mind starts off as a *tabula rasa*, a blank slate. All of our ideas have their origin in experience. Simple ideas, say of solidity and figure, are acquired through the senses, and from these we form complex ideas, say the idea of a dog, through the capacities of the understanding. Locke launched a research program for developing an empiricist account of the mind rather than spelling out a fully developed view.

Locke thinks that some of the impressions we get from sense experience are genuinely similar to how things are objectively in the world. Our sense experience of the shape of things, for instance, reflects the ways things really are. Locke refers to the qualities where there is a resemblance between our experience and the way things are as *primary qualities*. Shape, motion or rest, and number are a few of the primary qualities. Other aspects of our sense experience don't resemble the qualities in their objects. The taste of an apple, for instance, is not really in the apple. What is in the apple is just a power to produce the experience of a certain flavor. But we have no grounds for thinking that this power as it exists in the apple resembles in any way the sense experience we have of its taste. Locke calls qualities where our sense experience doesn't resemble the qualities that give rise to our experience *secondary qualities*. Our knowledge of the

external world, then, is based entirely on our experience of the primary qualities. Empiricism, as we will see in the case of later empiricists, especially Hume, tends to place sharp limits on what is knowable.

While all experience depends on having simple ideas had through sense experience, Locke does not take experience to be limited to these. We also have experience of the operations of the mind in building up complex ideas out of simple ideas. Once you have some simple ideas through sense experience, you also have an experience of yourself and of your mental operations on those simple ideas. So given simple ideas through experience, the operations of the mind become a source for further ideas. Locke thinks knowledge of the self, God, mathematics, and ethics can be derived from this additional internal source of experience. Hume, as we shall see, is not so optimistic.

Locke political thought was probably influenced significantly by Spinoza. Locke argued against the divine right of kings to rule and instead defended a liberal egalitarian political philosophy on which people have equal and natural rights to liberty. Liberty is being free from domination by others. Liberty is not being free to do whatever one pleases. For starters, if everyone is to be free from domination, then it follows that nobody is free to dominate. Locke also offers the classic justification for property rights as an extension of our self-ownership. So, property rights are seen as natural extensions of our human liberty. The point of government is just to secure our natural liberties to the highest degree possible as a night watchman. So, government is legitimate only when it is limited to this role. Thomas Jefferson was a close student of Locke's political thought.

Locke gave argument against the aristocracy and the alleged divine birth right of rulers. The authority of government is entirely derived from the consent of its free and equal citizens. According to Locke, in the state of nature (or in the absence of government) people exist in a state of perfect freedom. They are free to pursue their own happiness and well being. But this perfect freedom is not a license to do whatever one likes or treat others as one likes. Rather the freedom people have a natural and inalienable right to is freedom from domination and coercion by others. *The state of Nature has a law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his life*.

By the moral law of nature, one is not justified in assaulting others except as retribution for an injustice they have committed to one's self. Likewise, one is not justified in taking another's property except as redress for that person taking or destroying one's own property. But this state of nature inevitably leads to a state of chaos because people are not very good arbiters of justice in their own case. They are prone to inflate the wrongs committed against themselves and seek too much in the way of redress or retribution. The establishment of government is justified as a more efficient means of preserving the natural rights of individuals. In joining civil society, we voluntarily turn our right to protect and enforce our individual rights over to the state. The legitimate function of the state is to enforce the rights of equality and liberty that people enjoy by nature. Where a government exceeds these limits, Locke says people are justified in rebelling against the government.

Self-ownership is central to the natural rights equally enjoyed by all. Property rights are then justified as an extension of self-ownership. Locke sees all of nature as initially held in common by people, when a person *mixes her labor with the stuff of the earth*. But Locke also recognizes limits to the extent of property rights. Specifically, persons do not have a right to more property than they can make use of. Above and beyond what one can make use of, the fruits of one's labor return to the commons and are to be freely available to others. If natural resources can be regarded as unlimited, then there is not injustice to me if my neighbor has accumulated great wealth while I have little. This is because my neighbor's great wealth doesn't place any restriction on me investing my energy in creating wealth of my own. But if natural resources are limited and my neighbor has claimed much of what is available in the creation of his private property, then my opportunities are limited to that degree. But there remain the possibilities of regulating access to the commons or expanding the commons in some way. We don't create wealth from our own labor in a social vacuum. Enjoying the fruits of my labor nearly always requires doing business with someone else and the view of property rights offered by Locke is unrealistically individualistic.

George Berkeley is best known for arguing for idealism on empiricist grounds. In metaphysics, idealism is the view that there is no physical substance underlying our sense impressions of the world. Rather, the world consists entirely of ideas. Your mind is just a bundle of impressions, and there is nothing

in the world except for so many minds having their various perceptions.

Berkeley's argument attacks Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities and argues that all of our sense impressions are mere appearances and that we have no grounds for thinking that any of them bear any resemblance to the way things are. Since we lack any empirical experience of the underlying substances in which qualities in here, we have no empirical reason to suppose underlying substances even exist. All we have access to our sense impressions, and these are mental things, ideas. So, all we can claim knowledge of our ideas beginning with our sense impressions, the most basic ideas.

Berkeley also argues that positing underlying substances do no significant explanatory work. So, the common-sense empiricist view ought to be that we live in a world of ideas that lacks any underlying physical substance. This startling view might make us wonder what happens to my desk when I leave the room and cease to perceive it. Berkeley argues that the objects of our everyday life do have an enduring existence when we are absent. They continue to exist as ideas in the mind of God.

David Hume's empiricist epistemology is grounded in his philosophy of mind. Hume starts by asking what we have in the mind and where these things come from. He divides our mental representations into two categories, the relatively vivid *impressions*, these include sensations and feelings, and the less vivid *ideas* which include memories and ideas produced by the imagination. What distinguishes impressions from ideas in our experience is just their vividness. The picture of the mind Hume offers is one where all of our beliefs and representations are cooked up out of basic ingredients provided by experience. Our experience gives us only impressions through sense experience and internal impressions like feelings. From this we generate less vivid ideas. Memories are merely faint copies of impressions. Through the imagination we can generate further ideas by recombining elements of ideas we already have. So, through impressions we get the idea of a lizard and the idea of a bird. We can then generate the idea of a dragon by imaginatively combining elements of each.

The imagination is guided by associating relations like resemblance, contiguity (next-to-ness) and cause and effect. The imagination also includes our ability to understand things when we reason well in formulating new ideas from old ones. *A priori* reasoning, which is reasoning independent of experience, can produce understanding of relations of ideas. Mathematical and logical reasoning is like this. But *a priori* reasoning only reveals logical relations between ideas. It tells us nothing about matters of fact. Our ability to understand matters of fact, say truths about the external world, depends entirely on *a posteriori* reasoning, or reasoning based on experience. Often our philosophical confusion is the result of adding too more to our experience.

Hume's Skeptical Empiricism touch also a moral truths. The idea that there are objective moral truths, according to Hume, is a mistaken projection of our subjective moral sentiments. Hume is not worried that his subjectivism about morality will lead to moral anarchy. The subjectivist is justified through any other moral opinion. Hume thinks we have a basis for negotiating our moral differences in our more general and more or less universally shared moral sentiments of self-love, love for others, and concern for happiness. Hume's skepticism about objective moral truths now strikes many people as common sense.

There are four component ideas of everyday idea of causation: the idea of a constant conjunction of cause and effect (whenever the cause occurs, the effect follows); the idea of the temporal priority of the cause (the cause happens first, then the effect); the idea of causes and effects being contiguous (next to each other) in space and time; the idea of a necessary connection between the cause and the effect. But the idea of causes necessitating their effects, according to Hume's analysis, is a confused projection of the imagination for which we find no basis in experience. There aren't rational grounds for thinking that causes do necessitate their effects.

Our assumption that our impressions do correspond to an external reality is a rationally unsupportable product of our imagination. Closely related to Hume's skepticism about causation is Hume's skepticism about inductive reasoning. Inductive argument, in its standard form, draws a conclusion about what is generally the case, or what will prove to be the case in some as yet unobserved instance, from some limited number of specific observations. Every observed sample of water heated to well over 100 C has boiled. Therefore, whenever water is heated to well over 100 C, it boils. Unless every instance of water heated to over 100 C in the history of the universe is among the observed instances, we can't be sure that the conclusion is true given the truth of the premises. It follows, that strong inductive arguments like the

one above is not deductively valid. But Hume considers the suggestion that every inductive argument has a principle of induction as a suppressed premise, and it is this principle of induction that renders the inference from premises to conclusion rational. This principle of induction tells us roughly that unobserved instances follow the pattern of observed instances. So inductive arguments really go something like this. Every observed sample of water heated to over 100 C has boiled. Unobserved cases tend to follow the pattern of observed cases. So, whenever water is heated to over 100 C, it boils.

The argument still isn't valid, but that's not what we are aiming for in induction. Given the hidden second premise – our principle of induction – we can reasonably hold that the premises taken together give us good grounds to accept that the conclusion is probably true. However, if this principle of induction (2 above) is to render inductive inferences rational, then we need some grounds for thinking that it is true. In considering how this principle of induction is to be justified, Hume presents a dilemma. Since there is no contradiction in denying the principle of induction, it cannot be justified *a-priori* (independent of our experience as can be done with logical truths). And any empirical argument would be inductive and therefore beg the question by appealing to the very principle of induction that requires support. So, Hume concludes, we have no rational grounds for accepting inductive inferences. But inductive argument is not rational still, all of our experience of the sun regularly rising gives us no reason to think its rising tomorrow is even likely to happen. This is why philosophers speak of this topic as the Hume's dilemma or the *Problem of Induction.*

Empirical skepticism about religious matters leads Hume to argumentation, that the weight of the evidence of our experience overall will always give us stronger reason to mistrust our senses in the case of a seemingly miraculous experience than to doubt the otherwise consistently regular course of events in our experience. Testimony by others of miracles is on even shakier ground. No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish. Hume also undermines many arguments for the existence of God, including the Design Argument. According to Hume, the Design Argument is a weak argument by analogy. So even assuming we find the appearance of design in nature, we have little grounds to think that it is the product of a personal god or any sort of entity we can relate to. Charles Darwin cites Hume as among his major influences.

The contents of our immediate experience are just particular impressions and ideas. But we have no experience of any single unified self that is the subject of those experiences. The idea of a self, including the idea of the self as a soul, is a fanciful projection from our experiences. All we can say in an empirically grounded way of ourselves is that we are just a bundle of experiences. *For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe anything but the perception.*

A strict and carefully reasoned empiricism leads to a variety of skeptical conclusions. We tend think of science as pretty empirical. But perhaps scientific inquiry is not as strictly empirical as Hume's epistemology. Or perhaps, as some have argued, science can get along fine without induction or causation. Still, if we are not comfortable with Hume's skepticism about causation and induction, this might be cause to reconsider his empiricism. And perhaps also the skepticism about morality it seems to invite.

Empiricism led to Logical Behaviorism of Gilbert Ryle. Mental states like beliefs, desires, perceptions, and anxieties are not the sorts of things we can examine as physical object. This seems to take the mind out of the person. There is no place for any account of our inner lives or even the notion that my beliefs and desires are in some sense in me or part of me. The Brain State Identity Theory, most ably advanced by J. J. C. Smart proposes that mental states are identical with brain states. Contrary to Descartes' dualism, it takes mind to be a physical thing. Namely, it takes the mind to be identical with the brain. It's a physicalist view of the mind. Any belief is a certain neuro-chemical state of the brain. If a great many people share this belief this is a belief type. One's belief is just one token of that shared belief type. The distinction between types and tokens is important. The Identity Theory originally proposed that mental state types are identical with brain neuro-chemical state types. A popular and plausible example of such mental state/brain state type identity was that pain just is C-fibers, a certain kind of neuron, firing. Different parts of the brain carry out different functions and there is the map of the brain areas. But the science tells us is

that different brains store and process the same information in very different ways of a different people with a different property.

For functionalism to be in a mental state is to be in some underlying state, perhaps unobservable, that fulfills a certain functional role. It involves attributing underlying causal base properties. It provides a means for specifying what it is for an underlying brain state to realize, or be a causal basis for, a mental state type. Any state, physical or otherwise, can realize a mental state so long as it fulfills the appropriate role. One could be both a functionalist about mental states and a Cartesian dualist.

Another kind of dualism, property dualism by David Chalmers implies, that one kind of matter has fundamentally different kinds of properties. Chalmers thinks philosophical zombies without subjective conscious experience are possible, so consciousness can't be understood purely in terms of physical properties or the functional processes they ground. He instead proposes that we understand some properties of minds, like consciousness, as fundamentally mental properties that are not reducible, even in principle, to physical properties. While no distinct kinds of non-physical substance are proposed, Chalmers is offering a kind of dualism we now call property dualism. Property dualism in the philosophy of mind is the view that among the primitive most fundamental properties of our world, there are both basically physical properties and basically mental properties.

TOPIC 6. *Ethics*

Ethics or *moral philosophy* is a branch of philosophy that involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong conduct. Ethics is concerned with what we ought to do, what it would be best to do, how we ought to live, how we ought to treat others and how we ought to organize our communities. The main ethical question is *What should we do about it?*

Ethics concerns what is good. Different things can be good in different ways. We just considered the nature of the good life. The quality of one's life is something that can be evaluated for goodness. This makes it an ethical issue. Aristotle's theory of virtue was part of our inquiry into the good life. More familiar will be ethical theories of good character or good action. The ethics of good action concerns what is permissible, obligatory, and superogatory (good above and beyond what's obligated). Religiously inspired views about morality often take right and wrong to be simply a matter of what is commanded by a divine being. Philosophy has not succeeded in coming up with absolutely certain and definitive answer in ethics. Philosophers speak of moral intuitions in reference to this sense of the goodness or badness of things. Questions about how we can know what is good or what is right are questions for moral epistemology.

Descriptive ethics intends to describe how things are, how people think or how they behave. Prescriptive ethics is concerned how we should be motivated and how we should act.

Arethology, deontology, feliology, thanatology, theory of justice. The field of ethics, along with aesthetics, concerns matters of value, and thus comprises the branch of philosophy called axiology. As a field of intellectual inquiry, moral philosophy also is related to the fields of moral psychology, descriptive ethics, and value theory.

There are different levels of ethical issues, major areas of study within ethics. The specific matters in theoretical content are issues of *applied ethics*, concerning what a person is obligated (or permitted) to do in a specific situation or a particular domain of action. These are death penalty, legalizing of drugs, tax money for the poor, homosexual relationships and so on. *Normative ethics* concerns how things ought to be, the practical means of determining a moral course of action. *Meta-ethics* studies fundamental questions about the nature of ethics, concerning the theoretical meaning and reference of moral propositions, and how their truth values (if any) can be determined. For example, whether or not there are any ethical truths and, if so, what makes them true or explains their truth.

Ethical conventionalism implies that ethical truths are made true by people, God or others authorities, moral reformer rather than objective value. It is moral reformer's, who changed world to the better state, dilemma. Conventional ethics requires no critical thinking, just total obedience. Ethical truths are like truths of etiquette or law, more or less formal social conventions. Morality is something like a really serious variety of politeness. *Moral Relativism* is one of the more popular versions of ethical conventionalism. Right and wrong are relative to people or groups for Moral Relativism. Not all of the claims are absolute without exceptions. Honesty is a virtue, but lie for saving is a virtue as well. In spite of

the arbitrariness of Moral Relativism, it seems to support tolerance and respect for societies with differing moral views and has no problem with changes in moral standards. But societal Moral Relativism denies the existence of any value independent of group, often the strongest and most aggressive like a gangs and outlaw militias. Rational inquiry done well doesn't have to include unpleasant conflict, but it does hold out some hope for resolving conflicts reasonably. Any attempts to relativize morality undermine the normativity of moral beliefs altogether and so ultimately collapse into nihilism, the view that nothing matters, nothing is good. According to *Ethical Subjectivism* there are no ethical truths at all. David Hume and Logical Positivists were holding a view like this. But according to the subjectivists, *Honesty is a virtue* isn't the sort of sentence that could be true or false because there is no such property as being a virtue. There are no ethical properties at all, then being virtuous can't be a property of honesty. Also, there is no property of being ethical to attribute to whatever we want to do. Our moral and ethical talks are a way of displaying our moral sentiments even without moral arguments or actions themself. *Ethical realism* is the view that there are ethical truths and that they are made true by independent facts. These facts will be the truth-makers for ethical truths. For any realist ethical theory, we will want some account of what makes the theory true, if it is true. Many ethical theories can be understood as grounded in views about what has value, or what is good objectively.

Immanuel Kant's moral theory is grounded on intrinsic value. *Two things awe me most, the starry sky above me and the moral law within me*. Kant took the only thing to have moral worth for its own sake to be the capacity for good will we find in persons. Persons, conceived of as autonomous rational moral agents, are beings that have intrinsic moral worth and hence beings that deserve moral respect. *It is impossible to conceive of anything in the world, or indeed beyond it, that can be understood as good without qualification except for a good will*. The one thing that has intrinsic value, for Kant, is the autonomous good will of a person. That said, Kant does not understand the expression «good will» in the everyday sense. In everyday discourse we might speak of someone being a person of good will if they want to do good things. We take the philanthropist's desire to give to the less fortunate to be an example of good will in this everyday sense. On Kant's view, the person of good will wills good things, but out of a sense of moral duty, not just inclination. Naturally generous philanthropists do not demonstrate their good will through their giving according to Kant, but selfish greedy persons do show their good will when they give to the poor out of a recognition of their moral duty to do so even though they'd really rather not. So, it is our ability to recognize a moral duty and will to act in accordance with it that makes persons beings that have dignity and are therefore worthy of moral regard. On Kant's view, our free will, our moral autonomy, is our capacity to act according to duty as opposed to being a slave to our desires or inclinations. So free will, in the sense that is associated with moral responsibility, doesn't mean being free to do as you please without consequence. Rather, freedom comes with moral responsibility for the intentions we act on.

So, understanding the good will as the capacity to will and act out of duty or respect for moral law, we can see having this capacity as part of having a rational, autonomous will. As persons, we have a free or autonomous will in our capacity to weigh our desires against each other and against the rational constraints of morality and reach our own determination of the will. We are the originators and authors of the principles we act on. On Kant's view, our free will, our moral autonomy, is our capacity to act according to duty as opposed to being a slave to our desires or inclinations. Having an autonomous good will with the capacity to act from moral duty is central to being a person in the moral sense and it is the basis, the metaphysical grounding, for an ethics of respect for persons.

An imperative is a command. A hypothetical imperative tells you what to do in order to achieve some goal. For instance, *if you want to get a good grade in calculus, work the assignments regularly*. Kant divides hypothetical imperatives into two subcategories. *The rules of skill* are conditional and are specific to each and every person to which the skill is mandated by. These are particular ends that we assign ourselves, and they provide a framework to understand how our ends can be achieved. *Whoever wills the end also wills (in so far as reason has decisive influence on his actions) the indispensably necessary means to it that is in his control*. Kant's definition provides that there are a countless number of personal ends that can exist, because each human being has their unique perspectives, desires, personal circumstances, and intended methods to reach their ends. However, Kant also claims that there is at least one end that is universally sought after, and he determines that to be happiness. *The counsels of prudence (or rules of*

prudence) are attained *a priori* (unlike the rules of skill which are attained through experience, or *a posteriori*) and have universal goals such as happiness. Counsels of prudence are actions committed for the overall sake of good will for the individual, and with the best intentions. This assumes, then, that actions done with the best intentions are using the hypothetical imperative to discern and make decisions that are most moral good. Thus, almost any moral rule about how to act is hypothetical, because it assumes that your goal is to be moral, to be happy, or to please God, etc.

Kant calls his fundamental moral principle the Categorical Imperative. What is distinctive about a Categorical Imperative is that it tells you how to act regardless of what end or goal you might desire. Moral reasons override other sorts of reasons. Kant takes three formulations to be different ways of expressing the same underlying principle of respect for persons. They certainly don't appear to be synonymous.

The first formulation is known as the formula of the universal law. *Act only on that maxim that you can consistently will to be a universal law.* The maxim of our action is the subjective principle that determines our will. We act for our own reasons. Different intentions might lead to similar actions. We can identify different maxims in terms of these different reasons or intentions. For Kant, intentions matter. He evaluates the moral status of actions not according to the action itself or according to its consequences, but according to the maxim of the action. The moral status of an action is determined by the actor's intentions or reasons for acting. Morally permissible action is action that is motivated by an intention that we can rationally will that others act on similarly. A morally prohibited action is just one where we can't rationally will that our maxim is universally followed. Acting out of moral duty is a matter of acting only on maxims that we can rationally will others act on as well. The person of good will recognizes the humanity of others by not making any special exception for herself even when her interests or inclination would be served by doing so. Morality is not a matter of following rules, it is rather a matter of writing rules for ourselves that are compatible with the other persons rational autonomous nature. We show respect for others through restraining our own will in ways that demonstrate our recognition of them as moral equals. Negative examples: suicide, neglecting one's natural gifts, borrowing money knowing that one will not pay it back (lie) and refusing to help others in great need whom one could easily help at the same time.

The second formulation, tells us to treat individuals as ends in themselves. *Always treat persons (including yourself) as ends in themselves, never merely as a means to an end.* That is just to say that persons should be treated as beings that have intrinsic value. To say that persons have intrinsic value is to say that they have value independent of their usefulness for this or that purpose. The second formulation does not say that you can never use a person for your own purposes. But it tells us we should never use a person merely as a means to your own ends. We treat people as a means to our own ends in ways that are not morally problematic quite often. My interaction with peoples is morally acceptable so long as peoples help me voluntarily, or acting autonomously for his own reasons. By contrast, we use people merely as a means to an end if we force them to do our will, or if we deceive them into doing our will. Coercion and deception are paradigm violations of the Categorical Imperative. In coercing or deceiving another person, we disrupt his or her autonomy and his or her will. This is what the Categorical Imperative forbids. Respecting persons requires refraining from violating their autonomy.

The Third Formulation is The Formula of Autonomy: *So, act that your will can regard itself at the same time as making universal law through its maxims.*

Ethical monism analyzes right and wrong action in terms of a single fundamental underlying kind of value. *Ethical pluralism* is the view that there is a plurality of fundamentally good things. There may be multiple kinds of fundamental and irreducible real value in the world. The importance of happiness, for example, comes with the existence of pleasure. The value of respect for persons comes with the existence of persons. The ethical pluralist can say that both cultures are structured around worthy fundamental values and neither unjustly favors one kind of fundamental value at the expense of another. Pluralist might allow that some ways of prioritizing worthy fundamental ethical values really are better than others, but that there is no strict rational formula for working out which is best. The evidence in ethics consists of our ethical intuitions. We do have a moral sense about things. Our experience shapes our theoretical understanding and our theoretical understanding shapes our experience in turn in a more or less organic process of intellectual growth. Reason doesn't dictate any outcomes; it merely provides the system of currency in which this negotiation towards deeper understanding takes place.

TOPIC 7. *Philosophy of love*

Desire and need. Cause and aim of desire. Desire and self-consciousness according to Jean Hippolite. Desire is always, in fact, something other than it is shown. Desire as the desire of other. The desire of the desire of the Other. The machine of desire according to Gilles Deleuze. Let go of desire. The principle unsatisfiable of desire. From desire through passion to love.

Love comes in many varieties. A few varieties of love identified in ancient Greece continue to provide useful points of orientation.

Pragma is practical kind of love. Pragmatic use of other. The problem of sex-objectivation. An object as more than a subject, including one's own. Positive assessment of the benefits of other, through which he is considered worthy of love. Marriage contract. Philosophical pragmatism. The practical effect associated with the object and its practical bearings according to Charles Pierce.

Storge in dynastic marriages. Tolerance to partner defects. Achilles and Patroclus. Family affection. Indiscriminate comfort, coziness. «Old» as a subject of storge.

Mania is obsessive kind of love. Mania and property. Partner's personal space. Manic attitude to society and nature. Overcome a maniac by becoming a maniac. Black glasses: passion as hiding in plain sight according to Roland Bart.

Agape is selfless kind of love. Agapicity of Love's Supper of neoplatonists. *To Die For* by Gus Van Sant. Agape as charisma. *Agape* as universal love is the sort of love that God has for all people and it also provides the foundation for Christian ethical precepts.

Ludus is game kind of love. A woman as the most dangerous game according to Friedrich Nietzsche. Love affair as the most important thing and aestheticized seduction of ludus. Casanova and Don Juan.

Tokos is creative kind of love. Pteros is destructive kind of love. *Love* by Oleg Milov. *The Girl from the Song* by Ibai Abad. How to plan an orgy in a small town by Jeremy Lalonde. Dramosexualism, demisexualism and sapiosexualism.

Eros is ideal kind of love. In the *Symposium* Plato tried to answer the questions *Do we search for our ideal other half in love? Do we love for reasons? And if so, what of the individuals we love? Do they matter except for the qualities we find loveable in them?* When we are attracted to and desire some person, it may be because of this person's wit, beauty or some other quality we find charming. Socrates makes this point in Plato's *Symposium* and it becomes the first step towards a highly impersonal view of *eros*. We might love an individual for their beauty, but this is just a step towards loving beautiful people generally and ultimately to loving beauty itself. As Socrates sees it, this is all for the good as our attention and love is drawn ever closer to the most real and divine of things, the form of goodness itself. Attachment to a particular individual is not the proper aim of erotic love and may even be a hindrance. The view of erotic love voiced by Socrates in the *Symposium* becomes refocused on the Ideal. Any passionate aspiration can fall under the scope of the erotic on this broad view. An artist's passionate devotion to creative activity might count as erotic even when it has nothing to do with sexuality per se. Freud offers a kind of inversion of this view. All creative aspiration is erotic, but Freud sees erotic aspiration as essentially sexual. When our sexual longings get thwarted or repressed, they surface in other kinds of creative activity. So, Socrates would say that aspiration generally is erotic and not necessarily sexual. Freud would also say all aspiration is erotic and still indirectly sexual.

I can't love unless I give you up. R. Salecl on the fashionable names of father.

Aristophanes offers a colorful telling of the myth of the origins of love at the outset of the *Symposium.* In this story people were once two-headed eight-limbed round beings who upstaged the gods in their joyful vitality. To instill a bit of humility, the gods split them in two, and since then erotic love has been the attempt by us incomplete halves to find our other half and rejoin, if only temporarily. Love as a kind of union sounds appealing as an ideal, but it may shed only limited light on the nature of our relationships and attitudes, even when these are at their best. The dream of a soul mate has powerful appeal. But the prospects for disappointment and heartbreak are built into such high expectations. People are dynamic and person with the qualities you like might not have them tomorrow. Or you might come to prefer different qualities.

A sincere complement isn't just acknowledgement of something attractive or admirable in us, it amplifies that attractive or admirable quality. Through valuing something we bestow value on it even on the marketplace. Loving another is not just a feeling on this view, it's a creative and work activity.

Philia is friendly kind of love. Philia and carefree pleasures. The classic account of philia comes from Aristotle who takes friendship to be a concern for the good of another for her sake. In friendship we adopt the good of another as a good of our own. It's important that we understand this as expanding our sphere of concern beyond ourselves. Concern for another just because of some benefit she will bring to us is not genuine friendship. This is the significance of having concern for another for his or her own sake.

Friendship is not, on Aristotle's view, opposed to self-interest. It is common to think that when we come to genuinely care for another we do so at the expense of self-interest. Aristotle takes love in the sense of friendship to involve an expansion of our own sphere of concern to include the good of another, not the refocusing of it away from ourselves. Of course, there will be conflicting desires among friends. But among friends these aren't mere conflicts between their individual wills. Rather, when I love my friend in the sense of philia and I want one thing while my friend has a competing desire, I experience this as an internal conflict of my own will, and perhaps my friend does, too. It might not be obvious to either of us which movie we should see on our night out together. But the question of my self-interest versus my friend's dissolves in our mutual concern for each other for his or her own sake. The salient issue becomes what movie *we* should see together.

We often suppose that loving another means feeling good about that person. But love is emotionally more complicated than that, and Aristotle's account of Philia sheds some light on this. This makes perfect sense on Aristotle's account since to love the child is to adopt the good for the child as the good for the parent. When the child's bad choice threatens what's good for the child, being disappointed can be seen as part of caring about what is best for the child. A corollary of this insight is that coddling or spoiling a child is not the loving thing for a parent to do when this is liable to undermine what is good for the child in the long run.

If philosophy is genuinely a case of philia, then we should be able to make sense out of talk of loving things other than persons. We do commonly talk of loving chocolate, loving this or that band, or loving our house. In most cases this probably shouldn't be taken literally. Love is not mere appreciation, preferring, or desiring. Another kinds of value as *instrumental value*. Typically, we deny that non-sentient things have any value beyond their usefulness to us. But it is possible to ponder the relationship between an artist and his or her art as philia. In recognizing this we can see the potential for love in creative activity. Creative activity can involve expanding one's sphere of concern to include the goodness of some activity or product for its own sake and this is the essence of philia. Art is distinguished in part by the loving devotion of the artist.

To love yourself is just to care about what is best for you. What's best for me is just what's good for the things I love, then to love myself is just to love what I love. If loving what you love is all there is to self-esteem this would seem to make poor self-esteem logically impossible. To love yourself is nothing more than to love your friends and family, your community, your activities, and projects whole-heartedly. To love yourself without a narcissism is to wholeheartedly love what you love.

Eros is much more than friendship plus sex, friends with benefits. This view has the attraction of reducing erotic love to just a special variety of philia. But the world has seen plenty of serious lovers that for one reason or another can't or don't have sex. Erotic love does involve desire, attachment, and passion that is focused on a person, but this is not exhausted by the desire for sex. It's not even clear that this kind of love entails desire for sex. So, it's probably best to try to examine erotic love on its own terms, first and then maybe somewhere down the line thinks about how it relates to philia or friendship.

Delight, rapture, surprise as the only positive passion according to Descartes. Stealing the contours of a beloved. The cause and outrage, uncausality of love according to Spinoza. Love as identification with a beloved one, seeing the world through her eyes by Simone de Beauvoir. Femininity as exactiveness, requirement for the senses. The requirement of an oath and irritation from it. Free fidelity to yourself. Free love as love of freedom.

Love as a form of suicide, *loving is to give what one does not have* and she doesn't need according to Jacques Lacan. Problems of pair confluence. Love discourse of More (*Encore*). Meeting, tyche and

automaton by Jacques-Alain Miller. *Not my type* by Lucas Belvaux and *The Randomity of Love* by Pavel Kovtun. Fenómeno del amo (span.) – the phenomenon of the beloved/mister. The desire to be loved as the desire to castrate a beloved in hate/love (heinamoration). Freedom of choice of object and the will to love.

Umberto Eco about the semiotics of love. Erotology and erotography: the diversity of love discourses. Atopicism and irrelevance of love according to R. Bart: another place, another time. Such. How to get out of the hypnosis of love and continue to love. Holophrase I-love-you and answers to it. Love as a declaration of love.

The concept of confluent love according to Antony Giddens. Love-merger or fleeting love? Characteristic features of confluent love: sexual pleasure, the value of the relationship itself (the object is no longer considered unique), pure relationship – nothing but the desire and appetence of partners does not ensure the strength of the union, the optionality of heterosexuality. Polyamory and compension. Hypergamy in the ideology of incels (involuntary celibate) from sexual realistic point of view by Jordan Peterson. Forced monogamy or monoandria? Principal femininity of hormonal contraception. Sexual alt-right.

The one is divided into two: One and Twin, Binary according to Alain Badiou. The approaches of philosophy to sex through love. Philosophy as a kind of seduction. A relation of woman with love. Literature as a consequence of the permeation and establishment of the subject by love. Prose texts about love as a syntax that engages all its semantic fields. Male as imperative and immovable and female as narrative and wandering. Love as the most accessible, but not the most common procedure of truth. Sexuality of knowledge. Love is not a merger, an offer or an illusion. From attitudes to the production of truth. The specificity of love in comparison with other procedures of truth: being an experience of thought, it does not think of itself. Detotalizing disconnection (disjunction) of positions of a man and a woman, defined a posteriori. Disconnection as proof of the existence of Mankind. Love as the humanization of the female through its separation from the phallic. Appointing event as a mediator. The laboriousness of love. The paradoxicalness of love. Desire as a crime of the One. Masturbatority of sexual activity outside of love. Principal homosexuality of desire and heterosexuality of love. Fidelity to a love event. Fidelity to the rupturing of the abyss in itself. Scene and accomplishment of the Twin: presentation. Couple – status, but not love: representation. Risk and going beyond comfort marges. Je te mathème (I describe you with formulas).

Maurice Blanchot on the absence of friendship. Friendship as active forgetting. Jacques Derrida on the principled performativity of friendship. Principal incompleteness of unity according to Julia Kristeva. Love as an automatic occupation of an imaginary place according to Slavoj Žižek. Love as a comedy by Alenka Zupančič. The miracle of love as a funny miracle. Idealization of more than love. Eiron: the shortest shadow as the absence of duality. Love as intention according to Luce Irigaray: j'aime à toi. Love for the same. Women's jealousy of men's work. The concept of love letters by Nasrin Himada and Maiko Tanaka: love in action and the action of love, life. From writing to someone to writing with, close to. Think about writing letters.

The formula of love in Rites of *Love and Math: The Heart of Hidden Reality* by Edward Frenkel. Equivalence of two ways of calculating the correlation function. Cordomorphism of fractals.

TOPIC 8. *Philosophy of happiness*

Aristotle in *Nicomachean ethics* differs a passive with conflicting desires and an active happiness, which isn't dependent from external things. Moods and feelings are things that come and go in our lives. They are temporary states of mind. The Greek term Aristotle uses is *eudaimonia* and this might be best translated as living well and doing well. Aristotle would take goodness to be something we naturally aim at, something we are oriented towards by nature. What is good for a thing can be understood in terms of that thing is realizing its *telos*. In more contemporary language we might speak of things that are pursued for their *intrinsic value*, the value had *in itself, (up) to me* as opposed to things that are pursued for their *instrumental value*, their value in the sense of being useful as a means to other ends, *for me*. Money, for instance, has instrumental value, but no intrinsic value. Goodness is an end that has to be pursued built into it.

The human being essentially is the rational animal. The good life is the life of actively exercising one's rational capacities might be more flexible than it appears at first. Any of human activities will

contribute to your flourishing only if you engage your rational capacities and do them in thoughtful and inquisitive ways. There is a degree of flexibility in our inclinations and preferences and we have some ability to shape these over time. Habit is also the means available to us for shaping our lives for the better. This way of thinking about virtue stands in sharp contrast to more popular conceptions where to be virtuous involves lots of self-sacrifice. Aristotle concerned with the idea of virtue as a kind of excellence. Happiness requires more than just virtue. It also requires some degree of good fortune and good community. Both extreme poverty and luxury can be an obstacle to flourishing.

According to **Epicurus** life's goal should be to minimize pain and maximize pleasure, which is the standard by which we judge every good. Type of pleasures best for human happiness are natural and necessary pleasures. Firstly, it need to eliminate pains as much as we can. The most extreme pains usually pass quickly, chronic pains of illnesses can also be managed so that on balance our lives contain more pleasure. The real problem of pain is not with the physical ones, but psychological ones, especially anxiety-producing fears. Sources of fear is religious myth and deaths. If gods even exist, they don't influent on people. Death cannot cause us pain once we die, since we no longer exist.

While pleasure is the first good and natural with us, we do not choose every pleasure, but at times we pass over many pleasures when any difficulty is likely to result from them. We desire a wide range of things, and some contribute to happiness while others can be counterproductive. There are, he explains, three different kinds of desires. First, there are natural and necessary desires, which include food and shelter. These are easy to satisfy and should be pursued. Second, there are natural but unnecessary desires, such as luxury food. These ones should not be pursued since we can't count on them being available and, when they aren't, we will be frustrated. Third, there are vain and empty desires, such as power, wealth, and fame. These are difficult to satisfy since they have no limit: even if we acquire power we always want more and thus will never be satisfied. So too with wealth and fame, and so, according to Epicurus, we should not pursue any of these. The key is to seek pleasure through moderation. Simple pleasures give us the least amount of disturbance, whereas violent pleasures bring about violent pains, such as how the intense pleasure of drunkenness is followed by a hangover and any number of social problems. *When we say that pleasure is the chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the degenerate person, or those which involve sensual enjoyment, as some think who are ignorant or oppose our opinions, or else distort them. Rather, we mean the freedom of pain from the body and turmoil from the mind. Life is not made pleasant through continued drinking and partying, or sexual encounters, or feasts of fish and other such things as a costly banquet offers. It is sober contemplation which examines into the reasons for all choice and avoidance, and which chases away vain opinions from which the greater part of the confusion arises which troubles the mind.*

The third step in the quest for happiness is to develop the right virtues, that is, good habits, which will enable us to routinely experience the right kinds of pleasure, with the least amount of pain. Common virtues that Greek philosophers recommended are courage, honor, justice and moderation; Epicurus agrees that all of these good habits will lead us towards happiness. However, there is one main virtue that is the foundation of all of these, and that is *wisdom* (sometimes translated «prudence»), which is the ability to make careful decisions about one's interests and thereby choose the best pleasures. *Of all the things that wisdom provides for the happiness of the whole life, by far the most important is the acquisition of friendship.* Also high on the list are good conversation and frugal living. On the other hand, wisdom tells us to avoid the pleasures of ambition, public activity, marriage and children, since these produce more pain than pleasure in the long run. Wisdom also tells us that we must live justly in order to be happy. But justice for Epicurus is not an absolute an independently-existing truth, as Plato believed with his theory of the Forms. Instead, justice consists only of contracts made between people to keep from harming each other. I agree to not injure you, you agree to not injure me, and as a result we both benefit by living in society. I recognize that I must keep this agreement since, if I don't, one day I will be caught regardless of how secretly I plan my attack on you. He writes that it is impossible for the unjust man *to believe that he will always escape notice, even if he has escaped notice already ten thousand times; for, until his death, it is uncertain whether or not he will be detected. Empty are the words of that philosopher who offers therapy for no human suffering. For just as there is no use in medical expertise if it does not give therapy for bodily diseases, so too there is no use in philosophy if it does not expel the suffering of the soul.* Diogenes of

Oinoanda wrote: *Many men pursue philosophy for the sake of wealth and power, with the aim of procuring these either from private individuals, or from kings, who deem philosophy to be a great and precious possession. Well, it is not in order to gain wealth or power that we Epicureans pursue philosophy! We pursue philosophy so that we may enjoy happiness through attainment of the goal craved by Nature.*

The central theme of **Stoic** ethics is to live according to nature and resign oneself to what is fated in the world around us. There are three themes to Stoicism's ethical recommendation, the first of which involves living according to nature and its laws. As creatures of nature, the same cosmic ordering principle that gives structure to the world around us is also embedded within ourselves. Stoics coined the famous expression that there is a spark of divinity in each of us, by which they meant that the ordering principle of divine reason permeates each person just as it does the cosmos as a whole. To live ethically, then, is to live according to this ordering principle as it appears in both human nature and nature as a whole. One part of living according to nature involves abiding by moral virtues that are part of human nature. Another part of this, though, involves following the laws of human society, for the ordering principle of the cosmos is so thorough that it even shapes human laws according to Zeno. *This also means doing none of those things which the common law of humankind typically forbid. The common law is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Jupiter, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things.* Thus, the laws of society reflect the rational ordering principle of the cosmos. Ultimately, it is through the use of our human reason that we discover the rational law in nature, ourselves, and society. The second theme in Stoic ethics involves reconciling free will with fate. If my very actions are not within my control, then it seems that I'm not morally responsible for anything that I do. Fate controls everything outside of human beings – such as the weather, movement of the stars, and other natural events – but not completely what takes place in our thoughts. It's not that our minds defy the natural order of things. Rather, fate sets only the general conditions for how nature operates, but does not micromanage how our thoughts unfold within our minds. Cicero suggested such an analogy. *It is like a man who pushing a cylinder gives it a principle of motion, but not immediately that of revolution. Similarly an object strikes our sense and conveys its image to our mind, yet leaves us free to form our specific sentiment concerning it.* On the one hand, it could be that our minds are just machines that process perceptions according to inflexible rules, and our sense of free will is nothing more than an illusion. On the other hand, it could be that our thoughts operate freely in a little world of their own, isolated from the purely mechanical rules that govern our physical bodies and the world around us.

So, we should adjust our attitudes to accept the things outside of us over which we have no control. The Stoics explained this with an analogy. Epictetus asserted that we should be concerned only with things within our control, which are restricted to our own thoughts, impulses, and desires. At the same time, he argued, we should not be concerned with things outside of our control, such as our bodies, property, reputation, careers; rather, we should learn to accept these things as they come to us. *Remember, then, that if you suppose that things which are slavish by nature are also free, and that what belongs to others is your own, then you will be hindered. With regard to whatever objects give you delight, are useful, or are deeply loved, remember to tell yourself of what nature they are, beginning from the most insignificant things. If, for example, you are fond of a specific cup, remind yourself that it is merely a cup which you are fond of. Then, if it breaks, you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your child or your wife, say that you only kiss things that are mortal, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies.* In addition to being removed from loved ones, another common source of unhappiness is desiring something that we cannot have. We should deal with this in the same way that we should when we're at a banquet that has limited amounts of food. Wait until it is your turn to be served, and try to ignore what other people are getting and even to don't take the things which are set before you. We should see ourselves as citizens of the world, and not simply citizens of the country in which we live. The common law of the cosmos makes us common citizens.

Utilitarianism is based on the idea that happiness is good. Happiness has value objectively, independent of how much we might like it. John Stuart Mill characterizes Utilitarianism as the view that *an action is right insofar as it tends to produce pleasure and the absence of pain*. Every possible course of action will have a utility. In calculating the utility of an action, we are to consider all of the effects of the action, both long run and short run. Sometimes no possible course of action will produce more pleasure than pain. We often don't know what the long-run consequences of our actions will be, and even in the

short run we are often uncertain about just how much pleasure and pain will be caused for the various parties affected. Utilitarianism will simply require us to pursue the lesser evil. The action with the highest utility can still have negative utility. We need to take pleasure and pain in the broadest sense possible. There are social, intellectual, and aesthetic pleasures to consider, as well as sensual pleasures. Recognizing this is important to answering what Mill calls the doctrine of swine objection to Utilitarianism. He argued that social and intellectual pleasures are of an intrinsically higher quality than sensual pleasure.

Utilitarianism says that right action is action that maximizes overall happiness. So, Utilitarianism can call for great personal sacrifice, for example, in a parenthood. But a rule that tells doctors to kill their ordinary patients when others require their organs would not have very high utility in general. Thus, Rule Utilitarianism differs from Act Utilitarianism. But the possibility of rules with except when utility is maximized clauses renders Rule Utilitarianism vulnerable. Utilitarianism is often referred to as a consequentialist theory. Utilitarian considerations of good consequences seem to leave out something that is ethically important. Something other than consequences, a person and the sort of regard this merits is more important in deontological ethical theory such as Kantian one.

Trolley problem.

Western concern about childhood being a time of happiness has occurred only since the 19th century.

Not all cultures seek to maximize happiness, and some cultures are averse to happiness. Happiness vs. interest according S. Zizek.

TOPIC 9. *Philosophical anthropology*

Philosophical anthropology, philosophy of human is a special discipline in philosophy, in which various sciences and approaches are involved. Under philosophical anthropology in a broader sense one can simultaneously speak of a philosophical discipline: in addition to an in competing with other disciplines of philosophy (metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, philosophy of language, ontology, metaphysics, esthetics) and other sciences (psychology, anthropology, biology, sociology, science and technology, cultural studies). Philosophical anthropology is a discipline dealing with questions of philosophy of life, phenomenology, existentialism and others philosophical trends, studying the human person, and interpersonal relationships.

Philosophical anthropology is the attempt to unify disparate ways of understanding behaviour of humans as both creatures of their social environments and creators of their own values. Although the majority of philosophers throughout the history of philosophy can be said to have a distinctive anthropology that undergirds their thought, philosophical anthropology itself, as a specific discipline in philosophy, arose within the later modern period as an outgrowth from developing methods in philosophy, such as phenomenology and existentialism. The former, which draws its energy from methodical reflection on human experience (first person perspective) as from the philosopher's own personal experience, naturally aided the emergence of philosophical explorations of human nature and the human condition.

In the strict sense philosophical anthropology is a trend in German philosophy, developing from 1920s. Philosophical Anthropology in this sense is a specific approach, which includes so different thinkers as Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, Arnold Gehlen, Erich Rothacker, Adolf Portmann and in some respects, Peter Sloterdijk too. The group is full of differences and rivalries, a combination of these thinkers to a group base on their reflexive sight to the human «Nature»: as living beings within the realm of other living beings, but in a special position.

Scheler defined the human being not so much as a rational animal (as has traditionally been the case since Aristotle) but essentially as a loving being. He breaks down the traditional hylomorphic conception of the human person, and describes the personal being with a tripartite structure of lived body, soul, and spirit. Love and hatred are not psychological emotions, but spiritual, intentional acts of the person, which he categorizes as intentional feelings. Scheler based his philosophical anthropology in a Christian metaphysics of the spirit. Plessner would later emancipate philosophical anthropology from Christianity.

For Scheler phenomenology isn't a method in the strict sense, but rather *an attitude of spiritual seeing, something which otherwise remains hidden*. Original experience, the givenness of phenomenological facts (essences or values as *a priori*) *before they have been fixed by logic*. The essences

are never given to an outside observer with no direct contact with the thing itself. Thus, the particular attitude, disposition of the spirit or spiritual posture of the philosopher is crucial for the disclosure, or seeing, of phenomenological facts. This phenomenological attitude is fundamentally a moral one, where the strength of philosophical inquiry rests upon the basis of love. Scheler describes the essence of philosophical thinking as *a love-determined movement of the inmost personal self of a finite being toward participation in the essential reality of all possibles*.

The movement and act of love is important for philosophy for two reasons. Firstly, if philosophy hearkening back to the Platonic tradition, is a participation in a *primal essence of all essences*, it follows that for this participation to be achieved one must incorporate within oneself the content or essential characteristic of the primal essence. Such a primal essence is most characterized according to love, thus the way to achieve the most direct and intimate participation is precisely to share in the movement of love. It is important to mention, however, that this primal essence is not an objectifiable entity whose possible correlate is knowledge; thus, even if philosophy is always concerned with knowing, as Scheler would concur, nevertheless, reason itself is not the proper participative faculty by which the greatest level of knowing is achieved. Only when reason and logic have behind them the movement of love and the proper moral preconditions can one achieve philosophical knowledge.

Secondly, love is likewise important insofar as its essence is the condition for the possibility of the givenness of value-objects and especially the givenness of an object in terms of its highest possible value. Love is the movement which *brings about the continuous emergence of ever-higher value in the object just as if it was streaming out from the object of its own accord, without any sort of exertion on the part of the lover. True love opens our spiritual eyes to ever-higher values in the object loved*. Hatred, on the other hand, is the closing off of oneself or closing one's eyes to the world of values. It is in the latter context that value-inversions or devaluations become prevalent, and are sometimes solidified as proper in societies. Scheler hopes to dispel the interpretation that love and hate are only reactions to felt values rather than the very ground for the possibility of value-givenness (or value-concealment). Scheler writes, *love and hate are acts in which the value-realm accessible to the feelings of a being is either* extended *or* narrowed. Love and hate are to be distinguished from sensible and even psychical feelings; they are, instead, characterized by an intentional function (one always loves or hates *something*) and therefore must belong to the same anthropological sphere as theoretical consciousness and the acts of willing and thinking. Scheler, therefore calls love and hate, spiritual feelings and are the basis for an emotive *a priori* insofar as values, through love, are given in the same manner as are essences, through cognition. In short, love is a value-cognition, and insofar as it is determinative of the way in which a philosopher approaches the world, it is also indicative of a phenomenological attitude.

A fundamental aspect of Scheler's phenomenology is the extension of the realm of the *a priori* to include not only formal propositions, but material ones as well. In opposite to Kant's ethical formalism he insists, that values are given *a priori*, and are feelable phenomena. A human opens evermore to beings-of-value, values only exist with a value-bearer, as a value-being. Nevertheless, values can vary with respect to their bearers without there ever occurring an alteration in the object as bearer. The value of a specific work of art or specific religious articles may vary according to differences of culture and religion. However, this variation of values with respect to their bearers by no means amounts to the relativity of values as such, but only with respect to the particular value-bearer.

According to Scheler, the disclosure of the value-being of an object precedes representation. The axiological reality of values is given prior to knowing, but upon being felt through value-feeling, can be known (as to their essential interconnections). Values and their corresponding disvalues are ranked according to their essential interconnections as follows:
1. Values of the holy vs. disvalues of the unholy.
2. Values of the spirit, truth, beauty vs. disvalues of their opposites.
3. Values of life and the noble vs. disvalues of the vulgar.
4. Values of pleasure vs. disvalues of pain.
5. Values of utility vs. disvalues of the useless.

Further essential interconnections apply with respect to a value's (disvalue's) existence or non-existence:

1. The existence of a positive value is itself a positive value.

2. The existence of a negative value (disvalue) is itself a negative value.

3. The non-existence of a positive value is itself a negative value.

4. The non-existence of a negative value is itself a positive value.

5. Good and evil is the value that is attached to the realization of a positive or negative, a higher or lower value in the sphere of willing.

Goodness, however, is not simply attached to an act of willing, but originates ultimately within the disposition or basic moral tenor of the acting person. Accordingly, the criterion of good or bad consists in the agreement or disagreement of a value intended, in the realization, with the value preferred, or in its disagreement with the value rejected.

Scheler argued that most of the older ethical systems fall into axiological error by emphasizing one value-rank to the exclusion of the others. A novel aspect of Scheler's ethics is the importance of the kairos or call of the hour. Moral rules cannot guide the person to make ethical choices in difficult, existential life-choices. The very capacity to obey rules is rooted in the basic moral tenor of the person.

A disorder of the heart occurs whenever a person prefers a value of a lower rank to a higher rank, or a disvalue to a value. Reason cannot think values; the mind can only order categories of value after lived experience has happened. Philosophical anthropology strongly re-launches the centrality of the relation between the individual and the environment, between natural and artificial, as between innate and acquired. Human beings have always created images of themselves, in order to better know themselves with the awareness of never being given once and for all, but of having to continually define themselves, impelled by the need to act, to fulfill, and to complete themselves by means of their own doing.

The philosophers, depending upon the various tendencies, have given diverse responses to such interrogatives, thus constructing numerous and different images of the human being. *We are the first era, in which human beings have become completely and entirely «problematic» for themselves; in which they no longer know what they are, but at the same time know also that they do not know* Scheler wrote. Human beings have elaborated of themselves. Scheler says that philosophical anthropology must address the totality of man, while it must be informed by the specialized sciences like biology, psychology, sociology, etc.

Homo religious draws its origin from the Holy Scriptures and the belief in a supernatural world and on consequent feelings of fear and of hereditary fault. The homo religious is characterized by a profound sense of anguish, anxiety and dissatisfaction, derived from the myth of the fall and of original sin. At the basis of human nature there is thus an experience of rupture and of distancing, which still today weighs upon all of humanity, in the search of a well-being possessed and then lost, of a happiness felt and never again experienced, of which humanity nourishes an incurable nostalgia, and on which is founded the attitude of anguish and oppression that constitutes specifically the emotionality and impulsivity.

Both Greek philosophy and art create a harmonical, perfect and accomplished self-aware image of the superior human being – the idea of the *homo sapiens*. This image is founded upon a clear distinction between the human being and the animal. He differs not so empirically, but through posessing reason (logos, ratio). The logos thus constitutes the principium individuationis of the human being, its primary superior faculty, absolutely irreducible and incompatible with the others that characterize instead the animals. Human reason is considered a partial expression of the divine Nous and has a divine spark, which acts through the power of ideas and, as an eternal organizing principle, never ceases to produce this world and the order that regulates it. The power that orders the universe needn't an experience, exhibit its own spiritual power (power of the spirit, autonomy of the idea) and can remain constant throughout the historical becoming.

This image has been flanked, since the scientific revolution, by the naturalistic one of the *homo faber*. From this point of view, the human being is understood as the most developed animal, and the creator of highly specialized instruments (such as language), which uses a part of its animal energy in cerebral activity. Human beings do not possess a metaphysical origin and a rational faculty that qualifies them essentially, nor are they distinguished from animals from a qualitative point of view, but they are distanced from them only by a difference of degree. The only difference is a greater complexity in the results. He must obey the same laws that regulate all living beings. We have, in particular, technical intelligence, i.e.,

the capacity to adapt oneself actively, and without useless attempts, to new and atypical situations, by means of an anticipation of the objective structures of the environment. Human beings thus is the cerebral animal with an extraordinarily plasticity. Even the signs, words and concepts are none other than particularly refined mental instruments. The image of *homo faber* has such ancestors as atomists, empiricists, evolutionists and others.

Later in place of the faith in the progress of humanity common to all the preceding theories, it substitutes the conviction of a necessary decadence of the human being. The latter appears as an «impasse» in the evolutionary chain, the «traitor of life», of its fundamental values, its laws, its sacred cosmic sense, because using some simple surrogates it increased in a morbid way the consciousness of itself. The human being destined to become extinct, like many other animal and vegetable species. Even if its organism is in itself healthy, the human being as such is an illness, a fundamentally pathological tendency of life itself. Its spirit, or its presumed reason, were constituted by means of the process of corticalization, for which the greatest part of human energy is not at the service of the entire organism, but is utilized for the sustenance of the brain; in this way, humanity can also be defined as the «slave of the cortex». All of this then denotes an illness, a morbid orientation of life itself. The «earthworm», also known as human being, can well feel its self-importance and carve itself a role of protagonist in the course of history, to the point of founding nations, creating works of art, achieving always new scientific objectives, rather than remaining, like the animal, anchored to a single environment: this will not, however, permit it to exit from the «blind alley» or to overcome the illness that constitutes the essence of its life itself. Thought and reason, freedom of choice are nothing but a euphemism to hide the lack of instinctive security of the animal. Thus, a human being is a «false step» of life evolution and it will be civilization itself that will destroy humankind, like an «infernal» mechanism that will annihilate whoever produced it. The passage from spontaneous expression to mediated communication, from impulsive activity to conscious will, from the community to the society, from the organic conception of the world to the mechanistic one, from the society based upon the bond of blood to the state divided into classes, from the religions of the motherland to those that are patriarchal and spiritual, from magic to technology, from metaphysics to science, indicates the direction of the path of humanity towards death.

In the image of the *homo dionysiacus*, as in the preceding conception of the *homo sapiens*, the spirit or reason appears distinct from life and from the impulses of the soul; the two constituent aspects of the human being, rationality and vitality, are understood as two entities that are irreducible to each other. In the Dionysian image the spirit is regarded as a demon, the power that destroys life. The Dionysian is thus opposed to the *homo sapiens* or to the Apollonian of a Greek kind, of which it constitutes an antithetical ideal. For the *homo dionysiacus*, the only course of salvation is the search – through the elimination of the spirit, great usurper and despot of life – for a contact with the original vital impetus, in order to regain the lost unity. We can encounter echoes of this conception in Leopold Bolk, who sees the human being as *an infantile monkey with a disorganized system of internal secretions*.

While the image of the *homo dionysiacus* humiliates the human being, the image of the *homo creator* is an the most subtle one. This form of anthropology has recovered the Nietzschian idea of the superman. The basis of this theory is the rejection of religiosity, a rejection understood as a postulate of freedom and of responsibility. The atheism of the preceding centuries (materialism, positivism, etc.) considered the existence of God as something in and of itself desirable, but not demonstrable. The atheist anthropology of the *homo creator* sustains instead that, independently of that which we can or cannot demonstrate, a God cannot and must not exist if responsibility, freedom and duty are not simple words, and if the existence of the human being must have a meaning. Only in a mechanical and non-teleological world does a «real» human being have the possibility of existing in the maximum of responsibility and of sovereignty in human choices. The Nietzschean phrase *God is dead* expresses precisely the ultimate obligation of human beings who can lean neither upon a divinity that communicates to them what they must and must not do, nor upon scraps of old metaphysics, but must take upon themselves the divinity's characteristic attributes (predestination and providence). So, a human being is open, polysemantic, variable, and plural creature.

TOPIC 10. *Esthetics and philosophy of art*

When we think of great works of art, what comes to mind are great piece of art. Some pieces of art, though, are more controversial, such as in *The Museum of Non-Visible Art*, where each piece is text based and is designed to be seen with the minds-eye using a brief text on a card mounted on a wall. A buyers would attach the cards to wall in homes or offices, and encourage others to read the cards to have the conceptual experience.

The oldest philosophies of art focused on the concept of beauty, such as the beauty in a natural landscape, the beauty of a person, or the beauty of a human-made object like a vase. As different as these objects are from each other, something within each brings about a similar judgment that the object is beautiful.

We all recognize that art preference is a personal matter and we simply accept it. Is beauty in the eye of the beholder? Subjectivism: beauty resides in the preference of the observer, and judgments about beautiful objects have only subjective validity. Objectivism: beauty resides in the objects themselves, and judgments about beautiful objects have objective validity. *There are no disputing matters of taste* (*De gustibus non disputandum est*). It may be an irrational opinion. To see the evidence for this universality, we need to step back from our private preferences and consider the larger social context in which any work of art arises. In all artistic styles, there are schools that teach the concepts and techniques behind those pieces, which presumes that there is a standard of beauty to which each art object must conform. The standards of beauty reside in something beyond the subjective preferences of individual spectators.

According to scottish philosopher Thomas Reid (1710–1796) we have something like a sixth sense that detects the beauty embedded in external objects like a flower, much like our tongues detect flavorful qualities of foods. He describes it as *an agreeable feeling or emotion, accompanied with an opinion or judgment of some excellence in the object, which is fitted by nature to produce that feeling*. But it's clearly a statement about the object itself, and not about the feelings of the spectator. *The man who is skilled in painting or statuary, sees more of the beauty of a fine picture or statue than a common spectator. The same thing holds in all the fine arts.* Thus, it is through training that the universal components of art will become more apparent.

It could be that at least some, if not all, judgments of beauty blend together both a subjective and objective element. On the one hand, for example, a certain type of musical pitches and rhythms might objectively have the potential to universally please humans. On the other hand, a particular musical piece or style may subjectively appeal to only certain individual personalities. The third factor involved in judgments is culturalism: beauty resides the preferences of human cultures, and judgments about beautiful objects have mainly cultural validity. A notable difference between artistic culturalism and cultural moral relativism, though, is that artistic culturalism is far less controversial. Let clothing styles change as much as they will, and there is no problem, as long as they don't cross the boundaries of decency.

In ancient Greek culture the connection between beauty and goodness was so strong that they created the term beauty-good (*kalokagatia*) by combining the two notions. We will call this view the *beauty-goodness theory*: beauty and goodness are inseparably related within nature, human beings, and human artwork. There are two central features to this theory. First, beauty-goodness in its purest form exists independently of human subjective or cultural preferences and is the ultimate reality of the cosmos itself. The second feature of the beauty-goodness theory is that ultimate beauty and goodness are related in such a way that if you have one, you have the other, and they are in some sense interchangeable. Many philosophers of the time held that the interrelation went beyond just beauty and goodness to include other ultimate concepts, such as truth, unity, and even being or existence itself. In this way, the ultimate reality of the cosmos is ultimately perfect, beautiful, true, unified and existing. Philosophers today refer to this position as the convertibility of transcendentals, meaning that at least some ultimate qualities are connected together where one implies the others. The things are recognizably good and beauty in and of themselves, irrespective of any benefit we may receive from them. The two most important intrinsically good things are personal affection and the appreciation of beauty.

In the eighteenth-century concept of **taste** was the ruling philosophical theory of art. We may call this *taste theory*: humans have a sixth sense that detects beautiful and ugly artistic features, similar to how culinary taste detects delicious and repulsive flavors. There is an important rationale for this analogy between artistic and culinary taste. Our other senses, particularly sight and sound, are primarily vehicles

for gaining factual knowledge about objects in the world: your eyes report the fact that a dog is in front of you, your ears report the fact that the dog is barking. The sense of taste from your tongue, however, is more about pleasure than it is factual knowledge. When you bite into a pickle, you experience a flavor that is immediately pleasing or displeasing to you in different degrees. So too with artistic taste: it is an immediately pleasing or displeasing response to the beauty or ugliness of an art object.

An early proponent of the theory of taste was English writer Joseph Addison (1672–1719), who specifically investigated artistic taste in literature. He defined artistic taste as *that faculty of soul which discerns the beauties of an author with pleasure, and the imperfections with dislike. A man of a fine taste in writing will discern, after the same manner, not only the general beauties and imperfections of an author, but discover the several ways of thinking and expressing himself, which diversify him from all other authors, with the several foreign infusions of thought and language, and the particular authors from whom they were borrowed.* If you want to improve your literary taste, Addison recommends that you read as much literature as you can, have conversations with others about it, and consult the opinions of experts and critics. A good imagination, he adds, will also help.

There are three important features of the theory of artistic taste proposed by Addison and others of his day. First, taste theory is primarily an investigation into psychology or mental anatomy with sixth sense of beauty. The second feature is what is now called the *immediacy of art thesis*: the experience of artistic beauty is direct and unfiltered by rational evaluation. The third feature of taste theory is that, from the start, advocates of the theory recognized that beauty was only one of several qualities that our mental tongues detect. To simplify it to just four, it helps to think of our mental tongues as having different types of taste buds that respectively detect beauty, sublimity, virtue, and humor. All four follow the same mechanism: we observe some object or event through our five senses, and this triggers a special type of mental pleasure or pain within our mental tongues. They are like value detectors that produce different pleasures from our four mental taste buds, and we can call these all value-tastes. The term esthetic was introduced by German philosopher Alexander Baumgarten (1714–1762) as a replacement for the word taste in philosophical discussions of art.

According to Kant aesthetic attitude, judge in matters of taste is *disinterested*: you do not consider the art object for its practical use, but give it attention and appreciation for its own sake. Through disinterestedness as an attitude we see the thing as an end in itself, rather than a means to an end. That is, we recognize its intrinsic value, rather than its mere instrumental value. Mental distancing where I forget about my practical concerns give a purer experience with receiving an intuitive insight. Ineffability thesis: the aesthetic experience of art objects is incapable of verbal description and thus cannot be described directly.

In all branches of art there are special terms for derivative art objects, such as copies, replicas, recreations, interpretations, restorations, renovations, revisions, covers, forgeries, remixes. Each of these indicate in its own way that a thing is a derivative art object, rather than the original. *Derivative art object thesis*: we are permanently removed from *any* truly original art object, because of the passage of time and the ordinary process of decay, and derivatives are all we can know. We haven't access to the original Parthenon, and what stands in Athens today is only a descendent of it in ruins. John Dewey argued that the original use and context of an art object is central to its identity. We often place art objects on pedestals, both literally and metaphorically, and, by divorcing them from their social context, radically change what they are.

Charles Darwin stresses, that the sense of beauty emerged within animals and humans that gave them an advantage for survival through not natural but sexual selection. This sense of beauty that animals develop is a lower one, that is tied specifically to reproduction and attraction to the opposite sex. But humans have a higher sense of beauty that is independent of reproduction. For Darwin, the best we can say is that evolution through natural selection has given us an undefined sense of beauty, along with other related mental faculties that have aided in our survival, such as imagination, curiosity, the tendency to imitate, and the love of excitement. This explanation of our human sense of artistic beauty is a mixture of objectivism and culturalism: our psychological faculties are objective features of our human physiology, while how we direct those faculties is based on our culture.

Intuitionist theory holds that it is not the physical manifestation of art but, rather, the concept within the artists mind that is then transmitted to the viewer's mind. In this sense, the artist is not merely a craftsperson, but rather a visionary, and her artistic creations are just vehicles for transferring her unique artistic intuitions to the viewer. The artist might not have a clear conception of her artwork until her craftwork is fully complete. It seems natural to place the balance of the location of an art object on its physical manifestation, and not its mental conception.

The **imitation** theory of art is that all art represents something in the world. Plato held that human art is an attempt to copy ultimate realities. Aristotle's view of art as imitation is human art copies things in the physical world, both physical objects and human thought and behavior, modifying that content in interesting ways. *Dancing imitates character, emotion, and action, by rhythmical movement*. Even fantastic art objects contain features of a real object. Artists enter a state of mind often called enthusiasm. If we can't identify which type of aesthetic emotion we are experiencing, then we don't know what is copying. Maybe the art is just triggering some generic pleasurable experience within us, without straight imitating.

According to the theory of **expressivism**, art involves the communication of some emotional content through an art object. According to Aristotle, this is *cathartic expressivism*, which is that artworks help viewers express their bottled-up emotions in catharsis and purgation. The art itself doesn't need to be sad or terrifying, but it at least must strike the right chord, so to speak, to have the right impact. In those moments, released within you is a strange mixture of joy and sadness. During this the artist can communicates with the viewer.

According to **formalism**, art is about the purely visual or auditory components of the artwork that are alterable, not about what it represents or its relationship to the larger world. Art is intrinsic to the art object itself, not extrinsic to the world outside of it. The formalist view is encapsulated in the motto art for art's sake is divorced from any content that might accompany it. Any art object has the quality has in common with all other art objects – significant form, which stir our aesthetic emotions. It's the opposite of Plato or Aristotle form: significant form in art consists only of an object's particulars, such as a particular paintings lines and colors, or arrangements of notes in a song, with no larger meaning beyond these. We do not need to give the psychological reasons behind what makes specific lines, colors or notes aesthetically pleasing, but only recognize that they are so, even the artist try to do it. Forms cause special art emotions. The truly aesthetic emotional response we have to an artwork's significant form may vary greatly depending on our expertise in that branch of art.

There are two main options that are sometimes called de-definitions of art, that is, loose explanations of art that fall short of precise definitions. First is the **family resemblance** de-definition, which says that genuine art objects have some non-exclusive common art-related features, but no single feature that is present in them all. This gives a possibility for new art trends. The second de-definition of art is the **institutional definition**, which states that art is that which is accepted as such by authorities of art. The art-world which makes these decisions is consists of a bundle of systems. Culture has the capacity to radically redefined the institution of art, making it almost unrecognizable. Over time art institutions have identified a list of family resemblance features that serve as rules for what we call art. An advantage of this resemblance-institutional de-definition of art is that in many situations it moves beyond theory, and is descriptive of how the artworld actually works.

In *Handbook of Inaesthetics* Badiou both draws on the original Greek meaning and the later Kantian concept of aesthesis as material perception and coins the phrase inaesthetic to refer to a concept of artistic creation that denies the reflection/object relation yet, at the same time, in reaction against the idea of mimesis, or poetic reflection of nature, he affirms that art is immanent and singular. Art is immanent in the sense that its truth is given in its immediacy in a given work of art, and singular in that its truth is found in art and art alone – hence reviving the ancient materialist concept of aesthesis. His view of the link between philosophy and art is tied into the motif of pedagogy, which he claims functions so as to arrange the forms of knowledge in a way that some truth may come to pierce a hole in them. He develops these ideas with examples from the prose of Samuel Beckett, the poetry of Stéphane Mallarmé and Fernando Pessoa (who he argues has developed a body of work that philosophy is currently incapable of incorporating), among others.

TOPIC 11. Feminist and gender philosophy

Feminism is both an intellectual commitment and a political movement that seeks justice for women and the end of sexism in all forms. There are many overall shared commitments, there are numerous differences among feminist philosophers. Hence feminist philosophical scholarship is not homogeneous either in methods or in conclusions. Indeed, there has been significant debate within feminist philosophical circles concerning the effectiveness of particular methods within philosophy for feminist goals. Feminist philosophy strives for inclusivity and pluralism, even if it falls short.

Feminist philosophical scholarship begins with attention to women, to their roles and locations. What are women doing? What social/political locations are they part of or excluded from? How do their activities compare to those of men? Are the activities or exclusions of some groups of women different from those of other groups and why? How have their roles been valued or devalued? How do the complexities of a woman's situatedness, including her class, race, ability, and sexuality impact her locations? How is the feminine instantiated and constructed within the texts of philosophy? What role does the feminine play in forming, either through its absence or its presence, the central concepts of philosophy?

In the XIX the term feminism was used to refer to the qualities of females and advocacy of equal rights for women based on the idea of the equality of the sexes. The struggle to achieve basic political rights during the period from the XIX until counts as First Wave feminism.

The Second Sex of **Simone de Beauvoir** disrupts the boundaries between the personal, the political and the philosophical. Beauvoir takes herself, her situation, her embodiment and the situations, embodiments, the lived realities of other women, as the subjects of her philosophical reflections. Beauvoir speaks of the specific ways that the natural and social sciences and the European literary, social, political and religious traditions have created a world where impossible and conflicting ideals of femininity produce an ideology of women's natural inferiority to justify patriarchal domination.

Before *The Second Sex*, the sexed/gendered body was not an object of investigation. Beauvoir's argument for sexual equality takes two directions. First, it exposes the ways that masculine ideology exploits the sexual difference to create systems of inequality. Second, it identifies the ways that arguments for equality erase the sexual difference in order to establish the masculine subject as the absolute human type. Here Plato is her target. Plato, beginning with the premise that sex is an accidental quality, concludes that women and men are equally qualified to become members of the guardian class. Some women should be trained to rule. But the price of women's admission to this privileged class, however, is that they must train and live like men. Thus, the discriminatory sexual difference remains in play. Sexual differences be validated. Equality is not a synonym for sameness.

Beauvoir argues against the either/or frame of the woman question (either women and men are equal or they are different). It argues for women's equality, while insisting on the reality of the sexual difference. Beauvoir finds it unjust and immoral to use the sexual difference as an argument for women's subordination. She is obliged to examine women's unique experiences of their bodies and to determine how these experiences are co-determined by the everyday attitude (the common-sense assumptions that we unreflectively bring to our experience). As a feminist phenomenologist assessing the meanings of the lived female body, Beauvoir explores the ways that cultural assumptions frame women's experience of their bodies and alienate them from their body's possibilities.

One is not born but becomes a woman. She followed the distinction to its logical/radical conclusions, or whether or not radical conclusions are justified are currently matters of feminist debate. *The Second Sex* gave us the vocabulary for analyzing the social constructions of femininity and a method for critiquing these constructions. It needs to identify an assumptions, treat them as prejudices and put them aside; do not bring them back into play until and unless they have been validated by experience. The lived body's sex/gender was accidental to its lived relations, positions, engagements, etc. is a matter of history. It opened the way for the consciousness-raising that characterized second-wave feminism; it validated women's experiences of injustice.

The concept of the Other is introduced early in the text and drives the entire analysis. It has also become a critical concept in theories that analyze the oppressions of colonized, enslaved and other exploited people. Beauvoir will use it again in her last major work, *The Coming of Age*, to structure her critique of the ways that the elderly is othered by society. Beauvoir bases her idea of the Other on Hegel's account of

the master-slave dialectic. Instead of the terms master and slave, however, she uses the terms Subject and Other. The Subject is the absolute. The Other is the inessential. The Subject is Man and the Other is Woman. Oppressed Others may call on the resources of a common history and a shared abusive situation to assert their subjectivity and demand recognition and reciprocity. Unlike the Hegelian Other, however, women are unable to identify the origin of their otherness. They cannot call on the bond of a shared history to reestablish their lost status as Subjects. Further, dispersed among the world of men, they identify themselves in terms of the differences of their oppressors (e. g., as white or black women, as working-class or middle-class women) rather than with each other. They lack the solidarity and resources of the Hegelian Other for organizing themselves into that demands recognition. Finally, their conflict with men is ambiguous. According to Beauvoir, women and men exist in a primordial *Mitsein*: there is a unique bond between this Subject and its Other. Women must take account of the *Mitsein.*

Often criticized as one mark of Beauvoir's heterosexism, this reference to the *Mitsein* is not made in ignorance of lesbian sexuality and is not a rejection of non-heterosexual sexualities. If patriarchy is to be dismantled, we will have to understand how heteronormative sexuality serves it. We will have to denaturalize it. To Beauvoir's way of thinking, however, the institutional alienations of heterosexuality ought not be confused with the erotics of heterosexual desire. Not only is it used to enforce women's isolation and to support their inability to identify a common history, it is also responsible for the value and relationship that Beauvoir calls the bond, a situation-specific articulation of the appeal. *Hence woman makes no claim for herself as subject because she lacks the concrete means, because she senses the necessary link connecting her to man without positing its reciprocity, and because she often derives satisfaction from her role as the Other*. The ethical-political issue of fulfillment does not concern a woman's happiness. Happiness may be chosen or accepted in exchange for the deprivations of freedom. As Others, women are returned to the metaphysically privileged world of the child. If women are happy as the other, it may be because this is the only avenue of happiness open to them given the material and ideological realities of their situation. Woman feels a necessary bond with man regardless of a lack of reciprocity. In making an appeal to others to join me in my pursuit of justice I validate myself and my values. Given that my appeal must be an appeal to the other in their freedom, I must allow for the fact that the other may reject it. When this happens, I must (assuming that the rejection is not a threat to the ground value of freedom) recognize the other's freedom and affirm the bond of humanity that ties us to each other. In the case of women, Beauvoir notes, this aspect of the appeal (the affirmation of the bond between us) dominates.

Beauvoir argues that women's exploitation is historical, and therefore amenable to change. As an existential situation, however, women are responsible for changing it. A matter of women discovering their solidarity, rejecting the bad faith temptations of happiness and discovering the pleasures of freedom. Her optimism prevails. Men will ultimately recognize women as free subjects. The importance of women's gaining the right to vote and dismissing the necessity of women attaining economic independence are stressed. The liberated woman must free herself from two shackles: first, the idea that to be independent she must be like men, and second, the socialization through which she becomes feminized. The first alienates her from her sexuality. The second makes her adverse to risking herself for her ideas/ideals. Attentive to this current state of affairs, and to the phenomenology of the body, Beauvoir sets two prerequisites for liberation. First, women must be socialized to engage the world. Second, they must be allowed to discover the unique ways that their embodiment engages the world. In short, the myth of woman must be dismantled. So long as it prevails, economic and political advances will fall short of the goal of liberation. Speaking in reference to sexual difference, Beauvoir notes that disabling the myth of woman is not a recipe for an androgynous future. Given the realities of embodiment, there will be sexual differences. Unlike today, however, these differences will not be used to justify the difference between a Subject and his inessential Other.

Lovers experience themselves and each other ambiguously, that is as both subjects and objects of erotic desire rather than as delineated according to institutionalized positions of man and woman. *The erotic experience is one that most poignantly reveals to human beings their ambiguous condition; they experience it as flesh and as spirit, as the other and as subject*. She reveals the ways that it is as subject-objects for the world, to the world and in the world that we are passionately drawn to each other.

Feminism waned between the two world wars, to be revived in the late 1960s and early 1970s as Second Wave feminism. In this second wave, feminists pushed beyond the early quest for political rights to fight for greater equality across the board, e. g., in education, the workplace, and at home. Women's oppression under male domination rarely if ever consists solely in depriving women of political and legal rights, but also extends into the structure of our society and the content of our culture, the workings of languages and how they shape perceptions and permeate our consciousness.

A major figure in the relationship between feminism and queer theory is **Michel Foucault**, who has been extensively used in both queer and feminist theory, but who did not explicitly use the terms queer and feminist. Foucault's *The History of Sexuality* was read heavily by activists and scholars questioning dominant narratives around sexuality and identity and was also influential for texts often cited as foundational for queer theory. Foucault's genealogical approach to identity includes his exploration of the histories and models of power at work in modern conceptions of sexuality. Foucault's account of ethics is a practice of the self, or how we work on ourselves to become particular kinds of people, that resists expected developmental trajectories and normative timelines of a life (e. g., heterosexual coupling resulting in marriage and children). Foucault's theories of power analyze the biopower and now homonationalism, or how certain good gay and lesbian subjects, by aligning themselves with imperialism, are welcomed into the nation-state.

Contemporary feminist philosophical scholarship emerged in the 1970s as more women began careers in higher education, including philosophy. As they did so, they also began taking up matters from their own experience for philosophical scrutiny. They are analyzing issues raised by the women's liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s, such as abortion, affirmative action, equal opportunity, the institutions of marriage, sexuality, and love.

Third Wave feminists often critique Second Wave feminism for its lack of attention to the differences among women due to race, ethnicity, class, nationality, religion and emphasize identity as a site of gender struggle. Solving these problems, it would be to identify feminism in terms of a set of ideas or beliefs rather than participation in any particular political movement.

Gender is a socially established set of characteristics that is vulnerable and changeable. Gender is a description of power relations by J. Scott. Gender studies is a field for interdisciplinary study devoted to gender identity and gendered representation as central categories of analysis. This field includes women's studies (concerning women, feminism, gender, and politics), men's studies and queer studies. Sometimes, gender studies are offered together with study of sexuality. These disciplines study gender and sexuality in the fields of literature, language, geography, history, political science, sociology, anthropology, cinema, media studies, human development, law, public health and medicine. However, these disciplines sometimes differ in their approaches to how and why gender is studied. For instance, in anthropology, sociology and psychology, gender is often studied as a practice, whereas in cultural studies representations of gender are more often examined. In politics, gender can be viewed as a foundational discourse that political actors employ in order to position themselves on a variety of issues. Gender studies is also a discipline in itself, incorporating methods and approaches from a wide range of disciplines. Each field came to regard gender as a practice, sometimes referred to as something that is performative.

Gender studies also analyzes how race, ethnicity, location, class, nationality, and disability intersect with the categories of gender and sexuality. If one is not born a woman, one becomes one, the term gender should be used to refer to the social and cultural constructions of masculinities and femininities and not to the state of being male or female in its entirety. However, this view is not held by all gender theorists. According to Sam Killermann, gender can also be broken into three categories, gender identity, gender expression, and biological sex. These three categories are another way of breaking down gender into the different social, biological, and cultural constructions. These constructions focus on how femininity and masculinity are fluid entities and how their meaning is able to fluctuate depending on the various constraints surrounding them.

Feminist theory of psychoanalysis, articulated mainly by Julia Kristeva (the semiotic and «abjection») and Bracha L. Ettinger (the feminine-prematernal-maternal matrixial Eros of borderlinking and com-passion, matrixial trans-subjectivity and the primal mother-phantasies), and informed both by Freud, Lacan and the object relations theory, is very influential in gender studies. Beauvoir's is a view that

many sociologists support, though there are many other contributors to the field of gender studies with different backgrounds and opposing views, such as psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan and feminists such as Judith Butler.

Judith Butler works on the intersection of feminism and queer theory fields (as well as a number of other critical discourses). In *Gender Trouble* and *Bodies that Matter* Butler develops a simultaneously queer and feminist theoretical lens focused on understanding the relationship between gender and sexuality, as well as the operation of norms and identity categories more broadly under influence of Foucault. Critics point out that trans identity tends be affirmed in Butlerian queer feminist discourse when it can be used to demonstrate the actual constructedness of gender, or its lack of ontological necessity, but also that some trans identity is portrayed as problematically essentialist when accompanied by claims to really be a man or a woman and/or demands for medical transition.

In many of its forms, feminism seems to involve at least two groups of claims, one normative and the other descriptive. The normative claims concern how women ought (or ought not) to be viewed and treated and draw on a background conception of justice or broad moral position; the descriptive claims concern how women are, as a matter of fact, viewed and treated, alleging that they are not being treated in accordance with the standards of justice or morality invoked in the normative claims. Together the normative and descriptive claims provide reasons for working to change the way things are; hence, feminism is not just an intellectual but also a political movement. So, for example, a liberal approach of the kind already mentioned might define feminism (rather simplistically here) in terms of two claims: *men and women are entitled to equal rights and respect* and *women are currently disadvantaged with respect to rights and respect, compared with men*. As indicated by the ellipsis above, the descriptive component of a substantive feminist view will not be articulable in a single claim, but will involve an account of the specific social mechanisms that deprive.

Disagreements *within* feminism can occur with respect to either the descriptive or normative claims, e. g., feminists differ on what would count as justice or injustice for women (what counts as equality, oppression, disadvantage, what rights should everyone be accorded), and what sorts of injustice women in fact suffer (what aspects of women's current situation are harmful or unjust). Disagreements may also lie in the explanations of the injustice: two feminists may agree that women are unjustly being denied proper rights and respect and yet substantively differ in their accounts of how or why the injustice occurs and what is required to end it. Disagreements between feminists and non-feminists can occur with respect to both the normative and descriptive claims as well, e. g., some non-feminists agree with feminists on the ways women ought to be viewed and treated, but don't see any problem with the way things currently are. Others disagree about the background moral or political views.

As **bell hooks** so vividly pointed out, when Betty Friedan urged women to reconsider the role of housewife and demanded greater opportunities for women to enter the workforce, Friedan was not speaking for working class women or most women of color. In contemporary terms, this is known as the problem of intersectionality. Alice Walker proposed womanism as an alternative.

Two strategies for explicating sexist oppression have proven to be problematic. The first is to maintain that there is a form of oppression common to all women. For example, Catharine MacKinnon claims that to be oppressed as a woman is to be viewed and treated as sexually subordinate, where this claim is grounded in the alleged universal fact of the eroticization of male dominance and female submission.

A second problematic strategy has been to consider as paradigms those who are oppressed only as women, with the thought that complex cases bringing in additional forms of oppression will obscure what is distinctive of sexist oppression. This strategy would have us focus in the United States on white, wealthy, young, beautiful, able-bodied, heterosexual women to determine what oppression, if any, they suffer, with the hope of finding sexism in its purest form. Elizabeth Spelman makes the point: *no woman is subject to any form of oppression simply because she is a woman*.

Other accounts of oppression are designed to allow that oppression takes many forms, and refuse to identify one form as more basic or fundamental than the rest. For example, Iris Young describes five faces of oppression: exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and systematic violence, etc. Sexist or racist oppression, for example, will manifest itself in different ways in different contexts, e. g.,

in some contexts through systematic violence, in other contexts through economic exploitation. Acknowledging this does not go quite far enough, however, for monistic theorists such as MacKinnon could grant this much. Pluralist accounts of sexist oppression must also allow that there isn't an over-arching explanation of sexist oppression that applies to all its forms: in some cases, it may be that women's oppression as women is due to the eroticization of male dominance, but in other cases it may be better explained by women's reproductive value in establishing kinship structures (Gale Rubin), or by the shifting demands of globalization within an ethnically stratified workplace. In other words, pluralists resist the temptation to grand social theory, overarching metanarratives, monocausal explanations, to allow that the explanation of sexism in a particular historical context will rely on economic, political, legal, and cultural factors. Feminists are committed to bringing about social change to end injustice against women, in particular, injustice against women as women.

Feminism brings many things to philosophy including not only a variety of particular moral and political claims, but ways of asking and answering questions, constructive and critical dialogue with mainstream philosophical views and methods, and new topics of inquiry. Feminist philosophers work within all the philosophical traditions. Approaches to feminist philosophy are almost as varied as approaches to philosophy itself. But all approaches share a set of feminist commitments and an overarching criticism of institutions, presuppositions, and practices that have historically favored men over women. Feminist philosophies of most any philosophical orientation will be much more perspectival, historical, contextual, and focused on lived experience than their non-feminist counterparts. Unlike mainstream philosophers who can seriously consider the philosophical conundrums of brains in a vat, feminist philosophers always start by seeing people as embodied. Feminists argued that privileging of epistemological concerns over moral and political concerns common to much of philosophy are inextricably intertwined. Feminist philosophers generally agree that philosophy is a powerful tool for understanding.

For another, feminist philosophers all generally are keenly attuned to male biases at work in the history of philosophy, such as those regarding the nature of woman and supposed value neutrality, which on inspection is hardly neutral at all. Claims to universality is contrary to their manifest claims. Feminists using methods and approaches from more than one philosophical tradition. Feminist philosophers generally share is a commitment to normativity and social change; they are never content to analyze things just as they are but are instead looking for ways to overcome sexist practices and institutions.

The differences between the various philosophical approaches to feminism are significant, especially in terms of styles of writing, influences, and overall expectations about what philosophy can and should achieve. One feminist philosophy tends to value analysis and argumentation, another feminist theory values interpretation and deconstruction, and pragmatist feminism values lived experience and exploration. Coming out of a Hegelian tradition, both usually suspect that truth, whatever that is, emerges and develops historically. They tend to share with Nietzsche the view that truth claims often mask power plays. Yet where ones tend to argue that the way to counter sexism and androcentrism is through forming a clear conception of and pursuing truth, logical consistency, objectivity, rationality, justice, and the good, another are generally wary about notions of truth. Where ones, with its critique of essentialism, holds the sex/gender distinction practically as an article of faith, another tend to suspect either that even the supposedly purely biological category of sex is itself socially constituted (Butler) that sexual difference itself needs to be valued and theorized (Cixous and Irigaray).

Feminists working on environmental philosophy have uncovered how practices disproportionately affect women, children, and people of color. Liberal feminism has shown how supposed universal truths of liberalism are in fact quite biased and particular. Feminist epistemologists have called out epistemologies of ignorance that traffic in not knowing. Across the board, in fact, feminist philosophers are uncovering male biases and also pointing to the value of particularity, in general rejecting universality as a norm or goal.

Feminists working from the perspective of women's lives have been influential in bringing philosophical attention to the phenomenon of care and care-giving, dependency, disability, women's labor and scientific bias and objectivity, and have revealed weaknesses in existing ethical, political, and epistemological theories. More generally, feminists have called for inquiry into what are typically considered private practices and personal concerns, such as the family, sexuality, and the body, in order to

balance what has seemed to be a masculine pre-occupation with public and impersonal matters. Philosophy presupposes interpretive tools for understanding our everyday lives; feminist work in articulating additional dimensions of experience and aspects of our practices is invaluable in demonstrating the bias in existing tools, and in the search for better ones. In some such cases mainstream philosophical accounts provide useful tools; in other cases, alternative proposals have seemed more promising.

In thinking about care, feminists have asked questions about the nature of the self. Feminist philosophers have argued that we should recognize a fundamental kind of value in caring relationships. If caring relationships matter just because they bring happiness to human lives, then we already have this kind of value covered when we recognize happiness as a kind of fundamental value. But it is not at all clear that happiness fully explains the value of caring relationships.

TOPIC 12. *Philosophy of law and justice*

The philosophy of law lies at the intersection of a number of problems. These concern the relationship between law and morality; the logical status (as descriptive or prescriptive) of propositions of law; the possibility of separating adjudication from politics; and the distinction between law and organized force. It gives rise to philosophical, especially epistemological problems other than the problems of applied ethics.

The natural law tradition draws attention to law's rootedness in notions of justice, right and the common good. Modern debates have often centered on the process of adjudication, in particular upon the question of the extent to which judges may properly rely upon their personal moral judgement, and how far they are limited to the application of technical legal rules.

Legal positivists, by contrast, have insisted on a morally neutral concept of law, wherein a legal system consists of posited rules ascertainable by reference to factual criteria. They are inclined to analyze law in terms of purely formal features, such as the presence of organized sanctions, or the publication of black-letter rules (namely, rules which are established in a definite verbal formulation, such as the provisions of a statute or an explicitly formulated rule laid down by a judge), which are quite independent of the good or bad content of the law, and the good or bad intentions of the law-makers.

Political philosophers since **Thomas Hobbes** have tended to search for a form of politics that would leave each individual free, so far as possible, to pursue his or her own conception of a good and excellent life. On this approach, the private realm is seen as a critically important area of autonomy within which the individual can choose and pursue wholly personal goals and projects. The existence of such private areas of autonomy necessitates the clear demarcation and enforcement of individual entitlements. Law and the state exist primarily to sustain the clear areas of entitlement that comprise the private realm. To the extent that it emphasizes the role of individual entitlements, together with the need for pluralism and autonomy, the modern conception of politics takes on a profoundly jurisprudential character. Yet, if modern liberal political thought tends to promote individual autonomy above collective participation, the latter value nevertheless has a vital part to play, and a part that adds a further dimension to the problems of legal philosophy. For the modern world no longer regards the structures of civil society, the economy and the family as immutable structures forming a natural horizon within the parameters of which political life must be conducted. Liberal politics, therefore, values both collective project pursuit and (in the form of the liberal's concern for liberty or autonomy) individual project pursuit. But these two values compete. Kant, for example, argued in *The Metaphysics of Morals* that, even in a system of wholly posited laws, one would still require a basic natural law that established the moral authority of the lawgiver. A legal obligation is not a species of moral obligation, nor is a legal right a species of moral right. Law may or may not impose moral obligations on us, the positivist claims: moral obligatoriness is not a logically necessary feature of law. Earlier versions of positivism tended to respond to this challenge by adopting a **reductionist** stance. They claimed that the apparently prescriptive language of law could be analyzed reductively as a disguised form of descriptive or predictive language. In this way, propositions of law concerning legal rights and obligations could be treated as factual statements about the issuing of certain commands, predictions of the likely reactions of courts or the likelihood of suffering sanctions. This type of reductionist analysis appealed to positivists because it seemed to translate legal concepts into terms that were free of all moral connotations. The analysis encountered some rather obvious difficulties, however. Similarly, courts

generally invoke the existence of certain legal obligations incumbent on the litigants as a reason for deciding the case one way rather than another, and as a justification for imposing a sanction. This would make no sense if, correctly analyzed, statements about legal obligations were predictions of the reactions of courts or the imposition of sanctions.

More modern positivists have therefore sought to analyze propositions of law in a way that preserves their prescriptive character without equating them with moral judgements. This has proved to be a very delicate balancing act. The legal positivist **Hans Kelsen** sought to avoid reductionism by treating legal discourse as based on a fundamental presupposition to the effect that the regime which is in effective control within a certain territory ought to be obeyed. He called this presupposition the basic norm. To invoke such a basic norm looks at first like an abandonment of positivism, since the need for some such basic assumption seems to be precisely the point that is being made by Kant. Yet Kelsen argued that this basic presupposition of legal science can be deployed simply for the purpose of grounding a cognition of positive law. He described the basic norm as the minimum element of natural law without which a (non-reductionist) cognition of law is impossible. Kelsen adopted an ethical non-cognitivist stance which denied the possibility of knowledge of moral norms or values. The central core of his work was the attempt to demonstrate that scientific knowledge of positive legal norms was in fact possible. It is in the context of this project that we should interpret his remark about the basic norm as the minimum element of natural law without which a cognition of law is impossible.

Other approaches have been explored by those legal theorists who have found the notion of a basic normative presupposition unattractive. **Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart** argues that reductionist theories of law proceed from the external viewpoint of someone observing the workings of a legal system, rather than the viewpoint of a participant in that system. To avoid the errors of reductionism, legal theory needs to reproduce the viewpoint of a participant within the system. Such a participant regards the legal rules as standards that ought to be complied with. Statements about legal rights and obligations do not predict sanctions, but draw conclusions about the applicability of legal rules to particular circumstances. The internal point of view from which such language is deployed need not be an attitude of moral approval of the law; nor need it be expressive of a judgement as to law's moral bindingness. The internal point of view rests on a judgement that the law ought to be obeyed, but this ought need not be a moral ought. A great many diverse considerations might underpin the conclusion that one ought to obey the law. Legal theory can be neutral, it is argued, on what those considerations might be. The problem with this way of avoiding reductionism in legal theory is that very little middle ground seems to be left between the viewpoint of the external observer and the judgement that law is morally binding. Someone who obeys the law purely from fear of sanctions would seem to take an external view, since his only concern will be with identifying those forms of conduct that are in fact likely to incur sanctions. This approach, however, seems to depend upon a fundamental normative presupposition in very much the same way that Kelsen's theory does. It is therefore doubtful whether Hart succeeded in offering a genuine alternative to Kelsen's approach. But he offers pleasingly clear-cut answers to a number of questions, and seems to provide a simple way in which a distinction between legal doctrine and political dispute may be maintained. Hart worked in close collaboration with members of the Oxford ordinary language school of philosophy. Factual situations do not come neatly packaged and labelled in legal vocabulary, and there can be ample scope for doubt about whether a particular legal rule should or should not be applied in the individual case. Generally, the meaning of an utterance will be a function of formal linguistic rules in conjunction with the implications of the pragmatic context of the utterance. But legal rules frequently lack any obvious pragmatic context: they may have been enacted long ago with intentions that are now obscure, but they nevertheless purport to regulate the present. Different theorists have drawn different conclusions. Hart sought to sketch out a middle course between two extreme positions which he called formalism and rule-scepticism. By formalism he meant the view that all conceivable cases can be decided by applying pre-existing rules of law, without any need to ask questions about non-legal considerations such as justice or social policy. Rule-scepticism, on the other hand, is the view that judges are never really bound by rules, so that the decisive factors in each case are always extra-legal considerations of social policy. Hart argued that formalism ignores the fact that language exhibits an open texture: while words have a core of settled meaning they also possess a penumbra of uncertainty where it will be unclear if the word is properly applicable or not. In so far as legal rules are

linguistic entities, they too will exhibit this open texture. This is, of course, true of statutory rules, but within the common law developed by the courts it is not true. The binding part of a precedent is called the ratio decidendi, a phrase which refers to that part of the court's reasoning (as published in its judgement) which was necessary to justify the conclusion reached. All other observations made in the judgements are said to be obiter dicta. The distinction between ratio and obiter is extremely pliable, since a later court may take a different view from the original court about what exactly was necessary to the decision. Even where a court does offer a definite verbal formulation of the rule that it is applying, such a rule never becomes law simply by virtue of having been so pronounced, for it is always possible that a later court may treat the rule as obiter. We will then decide our case by reference to a revised version of the earlier principle, now including an exception for cases exhibiting facts of the kind found in the present case. The apparent pliability of the distinction between ratio and obiter, combined with the resulting tendency of courts to modify rules in the course of applying them, raises a problem of rule-scepticism. For if courts can alter the rules whenever they think it best then they are not really bound by rules: to be bound by a rule involves having to apply it even when you think that its application is not for the best.

Ronald Dworkin held that to argue that courts may alter the law while still being bound by the law might be possible, but only by radically breaking with the assumptions of legal positivism. Dworkin argues that law does not consist solely of rules deliberately established in precedents and statutes. In his view, law also includes general principles which are implicit within the established black-letter provisions. Judges have the task of constructing a coherent moral theory that provides an appropriate abstract justification for the established rules and institutions. They may interpret and modify established rules in a way that brings them more closely into line with the overarching abstract justification. Thus, even when judges modify established legal rules they are doing so in the application of deeper legal principles. On the one hand, Dworkin's theory resembles rule-scepticism in its denial that black-letter rules, viewed in abstraction from considerations of justice, provide reliable guides to judicial decision in most cases. On the other hand, the theory resembles formalism, since it claims that the judge need never step outside the law to decide the case on extralegal grounds of social policy. Every case can be decided by reference to the law: but law comprises much more than the black-letter rules allowed for by the positivist.

Analytical jurisprudence claims, not to offer prescriptions, but to analyze concepts, including the concept of law. The form of analysis developed by the legal positivist **John Austin** sought to dispel problems by breaking down the concept of law into simpler elements that would be more transparent. Thus, Austin claimed that laws were the commands of a sovereign person or body in an independent political society. Each of these terms was then defined in more basic and more transparent terms. The sovereign in a society was to be identified not by any legal criterion (this would render the theory circular), nor by a moral standard (which would convert the theory into a natural law theory), but by direct reference to observable facts about patterns of behavior. Thus, the sovereign was said to be that person or body that is habitually obeyed by the population, and is not itself in the habit of obeying any other determinate person or body. However, in many legal systems it is not possible to identify any person or body satisfying Austin's definition of sovereignty: power and obedience are divided according to shared constitutional rules. Moreover, Austin's theory is thoroughly reductionist in character, claiming that propositions about legal duties are statements about the likelihood of suffering sanctions in certain circumstances. Austin's version of legal positivism provided a powerful underpinning for the lawyer's claim to be an expert in a technical and self-contained area of knowledge distinct both from morality and from politics. Austin and his disciples thus introduced into legal theory a basic uncertainty concerning the status of investigations into the nature of law.

Hart took the view that Austin's account of the sovereign was misconceived in so far as it attempted to identify a fundamental source of law by direct reference to observable behavioral patterns. What was required, in Hart's view, was not the notion of a basic habit of obedience, but the notion of the acceptance of a rule. An accepted rule differs from a mere habit of obedience in that, in addition to a regular pattern of conforming conduct (which Hart called the external aspect), a rule involves the existence of a critical reflective attitude on the part of participants (the internal aspect): the pattern of conforming conduct is thought of as a standard that ought to be complied with; those who deviate are criticized; and the criticism is thought of as justified.

Primary rules by Hart are rules directly regulating conduct, such as rules prohibiting theft or violence. Secondary rules are rules that regulate the identification, modification and application of other rules. Hart claimed that the invention of secondary rules was as important as the invention of the wheel, and described it as representing the step from the pre-legal to the legal world. A social order containing only primary rules would exhibit various defects such as inflexibility and inefficiency. Most importantly, if such a society were of any complexity it would be likely to exhibit great uncertainty about the scope and content of its primary rules. Uncertainty of this kind could be overcome by adopting a basic rule of recognition which stipulated some criterion by which the society's primary rules might be identified. A very simple rule of recognition might provide that all the rules carved on a certain stone tablet were to be obeyed. Developed legal systems will have highly complex rules of recognition, identifying sources of law such as enactments of the legislature and decisions of the courts, and regulating the relations between those various sources. As we noted earlier, Hart sought to avoid the reductionism of Austin's theory and to preserve the prescriptive character of propositions of law by reproducing the internal point of view of the participants within a specific social context. But propositions of law (reporting the content of legal rights, duties, powers and so forth) are not descriptions of that social context. They express conclusions about the applicability of the rule of recognition and the rules derived from it. They are like the rules of a game. The separation of law and morals means rule's derivability from a basic rule of recognition in a legal system justice or injustice. There may or may not be a moral obligation to obey the law.

Dworkin has drawn a distinction between borderline disputes and pivotal disputes. In a borderline dispute, we have a shared criterion but disagree about the extent of its applicability: for example, we agree on some general concept of art but disagree about whether that concept is applicable to photography. In a pivotal dispute, we have no shared criterion: here our disagreement about photography is merely symptomatic of a deeper disagreement about the essential nature of art. Dworkin appears to suggest that Hart viewed legal theory as being concerned with borderline disputes, whereas legal theory is concerned with a pivotal dispute.

In Hart's view it is better and more honest to say, *This is law, but because it is unjust I should perhaps disobey it*, rather than, *Because this rule is unjust, it is not law*. The exclusivity of sources is the idea that legal validity is a matter of derivability from the rule of recognition. The moral neutrality of propositions of law is the idea that knowledge of one's legal duties does not in itself entail any judgements about how, from a moral point of view, one should behave. The propositions of law are indeed a species of moral judgement: they are judgements about the applicability of those moral reasons flowing from the need for a body of publicly ascertainable rules. Yet such judgements can never be morally conclusive, since they embody only one range of moral considerations which will need to be balanced against many other factors. Hart's positivism was closer to a utilitarian tradition.

In **John Finnis**'s view, positivists have tended to assume that the central thesis of natural law theory is the claim that legal validity is a matter of moral bindingness (or, perhaps, of justice) so that a rule that is not morally binding (or not just) cannot be said to be legally valid. As it is traditionally, if somewhat misleadingly, put *an unjust law is not a law*. He believes that a coherent theory of law can only be the consequence and an expression of a deeper moral and political theory. The common good isn't an aggregative conception, involving the maximization of individual goods, but a framework of institutions and conditions making individual pursuit of a good life possible.

According to Dworkin, the philosophical debate concerning the nature of law is not a search for a semantic definition of law, or a search for a universal concept. Rather it arises out of the adoption of an interpretive attitude in relation to our own practices: the ultimate question is how best to continue the practice. Dworkin offers a general theory of interpretation which he calls constructive interpretation. On this view, the best interpretation will satisfy two criteria, of fit, and of appeal. Criteria of fit concern the ability of the interpretation to accommodate the uncontroversially observable features of the practice. An interpretation need not be a perfect fit, but it must come up to a certain threshold of adequacy. Within the constraints of fit, we must choose the interpretation that makes the practice into the most appealing practice it can be from a moral point of view. Dworkin's theory of interpretation presents legal theory as having both a descriptive and a prescriptive aspect. Interpretive theories of law will be descriptive to the extent

that they must satisfy the constraints of fit; they will be prescriptive in so far as one must choose the morally most appealing interpretation amongst those that satisfy the constraints of fit.

Dworkin also seems oblivious to the way in which an interpretive and culturally specific view of the tasks of legal theory fundamentally erodes the distinction between philosophy and sociology (formerly policed by the distinction between the universal or the necessary and the particular or the contingent). The interpretation of a practice is necessarily prior to a study of its social or historical context. We may well wish to challenge this claim, however. When viewed in isolation, a practice may have an apparent meaning that is subverted once it is relocated in its social context. Practices of male courtesy towards women, for example, may take on a different meaning when located in the context of a male-dominated society within which women are generally subordinated. Radical critics of law, such as marxists and feminists, might well agree that law involves a discourse of equality; but they would point out that the apparent meaning of this discourse is subverted once we locate law in the context of a deeply hierarchical society founded on oppression and domination. The law then appears not as the expression of a deep concern for equality, but as an attempt to mystify and misrepresent social relations by presenting them as being founded on equality. The value of integrity in law throws us back on to extra-legal considerations of social policy, the judge confronts an enormous array of statutes and cases which must be subjected to a process of interpretation.

In **Lon Fuller**'s a more conservative view, the ultimate guiding principle of adjudication is to confuse fidelity to law with subservience to authority. Thus, a power to modify the rules in some cases may be consistent with the judge's fundamental duty. On appropriate occasions, the judge's duty may give rise to intractable moral dilemmas. A complex process of moral and philosophical reflection is therefore internal to the application of law.

Liberalism requires a firm distinction between law and politics. Critical Legal Studies movement (CLS) cannot successfully separate legal doctrine from politics as a leftist. **Roberto Unger** identified two problems that are internal to liberal political theory. *The problem of legislation* concerns the question of how liberal political theory can find a basis for generating just rules for the conduct of social life given its commitment to neutrality between conceptions of the good life. This problem is a central topic within political philosophy. *The problem of adjudication* concerns that, even given the enactment of authoritative legal rules, those rules could not be applied in specific cases without collapsing the issue back into political value judgements. He saw this claim as following from liberalism's rejection of essentialism, which is understood as the thesis that words have stable meanings by virtue of representing fundamental essences. Liberalism's moral neutrality required a rejection of essentialism, and yet liberalism's faith in law could not be sustained without essentialism. In effect, Unger was arguing that, once legal theory abandoned formalism (which is the claim that all cases can be resolved simply by applying legal rules without reference to any other considerations), it would have no way to avoid collapsing adjudication into politics. We are forced to assume that the rules represent a morally coherent and defensible scheme of human association, objectivism, for example, by Dworkin. However, law already represents within itself the conflict between rival social visions. There may be a way in which the principle and counter-principle are conventionally balanced against each other, but this balance will not itself be grounded in any deeper principle.

Jacques Derrida *Force of Law: the Mystical Foundation of Authority* wrote about immeasurability, irrelevance and groundlessness of justice. Fundamental forceless of justice and injustice of force. Force and violence. Fundamental excessiveness of management, navigation and justice. Performativity and signature. Identification the person, which is addressed to, the referent of justice. Justice as messianism without messiah. The law of hospitality and private laws as regimes. The illegality of the law of hospitality: a law without imperative. Non-deconstructibility of justice. Deconstruction as the restoration of justice, which is violated by criticism and reflection. Emotional justice according to neurobiology. Justice to justice. The possibility of silence of justice. *I haven't started yet*.

Self-deconstruction of hospitality by Derrida. Aporia of hospitality in *Pas d'hospitalité*. The host as a hostage of the guest. Fundamental unexpectedness and inappropriateness of the guest. The devastation of the possibility of non-arrival. Messianism without messiah. Uncertainty of the alien in the sky waiting. Problems of income amortization. Absolute hospitality and suspension of speech. Inhospitable of questions. Illegal law of hospitality. Laws of hospitality by Pierre Klossowski. Duty or gift? The question of hospitality is also a question of *I*ness. To be yourself at home or to stay on the threshold of yourself? Philosophical

aspects of the threshold. The eternal limit of hospitality. Hospitality as a challenge. Invasion (l'intrus) by Jeane-Luke Nancy. Abruption of a vital necessary insurgent. Acceptance and abruption as opposed to acceptance of abruption. Meeting with the insurgent. Another as a vital necessary insurgent.

Discourse of power and discourse of justice. Methods of working with the press according to Roland Bart: anonymous ideology (interests of the people), representativeness (show), sociolect, articulation. The right to discursiveness. Possibility of acratic language. Logorrhea.

TOPIC 13. *Environmental Philosophy, Bioethics and Esthetics*

Environmental philosophy is theory and practice about appropriate concern for, values in, and duties regarding the natural world. Values are at stake when humans relate to species of animals, plants and ecosystems. Humans are the only self-reflective, deliberative moral agents. Ethics is for people. Humans co-inhabit Earth with five to ten million species. It's a paradox that the self-consciously moral species acts only in its collective self-interest toward all the rest. Environmental ethics, raised in the 70s, claims that we humans are not so enlightened as once supposed. Before those values arose only with the interests and preferences of humans. In the theologies, God created a good Earth with myriads of creatures, and subjected these to human dominion. Western philosophy and theology were both dominantly humanistic and anthropocentric. But environmental quality is necessary for quality of human life. Humans need to include nature in their ethics; humans need to include themselves in nature. Just when humans, with their increasing industry and technology, seemed further and further from nature, having more knowledge about natural processes and more power to manage them. So, it needs an ecojustice, political ecology, sustainable development ethics, ecofeminism, ethics and sense of place and so on. Ethic concerning the environment can be doubted only by those who believe in no ethics at all. An anthropocentric ethics claims that people are both the subject and the object of ethics. Humans can have no duties to the Nature. Nature is a means, not an end in itself and man is the measure of things. We care about the quality of life in hybrids of nature and culture. One reason it is right is that people must co-operate to survive; and the more they reliably co-operate the more they flourish. Health is not simply a matter of biology from the skin-in. Humans desire a quality environment, enjoying the amenities of nature – wildlife and wildflowers, scenic views, places of solitude – as well as the commodities – timber, water, soil, natural resources. It's a human right to nature. But now the right must be made explicit and defended. There is not any claim against or for nature itself; rather it is a claim made against other humans who might deprive us of such nature.

The four most critical issues – peace, population, development and environment – are interrelated. Ethics is for people, but isn't only about people. An animal values its own life for what it is in itself, without further contributory reference, although, of course, it inhabits an ecosystem on which its life-support depends. Animals are value-able, able to value things in their world, their own lives intrinsically and their resources instrumentally. So, there can and ought to be an animal welfare ethic; or, some prefer to say, an animal rights ethic. Such ethicists may still say that value exists only where a subject has an object of interest, only now recognizing that the pleasures and pains of non-human subjects must be considered. At least some of what counts in ethics is generic to our kinship with animals, not just specific to our species. Human animals have many similarities with non-human animals. It seems that what humans value in themselves, if they find this elsewhere, they ought also to value in non-human others.

A biocentric ethics asks about appropriate **respect to life**, not only the wildlife and farm animals, but now lower animals, insects, microbes and even viruses. Over 96 per cent of species are invertebrates or plants; only a tiny fraction of individual organisms are sentient animals. A plant is a spontaneous life system, self-maintaining with a controlling genetic program (though with no controlling center, no brain). A plant is not a subject, but neither is it an inanimate object, like a stone. They are modular organisms, with a meristem that can repeatedly and indefinitely produce new vegetative modules, additional stem nodes and leaves when there is available space and resources, as well as new reproductive modules, fruits and seeds, as humans are too, from one perspective. But from an equally valid – and objective – perspective, the morphology and metabolism that the organism projects is a valued state. Vital is a more ample word now than biological. We could even argue that the genetic set is a normative set; it distinguishes between what is and what ought to be – not of course in any moral or environmental ethics conscious sense – but in the sense that the organism is an axiological system. An objector can say, *The plants don't care, so why should*

I? But plants do care – using botanical standards, the only form of caring available to them. The plant life per se is defended – an intrinsic value. Perhaps man is the only deliberative measurer of things, but man does not have to make himself the only measure he uses. Life is a better measure. Inclusive ethics care about biodiversity.

Aldo Leopold, a forester-ecologist and prophet of environmental ethics claimed, that the ecosystemic level in which all organisms are embedded also counts morally – in some respects more than any of the component organisms. In an axiological ethics, here is systemic value, as well as instrumental and intrinsic value. Value lies in processes as well as in products. A **land ethic** might seem a naturalistic ethic, but people are living on this land, and so nature and culture soon mix. Trying to map the human environments, we are valuing three main necessary territories: the urban, the rural and the wild. Environmental ethics cannot be an ecosystem ethic pure and simple; there is only an ethic about humans relating to their ecosystems, in the economies in which they live. Environmental ethics must be corporate; action must be taken in concern: green politics, green business. The wild is an environment that humans need and ought to respect; they may like to visit there. But the wild is not an environment in which we can reside and still be human. Man is by nature a political animal, said Aristotle – the animal who builds and inhabits a polis, a town. Hence, they say, ethics does not belong in the wild. It is for people, in urban or rural environments. But, again, a more radical environmental ethics, resolving to be quite inclusive and comprehensive, holds that humans can and ought to set aside wild areas for what they are in themselves, areas which we try to manage as little as possible, or to manage human uses of them so as to let nature takes its course, as far as we can. The most workable ethic is where persons identify with their geography. After all, ecology is about everyday living at home, house, oikos. They need to be natives, as much as citizens.

Michel Serres argues that the old social contract ought to be joined by a natural contract. An environmental ethic needs roots in locality. Taking a model from ecology, the deep ecology movement emphasizes the ways in which humans, although individual selves, can and ought to extend such selves through a webwork of connections. Ecology dissolves any firm boundary between humans and the natural world. Ecofeminists may add that women are better suited for such caring than men – at least men too much dominated by the dominion view.

The United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development declares: *Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs*. The radical environmental ethic finds, however, that this humanistic account fails. The axiological scales we construct do not constitute the value, any more than the scientific scales. Development in the West has been based on the Enlightenment myth of endless growth. None of the developed nations have yet settled into a sustainable culture on their landscapes. The underdeveloped nations have poverty and environmental degradation in a feedback loop. The over-consumption problem in the developed nations is linked with the underconsumption problem in the developing nations, and this results in increasing environmental degradation in both sets of nations. Sustainable development must close the gap between the rich and the poor, between and also within nations. Even if there were an equitable distribution of wealth, the human population cannot go on escalating without people becoming more and more poor. Even if there were no future population growth, consumption patterns cannot go on escalating on a finite Earth. There are three of economical ecology problems: overpopulation, over-consumption, and under-distribution. Ethics needs to become postmodern.

Bioethics investigates ethical issues arising in the life sciences. Subsets of bioethics are **medical ethics** and **genet(h)ics**. Kantian ethics is for instance often appropriated in bioethics as if it consisted only of the two formulations of the categorical imperative, and bioethical consequentialism often neglects the problems of precisely specifying the maxim and in a preference consequentialist theory. The perception that theoretical elegance has been prioritized to the detriment of realistic applicability to real-life ethical problems.

Intuitionism in bioethics is often derived from the writings of the later **Ludwig Wittgenstein**, especially his considerations about rules and rule-following in *Philosophical Investigations*. It entails the most radical rejection of the main traditions in moral philosophy, and claims that the reasons behind ethical decision-making cannot be formulated in statable rules, and even if such rules could be stated they would underdetermine the decision to be made in every realistic situation calling for ethical judgement. Bioethical

intuitionists therefore criticize mainline bioethics for being much too simplistic, and for neglecting the importance of the agents' pre-reflective ethical judgements. Intuitionists will maintain that if agents immediately feel revulsion at the thought of infanticide, then this is a moral fact which cannot easily be set aside. A «primitive» intuitionism will place all emphasis on immediate «gut feelings» as the bedrock of moral judgement, and will thus stand in danger of removing the possibility of moral debate, but more sophisticated intuitionists will try to avoid this danger.

The Four Principles approach (4PA) occupies a middle level and to mediate between an upper level of conflicting moral theories and a lower level of common morality (i. e. the immediate moral intuitions/judgements of ordinary people). Principles are supported by both deontological and consequentialist moral theories. The four principles – Respect for autonomy, Non-maleficence, Beneficence, Justice – are not rank-ordered. Each principle is applicable in the situation. If two or more principles are applicable, and if they do not support the same decision, the agent must specify the content of each principle and balance the principles against each other in order to reach a final solution.

Pluralist views attempt to combine the best insights from deontology, consequentialism and virtue ethics in some form of coherent framework. Certain pluralist views stand in pragmatism and consequentialism.

Hippocratic Oath, which originated in a Pythagorean school and with later Christian values, was first given expression of bioethics. Thomas Percival's idea was the dual responsibility of the professional towards the patient and towards the profession. During the 60s many young philosophers began again to turn to the moral problems. This move can be seen as part of the general social unrest resulting in the anti-war, nuclear disarmament and hippie movements.

Genetics insists on responsibilities for how people will be in the future, who will live and who will die and who will live in the future will actually be like. Genes are essentially immortal, or rather the information that they contain is essentially immortals. The Human Genome Project aimed at identifying all of the one hundred thousand and modifying them in various ways. Morally neutral traits are height, weight, build, hair color, eye color and so on. The therapeutic manipulation of genes (gene therapy) may make mistakes or unforeseen consequences. These techniques also raise issues about the moral status of the embryo. Cloning whole organisms has great dramatic appeal because a possibility of death postponement.

The event most popularly taken to mark the starting-point of human life is conception. But, first, conception can result in a hydatidiform mole, a cancerous multiplication of cells that will never become anything but a palpable threat to the life of the mother. Second, even if human life does begin at conception, it is not necessarily the life of an individual; twins may form at any point up to approximately fourteen days following conception. Cloning also has raised problems for our understanding of when life begins. Without the destruction of a single human cell, one human life, if that is what it is, can be split into four and can be recombined again into one. This is an interesting moral problem. The one thing human embryos have those members of other species do not is their potential not simply to be born and to be human. It's a **speciesism**. Potentiality argument are refuted by a question must we treat embryo if it had already become a human and what of the potential to become a zygote? Can someone be more or less of a person? Does this lead us into a hierarchy of persons? Are a personhood forms a threshold or a continuum?

In contemporary debate the issue of the ethics of abortion has been approached in three major ways. The first treats the ethics of abortion as turning on the moral status of the embryo or foetus. The second approach takes a 'women's rights' view of the ethical issue and suggests that it is a woman's right to choose what happens in and to her body. The third approach stresses an unjustifiable claim on the mother that she is under no obligation to meet.

The ethics of end-of-life decision cases turn principally on the questions of whether or not a competent individual is entitled to control her own destiny, including the timing and manner of her death, and if she is not wholly entitled to exercise this control whether or not there are some circumstances in which this may be legitimate. Some people regard as morally significant whether the steps required to bring about death are active or passive, distinguishing between active euthanasia (sometimes referred to as direct killing) and passive euthanasia (sometimes referred to as indirect killing). Another class of cases are those who have permanently lost consciousness and assisted feeding and hydration. Persistent Vegetative State

(PVS) permanent and irreversible may include spontaneous breathing. We may not have the same obligations not to kill and to help sustain the life.

The main problem of distributive justice discussed in bioethics is the problem of the distribution of scarce health-care resources. A popular answer is that we should try to maximize the production of QALYs (Quality Adjusted Life Years), HLYEs (Healthy Life Year Equivalents) or DALYs (Disability Adjusted Life Years) (although for technical reasons DALYs should be minimized, since they measure the burden of disability and distress). QALY discriminates against the elderly and the already disabled; it fails to take account of an important distinction between life-saving and non-life saving interventions; and it fails to take account of the fact that health care may have more than one goal. For instance, could it be the case that a fireman has a special claim to health care? Such a claim seems to have intuitive merit, but it turns out to be very difficult to explicate exactly what kinds of desert can justify health-care claims.

One more problem is public health versus individual rights. Patient autonomy asserts, that the state should refrain from intervention in private lives save where the individual's health-state or lifestyle endangers others. The development of social policy relating to HIV/AIDS illustrates this tension. HIV/AIDS is often seen as a disease centrally related to lifestyle for its association with drug use and sexual conduct. But it concerns how should lifestyle considerations and disease state be accounted for in insurance?

Concept of informed consent means, that the information must be understood to a sufficient degree. The idea that confidentiality, important the Hippocratic Oath in The World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki states is *Concern for the interest of the subject must always prevail over the interest of science and society*. However, pandemics has drawn attention to the fact that both the interests of individuals and the interests. A second principle of the Helsinki Declaration requires that subjects should not be coerced or induced to participate by offers of reward, particularly financial reward to avoid exploitation. However, in an increasingly consumerist world, individuals more often not expect to be rewarded or at least compensated for their contribution. A further issue is the ethics of using animal rise a problem of sentience (the capacity to feel pain or sensation) notes that humans and animals need equal protection. It is better to permit research on the latter but not the former. Finally, some perceive a morally significant hierarchy in animals and would distinguish, for example, primates from other animals in terms of their appropriateness as research subjects. The resolution of these issues depends crucially on the account one feels compelled to give of the acquisition and maintenance of moral status or of the moral significance of sentience.

TOPIC 14. *Postmodern Philosophy*

According to **G. Deleuze**, philosophy is the art of forming, inventing, fabricating and creating concepts. Friend is one such person that is even said to reveal the Greek origin of philo-sophy. Philosophers – the friends, lovers, climants of wisdom and concept, those who seek wisdom but do not formally possess it. The old oriental sage thinks in Figures, whereas the philosopher invents and thinks the Concept. A concept is a set of inseparable variations that is produced or constructed on a plane of immanence insofar as the latter crosscuts the chaotic variability and gives it consistency (reality). A concept is therefore a chaoid state par excellence; it refers back to a chaos rendered consistent, become Thought, mental chaosmos.

Immanence is an encompassing or manifesting of the sublime (spiritual, divine) in the material world. Spiritual world permeates the mundane. Transcendence is an appearance of the sublime outside the material world.

Agon, philosophical athleticism and philosophical taste. Philosophers carry out a vast diversion of wisdom; they place it at the service of pure immanence. They replace genealogy with a geology. Philosophy is becoming, not history; it is the coexistence of planes, not the succession of systems. This is a stratigraphic time where «before» and «after» indicate only an order of superimpositions. Philosophy necessarily doesn't become indistinguishable from its own history, philosophy is a geophilosophy. The whole philosophy is a grandiose allusion.

Philosophical concepts will be functions of the lived, as scientific concepts are functions of states of affairs. Confusing the concept with the function is makes science the concept par excellence, which is

expressed in the scientific proposition (first prospect). It replaces the philosophical concept with a logical concept, which is expressed in factual propositions (second prospect). It leaves the philosophical concept with a reduced or defective share that it carves out in the domain of opinion (third prospect) by exploiting its friendship with a higher wisdom or with a rigorous science.

What is preserved – the thing or the work of art – is a bloc of sensations, a compound of percepts and affects. Percepts are no longer perceptions; they are independent of a state of those who experience them. Affects are no longer feelings or affections; they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them. The landscape sees. Harmonies are affects. «Motif» that is to say, the percept.

Philosophy – concepts – events – variations – superject – virtual – conceive

Art – sensations – monuments – varieties – inject – actual – feel

Science – functions – states or affairs – variables – eject – potential – know

According to **A. Badiou** (*Manifesto for Philosophy, Being and Event*), philosophy is suspended from four truth procedures, conditions: science (ontology) – joy – the matheme, politics – enthusiasm – ethics – political invention, art – pleasure – the poem, love – happiness – anthropology, psychoanalysis. Truths are constructed through processes. Philosophy must avoid to suture, sew, hand over itself, that is, to its entire intellectual effort, to any of these independent truth procedures. Philosophy is a thinking of the compossibility of the truth procedures (the intersection of art and love in the novel) and it is only philosophy that can speak of the truth procedures *as* truth procedures (true lover's love as the unfolding of a truth). A truth is everywhere and always the case, it passes unnoticed unless there is a rupture in the laws of being and appearance, during which the truth in question becomes, but only for a passing moment, discernible. It is by positioning oneself to the truth of an event that a human animal becomes a subject and continue to be faithful, keep fidelity to a truth event. He distances truth from knowledge, sooth. Bodies and languages, *except* there are also truths. Ethical maxim is *decided upon the undecidable* through fidelity to event.

TOPIC 15. *Speculative realism and object-oriented ontology*

Speculative realism is a movement in contemporary Continental-inspired philosophy (also known as **post-Continental philosophy**) that defines itself loosely in its stance of metaphysical realism against its interpretation of the dominant forms of post-Kantian idealistic philosophy (or what it terms «correlationism» and philosophies of access). While often in disagreement over basic philosophical issues, the speculative realist thinkers have a shared resistance to what they interpret as philosophies of human finitude inspired by the tradition of Immanuel Kant. What unites the four core members of the movement is an attempt to overcome both correlationism and philosophies of access. In *After Finitude*, Quentin Meillassoux defines correlationism as *the idea according to which we only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from the other*. Philosophies of access are any of those philosophies which privilege the human being over other entities. Both ideas represent forms of anthropocentrism.

Speculative realism is notable for its fast expansion via the Internet in the form of blogs.

Meillassoux finds two principles as the locus of Kant's philosophy. The first is the *principle of correlation* itself, which claims essentially that we can only know the correlate of Thought and Being; what lies outside that correlate is unknowable. The second is termed by Meillassoux the *principle of factuality*, which states that things could be otherwise than what they are. This principle is upheld by Kant in his defense of the thing-in-itself as unknowable but imaginable. We can imagine reality as being fundamentally different even if we never know such a reality. According to Meillassoux, the defense of both principles leads to «weak» correlationism (such as those of Kant and Husserl), while the rejection of the thing-in-itself leads to the «strong» correlationism of thinkers such as late Ludwig Wittgenstein and late Martin Heidegger, for whom it makes no sense to suppose that there is anything outside of the correlate of Thought and Being, and so the principle of factuality is eliminated in favor of a strengthened principle of correlation.

Meillassoux follows the opposite tactic in rejecting the principle of correlation for the sake of a bolstered principle of factuality in his post-Kantian return to Hume. He is led to reject the necessity not only of all physical laws of nature, but all logical laws except the Principle of Non-Contradiction (since eliminating this would undermine the Principle of Factiality which claims that things can always be otherwise than what they are). By rejecting the Principle of Sufficient Reason, there can be no justification

for the necessity of physical laws, meaning that while the universe may be ordered in such and such a way, there is no reason it could not be otherwise. Meillassoux rejects the Kantian *a priori* in favour of a Humean *a priori*, claiming that the lesson to be learned from Hume on the subject of causality is that *the same cause may actually bring about «a hundred different events» (and even many more)*.

Object-oriented ontology (OOO for short) puts *things* at the center of this study. Its proponents contend that nothing has special status, but that everything exists equally – plumbers, DVD players, cotton, bonobos, sandstone, and Shrek, for example. In particular, OOO rejects the claims that human experience rests at the center of philosophy, and those things can be understood by how they appear to us. In place of science alone, OOO uses speculation to characterize how objects exist and interact. In contemporary thought, things are usually taken either as the aggregation of ever smaller bits (scientific naturalism) or as constructions of human behavior and society (social relativism). OOO steers a path between the two, drawing attention to things at all scales (from atoms to alpacas, bits to blinis), and pondering their nature and relations with one another as much with ourselves.

OOO defines a theoretical commitment to thinking the real beyond human experience. It seeks to uncover the true existence of things, favoring concepts of stability, essence, solidity and permanence over notions of flux, relationality, process and contingency. OOO's ambition is to engage with objects in their own terms in order to address what lies beyond rationality, cognition, knowledge and human mastery.

The obscurity and autonomy of things isn't compatible with relational and materialist accounts and its fierce rejection of forms of process philosophy and praxeologial accounts. OOO promises to break once and for all with subject-object dualism results in a revived form of subjectivism. The attempt to go back to the object, to start all over again by exploring the inner depth of things, ends up in a superficial attitude that proclaims the return to the object while erasing any account of situatedness or contextuality.

Object-oriented ontology maintains that objects exist independently (as Kantian noumena) of human perception and are not ontologically exhausted by their relations with humans or other objects. The reality of anything outside of the correlation is unknowable. For Graham Harman, Heideggerian *Zuhandenheit*, or readiness-to-hand, refers to the withdrawal of objects from human perception into a reality that cannot be exhausted by either practical usage or theoretical investigation. *If Husserl draws a distinction between the ferry in consciousness and its various shifting profiles, Heidegger considers the ferry as withdrawn from all conscious access. For Husserl the ferry is always available, and simply encrusted with noisy accidents that vary without cease; by contrast, Heidegger's ferry is concealed from any human encounter* (*Circus Philosophicus*).

Harman further contends that objects withdraw not just from human interaction, but also from other objects. *If the human perception of a house or a tree is forever haunted by some hidden surplus in the things that never becomes present, the same is true of the sheer causal interaction between rocks or raindrops. Even inanimate things only unlock each other's realities to a minimal extent, reducing one another to caricatures even if rocks are not sentient creatures, they never encounter one another in their deepest being, but only* as present-at-hand; *it is only Heidegger's confusion of two distinct senses of the as-structure that prevents this strange result from being accepted.*

Preservation of finitude means that unlike other speculative realisms, object-oriented ontology maintains the concept of finitude, whereby relation to an object cannot be translated into direct and complete knowledge of an object. Since all object relations distort their related objects, every relation is said to be an act of translation, with the caveat that no object can perfectly translate another object into its own nomenclature. Object-oriented ontology does not restrict finitude to humanity, however, but extends it to all objects as an inherent limitation of relationality.

Object-oriented ontology holds that objects are independent not only of other objects, but also from the qualities they animate at any specific spatiotemporal location. Accordingly, objects cannot be exhausted by their relations with humans or other objects in theory or practice, meaning that the reality of objects is always present-at-hand. The retention by an object of a reality in excess of any relation is known as *withdrawal*. This holds true for all entities, be they human, non-human, natural, or artificial, leading to the downplayment of *dasein* as an ontological priority. In its place, Harman proposes a concept of substances that are irreducible to both material particles and human perception, and *exceed every relation into which they might enter*.

Coupling Heidegger's tool-analysis with the phenomenological insights of Edmund Husserl, Harman introduces two types of objects: *real objects* and *sensual objects*. Real objects are objects that withdraw from all experience, whereas sensual objects are those that exist only in experience. Additionally, Harman suggests two kinds of qualities: *sensual qualities*, or those found in experience, and *real qualities*, which are accessed through intellectual probing. Pairing sensual and real objects and qualities yields the following framework:

1. **Sensual Object/Sensual Qualities**: Sensual objects are present, but enmeshed within a *mist of accidental features and profiles*.

2. **Sensual Object/Real Qualities**: The structure of conscious phenomena is forged from eidetic, or experientially interprete, qualities intuited intellectually.

3. **Real Object/Sensual Qualities**: As in the tool-analysis, a withdrawn object is translated into sensual apprehension via a «surface» accessed by thought and/or action.

4. **Real Object/Real Qualities**: This pairing grounds the capacity of real objects to differ from one another, without collapsing into indefinite substrata.

Vicarious causation means, that two hypothetical entities meet in the interior of a third entity, existing side-by-side until something occurs to prompt interaction. Harman compares this idea to the classical notion of formal causation, in which forms do not directly touch, but influence one another in a common space *from which all are partly absent*. Causation is always vicarious, asymmetrical, and buffered. *«Vicarious» means that objects confront one another only by proxy, through sensual profiles found only on the interior of some other entity. «Asymmetrical» means that the initial confrontation always unfolds between a real object and a sensual one. And «buffered» means that [real objects] do not fuse into [sensual objects], nor [sensual objects] into their sensual neighbors, since all are held at bay through unknown firewalls sustaining the privacy of each from the asymmetrical and buffered inner life of an object, vicarious connections arise occasionally giving birth to new objects with their own interior spaces.*

Thus, causation entails the connection between a real object residing within the directionality of consciousness, or a unified «intention» with another real object residing outside of the intention, where the intention itself is also classified as a real object. From here, Harman extrapolates five types of relations between objects. *Containment* describes a relation in which the intention «contains» both the real object and sensual object. *Contiguity* connotes relations between sensual objects lying side-by-side within an intention, not affecting one another, such that a sensual object's bystanders can be rearranged without disrupting the object's identity. *Sincerity* characterizes the absorption of a real object by a sensual object, in a manner that «takes seriously» the sensual object without containing or being contiguous to it. *Connection* conveys the vicarious generation of intention by real objects indirectly encountering one another. Finally, *no relation* represents the typical condition of reality, since real objects are incapable of direct interaction and are limited in their causal influence upon and relation to other objects.

Rejection of anthropocentrism limits attributes such as mind, autonomy, moral agency, reason, and the like to humans, while contrasting all other beings as variations of object, or things obeying deterministic laws, impulses, stimuli, instincts, and so on. Non-human object relations distort their related objects in the same fundamental manner as human consciousness. Because object-oriented ontology is the realist philosophy, it stands in contradistinction to the anti-realist trajectory of correlationism, which restricts philosophical understanding to the correlation of being with thought by disavowing any reality external to this correlation as inaccessible, and, in this way, fails to escape the ontological reification of human experience.

The central tenet of Graham Harman and Levi Bryant's OOO is that objects have been neglected in philosophy in favor of a radical philosophy that tries to undermine objects by saying that objects are the crusts to a deeper underlying reality, either in the form of monism or a perpetual flux, or those that try to overmine objects by saying that the idea of a whole object is a form of folk ontology. According to Harman, everything is an object, all things, whether physical or fictional, are equally objects. Sympathetic to panpsychism, he proposes a new philosophical discipline called speculative psychology dedicated to investigating the cosmic layers of psyche and ferreting out the specific psychic reality of earthworms, dust, armies, chalk, and stone.

First, one can undermine objects by claiming that they are an effect or manifestation of a deeper, underlying substance or force. Second, one can overmine objects by either an idealism which holds that there is nothing beneath what appears in the mind or, as in social constructionism, by positing no independent reality outside of language, discourse or power. The new concept of duomining, which comes from computing science, and reshaped for the Harman's purpose. Though the concept of duomining refers to a blend of data mining and texts (as call logs), Harman means that both undermining and overmining, when both attitudes are kept together, lead to duomining, which is the case with Quentin Meillassoux who *takes a classic duomining position, since he holds that the primary qualites of things are those which can be mathematized* and *denies that he is a Pythagorean, insisting that numbers do not exhaust the world but simply point to sort of «dead matter» whose exact metaphysical status is never clarified*.

Harman defends a version of the Aristotelian notion of substance. And unlike Leibniz, for whom there were both substances and aggregates, Harman maintains that when objects combine, they create new objects. In this way, he defends an a priori metaphysics that claims that reality is made up only of objects and that there is no bottom to the series of objects. An object is in itself an infinite recess, unknowable and inaccessible by any other thing. This leads to his account of what he terms vicarious causality. Inspired by the occasionalists of medieval Islamic philosophy, Harman maintains that no two objects can ever interact save through the mediation of a sensual vicar. The real objects are the things of everyday life, while the sensual objects are the caricatures that mediate interaction. For example, when fire burns cotton, the fire does not touch the essence of that cotton which is inexhaustible by any relation, but that the interaction is mediated by a caricature of the cotton which causes it to burn.

Iain Hamilton Grant defends a position he calls **transcendental materialism**. He argues against what he terms somatism, the philosophy and physics of bodies. Aristotle distinguished between Form and Matter in such a way that Matter was invisible to philosophy, whereas Grant argues for a return to the Platonic Matter as not only the basic building blocks of reality, but the forces and powers that govern our reality. He traces this same argument to the post-Kantian German Idealists Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, claiming that the distinction between Matter as substantive versus useful fiction persists to this day and that we should end our attempts to overturn Plato and instead attempt to overturn Kant and return to speculative physics in the Platonic tradition, that is, not a physics of bodies, but a physics of the All.

Eugene Thacker has examined how the concept of life itself is both determined within regional philosophy and also how life itself comes to acquire metaphysical properties. Ontology of life operates by way of a split between Life and the living, making possible a metaphysical displacement in which life is thought via another metaphysical term, such as time, form, or spirit. *Every ontology of life thinks of life in terms of something-other-than-life, that something-other-than-life is most often a metaphysical concept, such as time and temporality, form and causality, or spirit and immanence*. Thacker traces this theme from Aristotle, to Scholasticism and mysticism/negative theology, to Spinoza and Kant, showing how this three-fold displacement is also alive in philosophy today (life as time in process philosophy and Deleuzianism, life as form in biopolitical thought, life as spirit in post-secular philosophies of religion). Thacker examines the relation of speculative realism to the ontology of life, arguing for a vitalist correlation. *Let us say that a vitalist correlation is one that fails to conserve the correlationist dual necessity of the separation and inseparability of thought and object, self and world, and which does so based on some ontologized notion of «life»*. Ultimately Thacker argues for a skepticism regarding life. *Life is not only a problem of philosophy, but a problem* for *philosophy*.

Ray Brassier **transcendental nihilism** maintains that philosophy has avoided the traumatic idea of extinction, instead attempting to find meaning in a world conditioned by the very idea of its own annihilation. Thus, Brassier critiques both the phenomenological and hermeneutic strands of continental philosophy as well as the vitality of thinkers like Gilles Deleuze, who work to ingrain meaning in the world and stave off the threat of nihilism. Instead, drawing on thinkers such as Alain Badiou, François Laruelle, Paul Churchland and Thomas Metzinger, Brassier defends a view of the world as inherently devoid of meaning. That is, rather than avoiding nihilism, Brassier embraces it as the truth of reality. Brassier concludes, that the universe is founded on the nothing, but also that philosophy is the organon of extinction, that it is only because life is conditioned by its own extinction that there is thought at all. Brassier then

defends a radically anti-correlationist philosophy proposing that Thought is conjoined not with Being, but with Non-Being.

Levi R. Bryant **onticology** also opposes post-Kantian anthropocentrism and philosophies of access. The Kantian contention that reality is accessible to human knowledge because it is structured by human cognition limits philosophy to a self-reflexive analysis of the mechanisms and institutions through which cognition structures reality. *For, in effect, the Copernican Revolution will reduce philosophical investigation to the interrogation of a* single *relation: the human-world gap. And indeed, in the reduction of philosophy to the interrogation of this single relation or gap, not only will there be excessive focus on how humans relate to the world to the detriment of anything else, but this interrogation will be profoundly* asymmetrical. *For the world or the object related to through the agency of the human will becomes a mere prop or vehicle for human cognition, language, and intentions* without contributing anything of its own.

To counter the form of post-Kantian epistemology, Bryant articulates principles of onticology. First, the *Ontic Principle* states that *there is no difference that does not make a difference*. Following from the premises that questions of difference precede epistemological interrogation and that to be is to create differences, this principle posits that knowledge cannot be fixed prior to engagement with difference. The thesis that there is a thing-in-itself which we cannot know is untenable because it presupposes forms of being that make no differences. Similarly, concepts of difference predicated upon negation – that which objects are not or lack when placed in comparison with one another – are dismissed as arising only from the perspective of consciousness, rather than an ontological difference that affirms independent being. Second, the *Principle of the Inhuman* asserts that the concept of difference producing difference is not restricted to human, sociocultural, or epistemological domains, thereby marking the being of difference as independent of knowledge and consciousness. Humans exist as difference-making beings among other difference-making beings, therefore, without holding any special position with respect to other differences. Third, the *Ontological Principle* maintains that if there is no difference that does not also make a difference, then the making of difference is the minimal condition for the existence of being. In Bryant's words, *if a difference is made, then the being is*. Bryant further contends that differences produced by an object can be *inter-ontic* (made with respect to another object) or *intra-ontic* (pertaining the internal constitution of the object).

Onticology distinguishes between four different types of objects. *Bright objects* are objects that strongly manifest themselves and heavily impact other objects, such as the ubiquity of cell phones in high-tech cultures. *Dim objects* lightly manifest themselves in an assemblage of objects; for example, a neutrino passing through solid matter without producing observable effects. *Dark objects* are objects that are so completely withdrawn that they produce no local manifestations and do not affect any other objects. *Rogue objects* are not chained to any given assemblage of objects, but instead wander in and out of assemblages, modifying relations within the assemblages into which they enter. Political protestors exemplify rogue objects by challenge, change, or cast off the prior assemblage. Wilderness ontology explains the philosophical pluralization of agency away from human privilege.

In *The Ecological Thought*, Morton introduced the concept of *hyperobjects* to describe objects that are so massively distributed in time and space as to transcend spatiotemporal specificity, such as global warming, styrofoam, and radioactive plutonium. He has subsequently enumerated five characteristics of hyperobjects:

1. **Viscous:** Hyperobjects adhere to any other object they touch, no matter how hard an object tries to resist. In this way, hyperobjects overrule ironic distance, meaning that the more an object tries to resist a hyperobject, the more glued to the hyperobject it becomes.

2. **Molten:** Hyperobjects are so massive that they refute the idea that spacetime is fixed, concrete, and consistent.

3. **Nonlocal:** Hyperobjects are massively distributed in time and space to the extent that their totality cannot be realized in any particular local manifestation. For example, global warming is a hyperobject that impacts meteorological conditions, such as tornado formation. Objects don't feel global warming, but instead experience tornadoes as they cause damage in specific places. Thus, nonlocality describes the manner in which a hyperobject becomes more substantial than the local manifestations they produce.

4. **Phased:** Hyperobjects occupy a higher dimensional space than other entities can normally perceive. Thus, hyperobjects appear to come and go in three-dimensional space, but would appear differently to an observer with a higher multidimensional view.

5. **Interobjective:** Hyperobjects are formed by relations between more than one object. Consequently, objects are only able to perceive the imprint, or «footprint» of a hyperobject upon other objects, revealed as information. For example, global warming is formed by interactions between the Sun, fossil fuels, and carbon dioxide, among other objects. Yet, global warming is made apparent through emissions levels, temperature changes, and ocean levels, making it seem as if global warming is a product of scientific models, rather than an object that predated its own measurement.

Hyperobjects not only become visible during an age of ecological crisis, but alert humans to the ecological dilemmas defining the age in which they live. Additionally, the existential capacity of hyperobjects to outlast a turn toward less materialistic cultural values, coupled with the threat many such objects pose toward organic matter, gives them a potential spiritual quality, in which their treatment by future societies may become indistinguishable from reverential care.

Alien phenomenology by Ian Bogost, a video game researcher, has articulated an applied object-oriented ontology, concerned more with the being of specific objects than the exploration of foundational principles. Bogost calls his approach *alien phenomenology*, with the term alien designating the manner in which withdrawal accounts for the inviolability of objectal experience. From this perspective, an object may not recognize the experience of other objects because objects relate to one another using metaphors of selfhood.

Alien phenomenology is grounded in three modes of practice. First, *ontography* entails the production of works that reveal the existence and relation of objects. Second, *metaphorism* denotes the production of works that speculate about the inner lives of objects, including how objects translate the experience of other objects into their own terms. Third, *carpentry* indicates the creation of artifacts that illustrate the perspective of objects, or how objects construct their own worlds. Bogost sometimes refers to his version of object-oriented thought as a *tiny ontology* to emphasize his rejection of rigid ontological categorization of forms of being, including distinctions between real and fictional objects.

David Berry and Alexander Galloway have commented on the historical situatedness of an ontology that mirrors computational processes and even the metaphors and language of computation. Pancomputationalism and digital philosophy explore these ideas further. Joshua Simon contextualized the rise of popularity of the theory in contemporary art circles as a variation on commodity fetishism – a return to the primacy of the object, in a post-2008 art market.

Steven Shaviro has criticized object-oriented ontology as too dismissive of process philosophy. According to Shaviro, the process philosophies of Alfred North Whitehead, Gilbert Simondon, and Gilles Deleuze account for how objects come into existence and endure over time, in contrast to the view that objects are already there taken by object-oriented approaches. Shaviro also finds fault with Harman's assertion that Whitehead, Simondon, and Iain Hamilton Grant undermine objects by positing objects as manifestations of a deeper, underlying substance, saying that the antecedence of these thinkers, particularly Grant and Simondon, includes the plurality of actually existing objects, rather than a single substance of which objects are mere epiphenomena.

Jane Bennett's book *Vibrant Matter*, which argues for a shift from human relations to things, to a vibrant matter that cuts across the living and non-living, human bodies and non-human bodies. Leon Niemoczynski invokes what he calls speculative naturalism so as to argue that nature can afford lines of insight into its own infinitely productive vibrant ground, which he identifies as *natura naturans*.